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Elspeth Amabel Wilson 
Summary 
In learning language, children have to acquire not only words and 
constructions, but also the ability to make inferences about a speaker’s intended 
meaning. For instance, if in answer to the question, ‘what did you put in the bag?’, the 
speaker says, ‘I put in a book’, then the hearer infers that the speaker put in only a 
book, by assuming that the speaker is informative. On a Gricean approach to 
pragmatics, this implicated meaning – a quantity implicature – involves reasoning 
about the speaker’s epistemic state. This thesis examines children’s development of 
implicature understanding. It seeks to address the question of what the relationship is 
in development between quantity, relevance and manner implicatures; whether word 
learning by exclusion is a pragmatic forerunner to implicature, or based on a lexical 
heuristic; and whether reasoning about the speaker’s epistemic state is part of 
children’s pragmatic competence. 
This thesis contributes to research in experimental and developmental 
pragmatics by broadening the focus of investigation to include different types of 
implicatures, the relationship between them, and the contribution of other aspects of 
children’s development, including structural language knowledge. It makes the novel 
comparison of word learning by exclusion with a clearly pragmatic skill – implicatures 
– and opens an investigation of manner implicatures in development. It also presents 
new findings suggesting that children’s early competence with quantity implicatures 
in simple communicative situations belies their ongoing development in more 
complex ones, particularly where the speaker’s epistemic state is at stake.  
I present a series of experiments based on a sentence-to-picture-matching task, 
with children aged 3 to 7 years. In the first study, I identify a developmental trajectory 
whereby word learning by exclusion inferences emerge first, followed by ad hoc 
quantity and relevance, and finally scalar quantity inferences, which reflects their 
increasing complexity in a Gricean model. Then, I explore cognitive and 
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environmental factors that might be associated with children’s pragmatic skills, and 
show that structural language knowledge – and, associated with it, socioeconomic 
status – is a main predictor of their implicature understanding. In the second study, I 
lay out some predictions for the development of manner implicatures, find similar 
patterns of understanding in children and adults, and highlight the particular 
challenges of studying manner implicatures experimentally. Finally, I focus on 
children’s ability to take into account the speaker’s epistemic state in pragmatic 
inferencing. While adults do not derive a quantity implicature appropriately when the 
speaker is ignorant, children tend to persist in deriving implicatures regardless of 
speaker ignorance, suggesting a continuing challenge of integrating contextual with 
linguistic information in utterance interpretation.  
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1 The acquisition of implicatures 
I go to vote, mummy! 
And how did you vote? 
Fold paper, and put it in box!  
(Hannah, 2 years, personal communication) 
Anyone observing a child learning to communicate is at once amazed at their 
progress, amused at their distinctive use of language, and, perhaps, puzzled at how 
these young conversationalists can pick up so much, so quickly, and yet sometimes 
still entirely miss the point. This thesis is about how children develop language, and, 
in particular, how they learn to understand others in discourse, by making inferences 
about meaning. In other words, it is about children’s pragmatic development, and 
especially their implicature understanding.  
When we humans communicate, we typically mean far more than we literally 
say. Indeed, we often talk about ‘reading between the lines’ or ‘filling in the gaps’. But 
this conscious awareness belies the complex inferences that we make all the time as 
hearers in what, on the surface, seem like trivial cases. Take the following examples – 
adapted from Experiment 1:  
a) Bob came out of the kitchen. His mum asked, ‘What did you take 
from the fridge?’ He replied, ‘I took a strawberry.’ 
b) Bob made a crash in the kitchen. His mum asked, ‘What did you do 
with the pile of plates?’ He said, ‘I broke some of the plates.’  
c) It was breakfast time. Bob’s mum asked, ‘What do you want for 
breakfast?’ He said, ‘I’ll get the milk.’  
[with choice of toast or cereal on the table] 
How might Bob’s mum understand his reply in each of these cases? Perhaps 
something like this:  
a) I took only a strawberry (and nothing else)  
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b) I broke only some of the plates (but not all of them)  
c) I want cereal (not toast)  
On closer inspection, these everyday examples turn out to be not so simple. To 
understand that the speaker means that he took only a strawberry, the hearer must 
have some kind of expectation that the speaker will give a full answer to the question – 
that he will be maximally informative. And not only that, but the hearer also expects 
that the speaker himself has the same expectation, that he will be informative, and 
that his hearer expects him to be so. And so the hearer can infer that if he had taken 
anything else, he would have said so. Or take the breakfast exchange: to understand 
that the speaker means that he wants cereal, the hearer must be assuming that the 
speaker will answer the question, that he will be relevant. And, again, that the speaker 
himself also expects to make a relevant contribution, and expects his hearer to expect 
him to do so. That is, the interlocutors must have some expectations about how 
communication works, and expect each other to share these assumptions. It seems 
communication is not just a matter of encoding and decoding without reference to 
context, but reasoning about others’ beliefs and intentions in each instance of 
language use.  
 At least, this has been one dominant view of communication, following and 
developing the proposals of Grice, in many ways the father of contemporary 
pragmatics (Grice, 1975). If this model is along the right lines, and such quotidian 
conversations involve complex inferencing, this raises a number of questions: Is this 
what children are doing when they communicate, or not? How do they acquire this 
skill? What difference to acquisition does the type of implicature make? 
1.1 Grice and some founding principles 
First, let’s take a step back. In this introductory chapter, I outline the theoretical 
pragmatic foundations of this research, and introduce key concepts: the assumptions 
made by Grice and the field of experimental pragmatics; the Gricean distinction of 
types of implicature; the nature of inferences; and the role of the Question Under 
Discussion. I then turn to the approach to language acquisition within which this 
thesis sits. Finally, I preview the coming chapters, and the questions about children’s 
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pragmatic development that each seeks to address.  
1.1.1 Basic assumptions and experimental pragmatics 
This thesis is located within the new and growing programme of research in 
experimental pragmatics (Schwarz, in press), that was catalysed, at least in part, by a 
study on this very topic – the acquisition of implicatures (Noveck, 2001). It is also 
firmly Gricean in its approach to language (Grice, 1989). Throughout the thesis, as I 
consider the theoretical background or implications for each experiment, I tend to 
start with Grice, but also draw significantly on those that have followed him, and in 
particular those within experimental and probabilistic pragmatics that have clarified 
or tightened up its model, with a constraint-based approach (e.g. Degen & Tanenhaus, 
2014; Franke & Jäger, 2016; Geurts & Rubio-Fernández, 2015). 
A first very basic assumption of experimental pragmatics as a field – and the 
major contribution of Grice himself – is that linguistic meaning has different 
components: on the one hand, the literal content and, on the other, the pragmatic 
content. Where the line should be drawn – and, indeed, how many lines – may have 
varied (e.g. Bach, 2007; Levinson, 2000; D. Wilson & Sperber, 2012), but the 
distinction is widely acknowledged. And it has immediate consequences for children’s 
language development, because the challenge for the infant-communicator is to learn 
to understand both meaning that is cross-situationally stable – semantics – and that 
which is contextually dependent – pragmatics. The hearer’s job is to infer the speaker’s 
communicative intention – through pragmatic reasoning.1  
Context is clearly a key concept in pragmatics, though often left undefined. Here 
I do not subscribe to a particular theory of context, but take a broad view that it may 
include any features of the immediate situation, the preceding discourse, speaker 
characteristics and shared knowledge. Importantly for empirical studies, this means 
that there are two aspects of context in any experiment, as Meibauer (2012) points 
out: ‘first, the context of the experimental setting, second the context evoked by test 
materials’ (2012: 23). Context is often assumed to be coextensive with common 
                                                 
1 Note, though, that making this distinction does not commit oneself to a two-step processing 
model (first semantic, then pragmatic content), which is a different level of analysis, as shall 
be seen shortly. 
4 
 
ground (H. H. Clark, 1996) – the mutual knowledge that can be presupposed by the 
speaker and hearer – as opposed to privileged ground – knowledge available only to 
the speaker or the hearer.  
A second basic assumption is that whatever the guiding principles or reasons in a 
model of communication, they describe or explain communication in general, not 
particular phenomena. Grice was clear that his principles were based on rational and 
co-operative human behaviour (Grice, 1989), a claim that has been clearly embraced 
by probabilistic or computational approaches to pragmatics, which have thus pursued 
its application to a wide range of pragmatic phenomena, including reference (Franke & 
Degen, 2016), negation (Nordmeyer & Frank, 2014) and gradable adjectives (Qing & 
Franke, 2014). This, too, has implications for acquisition, leading us to expect some 
element of commonality in children’s pragmatic development, broadly construed. This 
thesis, however, is about implicatures, and I will shortly turn to the distinct categories 
of implicature proposed by Grice. 
It is important to mention at the outset what kind of model the Gricean approach 
to pragmatics provides – especially as this has been the cause of some worry in recent 
years. Building on Marr’s (1982) three levels of analysis – computational, algorithmic, 
and implementational – Franke and Jaeger (2016) helpfully distinguish four different – 
though not necessarily exhaustive – levels of analysis for pragmatic theory, all at the 
computational level. Firstly, addressing the question ‘what?’, there are constraints, and 
there are principles (e.g. Hurford’s constraint): these are both primarily descriptive, 
such that the data they are aimed at accounting for is entailed by the abstract 
structure or element proposed. Secondly, there is the level of maxims, like Grice’s own, 
that are on the cusp of ‘what?’ and ‘why?’ – part description, part explanation. Thirdly, 
reasons – such as speaker rationality – focus only on the ‘why?’. Crucially, these are all 
distinct from – though potentially related to – processes, the ‘how?’ of the ‘what?’ and 
the ‘why?’. Some have criticised Grice on the basis of being ‘psychologically 
implausible’, but these typically stem from an expectation that it is about processes: 
for example, suggesting that recursive mindreading is too costly (e.g. D. Wilson, 
2000), or that ‘semantic’ interpretations should be universally less costly (i.e., shorter 
time course) than ‘pragmatic’ ones, which they are not (e.g. Scott-Phillips, 2014). In 
other words, they confuse description and reasons at the computational level, with 
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processes, at a more algorithmic one, or at least overlook the importance of the 
former, as Geurts and Rubio-Fernandez (2015) argue.  
Like Grice’s theory, this thesis hovers between asking ‘what?’ and asking ‘why?’. I 
am interested in what children do, and why they do it, in terms of rational, co-
operative communication and Gricean maxims. I largely try to stay clear of leaping to 
what this might mean for cognitive processing – although this can be challenging 
when talking about development in particular, because general cognitive development 
of course has ramifications for interpretation of behaviour (for instance, arguments 
such as ‘children lack inhibitory control to suppress contextual alternatives’). This 
might seem particularly to be the case in discussions about the relationship between 
Theory of Mind and pragmatic reasoning. It, too, is a theory, though, articulated in 
terms of description of behaviour, heuristics and reasons, just like Gricean pragmatics: 
people have emotions, desires and beliefs, expect others to have them too, and reason 
about those mental states, which lays the foundation for our communication.2 
However, making predictions from Grice’s maxims for children’s behaviour does 
require certain linking hypotheses and assumptions. A key notion in studying 
children’s development is what is challenging for them – what they can do at a 
younger or older age, or in more or less supportive contexts – and this can be married 
with the complexity found in the model, in this case, of the derivation of different 
implicatures. One linking hypothesis could be that more complex inferencing 
translates to more complex processing, which translates to being more challenging to 
acquire. Until more is known about processing of implicatures in comprehension (and 
not just scalar ones), this is quite an uncertain step. An attractive alternative, albeit a 
simplistic one, is that more complex inferencing – involving more components – 
translates into more skills to acquire, and therefore possible later development. This is 
my working assumption – and it is an assumption – that provides some traction on 
formulating expectations for children’s pragmatic development from theory.3    
                                                 
2 Just as for pragmatics, this is not to say that Theory of Mind cannot be modelled in terms of 
processes, just that it is not always and does not have to be, and this is the level I operate at 
here. Some approaches to Theory of Mind, like Apperly’s (2011) ‘two-systems’ approach clearly 
do try to bridge from reasons to processes. 
3 Obviously, one can easily imagine where 10 simple components would be easier than one 
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1.1.2 Distinct principles and implicatures 
As I have already mentioned, Grice’s model of communication is grounded on 
human rationality, and it is captured by an overarching heuristic that describes 
communicative behaviour: The Co-operative Principle. It states: ‘Make your 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted 
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged’ (Grice, 1989: 26). 
In other words, say the right thing, at the right time, in the right way. And what is 
‘right’ in communication? In addition to the foundational maxim of quality – be 
truthful – three further maxims flesh this out. To paraphrase: the maxim of quantity – 
be informative, but not overly so; the maxim of relevance – be relevant; and the maxim 
of manner – be clear and conventional. When speakers appear to not follow these 
maxims in the literal content of their utterance, hearers can infer their intended 
meaning, the implicature, on the assumption that they are in fact doing so. The 
maxims capture expectations of both speakers and hearers, but as I am particularly 
interested in pragmatic inferencing in comprehension, here I will concentrate more on 
the hearers’ perspective.  
Taking the examples from above, with one new case, it can be seen how this 
might work; each utterance is followed by the implicature, and an indication of the 
reason for its derivation. 
a) Bob came out of the kitchen. His mum asked, ‘What did you take 
from the fridge?’ He replied, ‘I took a strawberry.’ 
⇸ I took only a strawberry (and nothing else)  
Otherwise, the speaker would have said so, to be optimally informative: 
Quantity (ad hoc) 
b) Bob made a crash in the kitchen. His mum asked, ‘What did you do 
with the pile of plates?’ He said, ‘I broke some of the plates.’  
⇸ I broke only some of the plates (but not all of them)  
Otherwise, the speaker would have said so, to be optimally informative: 
Quantity (scalar) 
                                                 
complex one, so this working assumption rests on more assumptions, like any other. 
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c) It was breakfast time. Bob’s mum asked, ‘What do you want for 
breakfast?’ He said, ‘I’ll get the milk.’  
 ⇸ I want cereal (not toast)  
Given that the available options are toast or cereal, and that people 
typically have milk with cereal, this is a relevant answer to the question: 
Relevance 
d) The man made the door close.  
⇸ in an unusual way  
Otherwise, he would have used the briefer expression ‘closed the door’: 
Manner 
In this thesis, I adopt Grice’s original formulation, and work on the basis of three 
distinct types of implicature: quantity, relevance and manner. Though neo- and post-
Gricean theorists have streamlined his maxims, only Relevance Theory has reduced 
them to a single principle (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; D. Wilson & Sperber, 2012). 
Others have maintained a distinction between informativeness and relevance (Horn, 
2004), and I will argue in Chapter 4 that there are good reasons to keep manner 
distinct, too (cf. Levinson, 2000). The distinction between quantity and relevance has 
also been adopted as uncontroversial in the experimental and developmental 
literature (e.g. Noveck, 2001; Schulze, Grassmann, & Tomasello, 2013; Stiller, 
Goodman, & Frank, 2015).  
I also gravitate towards a constraint-based version of the Gricean approach, 
which supposes that a whole number of considerations will contribute to any 
inference, and that these may be more or less important in different contexts (Degen 
& Tanenhaus, 2014). In other words, cues to the speaker’s intended meaning are given 
more or less weight, and this will determine the inference. This account supplements 
Grice’s maxims at the levels of ‘what’ and ‘why’: ‘Under the Constraint-Based account, 
then, the research program becomes one of identifying the cues that listeners use in 
service of the broader goal of understanding the representations and processes that 
underlie generation of implied meanings’ (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2014: 672).  
Besides these context-driven accounts, there are other approaches to quantity 
implicatures in particular. Grammatical approaches to scalar – and, more recently, ad 
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hoc – implicatures involve a covert exhaustifier operator, akin to ‘only’, and 
alternatives that are provided by the grammar (Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, Gualmini, & 
Meroni, 2001; Chierchia, Fox, & Spector, 2008). On this view, inserting such an 
operator or not is a process of disambiguation, in parsing a sentence. Chemla and 
Singh (2014a, 2014b) point out, though, that the grammatical approach is not only a 
matter of grammar, just as the context-driven approach is not just a matter of 
pragmatics; both involve both grammar and pragmatics, but distribute the work 
differently. This also makes testing the different approaches empirically more 
challenging. In this thesis, I occasionally refer to this alternative view, but largely work 
within a context-driven, Gricean approach to implicatures. 
1.1.3 Inferences and alternatives 
A neo-Gricean model says something not just about motivations for deriving 
implicatures, but about the nature of the derivation itself. Two characteristics are key: 
the role of elaborative inference and of alternatives.  
A typical relevance inference, such as that triggered by ‘I’ll get the milk’, in 
example (c) above, could be described in the following steps:  
[in the context of choosing breakfast, with toast or cereal as options] 
1. The speaker said, ‘I’ll get the milk’. 
2. This utterance does not directly address the question.  
3. It can be assumed that the speaker intends his utterance to be 
relevant. 
4. His utterance is relevant to the above exchange to the extent that 
its content relates to the question. 
5. The content of his utterance is related to the content of the 
question by virtue of the fact that the milk he mentions is useful and 
typically necessary for one of the breakfast options, namely cereal.  
6. He means that he would like cereal for breakfast.  
(based on Cummings, 2005: 102) 
Note, firstly, the kind of reasoning that this is – non-deductive reasoning (Geurts, 
2010), where the conclusion is compatible with the evidence so far, but further 
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evidence may cancel it. Specifically, following Cummings (2005), it has elements of 
presumptive and elaborative reasoning. Presumptive reasoning depends on arguments 
from ignorance: the hearer assumes that the speaker is being informative (step 3) and 
is fully informed (step 6), reasonably based on lack of evidence to the contrary. 
Implicatures can thus be cancellable, should evidence to the contrary appear. 
Elaborative inferences a) form a cohesive link b) through world knowledge, c) based 
on what is typically the case. Here, elaborative reasoning is evident in step (5) where, 
by a cohesive link, the hearer uses world knowledge to establish the relevance of the 
speaker’s utterance. 
Cummings argues that it seems clear ‘that some form of elaborative inferencing is 
integral to the recovery of implicatures’ (2005: 104), by facilitating the use of 
communicative knowledge (e.g. of the Co-operative Principle) and world knowledge in 
utterance interpretation. It seems that they are not just limited to relevance 
inferences. Take this description of a scalar implicature, for the example ‘I broke some 
of the plates’ (cf. Breheny, Ferguson, & Katsos, 2013): 
1. The speaker said ‘some’. 
2. In this situation, propositions with some or the stronger and 
relevant alternative all could be true. 
3. Assuming that the speaker is being informative (and is expecting 
me to expect so) … 
4. If he had meant all, he would have said ‘all’ (otherwise he would not 
be informative). 
5. He did not say ‘all’, therefore he does not know whether he broke 
all of the plates. 
6. Assuming the speaker does know whether he broke all the plates…   
7. He means that he broke some but not all of the plates4. 
8. And intends me to reason in this way. 
                                                 
4 The assumption in (6) contradicts the conclusion in (5), and therefore by contradiction the 
assumption in (4), namely, that is the hearer now knows that the speaker did not mean all; 
therefore, the hearer can conclude (7).  
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Here the elaborative inference is seen in step (2), where the alternative is 
brought in to the inference, which a) forms a cohesive link between what is said and 
the discourse or situation context (as shall be seen more clearly below for the 
Question Under Discussion), b) is accessed as part of linguistic knowledge, and c) is a 
stronger utterance by linguistic convention. I take it, therefore, that across types of 
implicature, some kind of elaborative inference, related to the relevance of the 
utterance, is involved, and is part of the acquisitional challenge for children (see, too, 
for discussion, Skordos, 2014).  
Note, secondly, that an important step in the chain of reasoning for a quantity 
implicature – and, as shall be seen in Chapter 5, for manner as well – is thinking about 
alternatives that the speaker could have said but did not. In this case, the alternative is 
‘I broke all the plates’ (step 2); for the example, ‘I took a strawberry’, alternatives could 
be the contextually available ‘strawberry and orange, strawberry and orange and kiwi’, 
and so on. In both cases, the alternatives are not anything imaginable, but are relevant 
to the discourse and its context.  
1.1.4 The Question Under Discussion 
But what do I mean when I say that alternatives are relevant? Geurts (2010: 47) 
suggested that ‘the differences between φ and ψ [what is said and its alternative] may 
be (i) relevant to the purposes of the discourse, (ii) of potential interest to the hearer, 
or (iii) of general interest’, being somewhat reluctant to commit to a more precise 
definition. Cummings (2005), though, clearly concentrates on the first option of the 
discourse, and I follow suit here, in line with other work that increasingly recognises 
the importance of the Question Under Discussion (Roberts, 2012; Van Kuppevelt, 
1996). This notion can be traced back to Grice (1975) and has more recently been 
employed by pragmaticians with an experimental approach (for an overview see Benz 
& Jasinskaja, 2017; Cummins, 2017); here I adopt the general notion, without 
committing to a specific theoretical or processing instantiation. 
The Question Under Discussion (QUD) does not have to be an explicit question, 
as in the examples considered so far; it is the topic of discussion, or the subgoal for 
that discourse that the interlocutors have mutually agreed on to pursue. Relevance can 
thus be formalised as the degree to which the utterance addresses the QUD. For a 
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relevance implicature, the elaborative inference derives a speaker meaning that does 
address the QUD, unlike the literal content. For quantity, the available alternatives – 
and whether an implicature is derived at all – are constrained by the QUD, by whether 
they address it more directly than what is literally said. QUDs ‘activate alternative sets, 
and indicate what kind of information is contextually useful’ (Benz & Jasinskaja, 2017: 
182). Empirical evidence has been amassed showing that potential quantity 
implicatures are not derived if they are not relevant, that is, if they do not address the 
QUD more fully than the literal content (Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006; Politzer-
Ahles & Fiorentino, 2013; A. J. Zondervan, 2010; A. Zondervan, Meroni, & Gualmini, 
2008). To illustrate, consider now the ad hoc quantity example in different contexts, 
with different explicitly stated QUDs, (a–c):  
 a. ‘What did you take from the fridge?’  
 b. ‘Did you get fruit from the fridge?’  
 c. ‘Anyone with some fruit can also have a chocolate bar.’  
 ‘I took a strawberry.’  
In cases (b) and (c) the QUD is addressed by the literal content (I took at least a 
strawberry), so no exhaustive inference (I took only a strawberry) need be drawn.  
This theoretical diversion has consequences for looking at acquisition: on this 
approach to implicatures, relevance is crucial not just for relevance implicatures, but 
for quantity as well. Computational models like this ‘represent the task faced by the 
child rather than as the child solves them’ (Frank, 2014: 211). Hence, the model, in 
which relevance is an integral part of implicature derivation, is a description of the 
competence the child is learning. Indeed, as I shall discuss in the following chapter, 
tracking the QUD and generating relevant alternatives seem to be two factors that 
play an important role in the course of children’s development of implicatures.  
1.2 Approach to language acquisition 
This thesis has a narrow focus on implicatures in development, but it is situated 
in the wider framework of a usage-based approach to language acquisition (Scott-
Phillips, 2014; Tomasello, 2003). According to this view, children’s primary goal is not 
to learn abstract linguistic knowledge per se but to communicate with others, and 
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their innate tendency to prosociality is a key contributor (Ambridge & Lieven, 2011).  
On one such account, Tomasello (2003) identifies three skills that open up the 
way to communication, emerging from 9–12 months onwards: joint attention, 
intention reading, and cultural learning or role-reversal imitation (see too Stephens & 
Matthews, 2014). Firstly, in learning to participate in a joint attentional frame, 
children move from dyadic to triadic interaction, engaging with another person and an 
object or event by being aware that both they and their interlocutor are attending to 
the same thing, and know this. This is supported with gaze-tracking. Secondly, 
children learn to understand that others have intentions, and, in particular, 
communicative intentions. For instance, from 9 months, infants react differently 
depending on whether someone is unwilling or is unable to perform an action (e.g. 
Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005), and later children grasp communicative 
intention, recognising that in communicating a speaker wishes to direct the hearer’s 
attention or change their beliefs (e.g. Grosse, Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010). 
Thirdly, in role-reversal imitation, children ‘must learn to use a symbol toward the 
adult in the same way the adult used it toward [them]’, in order to produce intentional 
utterances themselves (Tomasello, 2003: 27).  
This, then, is in many ways a ‘pragmatics first’ view of language acquisition. 
Indeed, Tomasello comments: ‘It is interesting to note that the intersubjectivity 
inherent in socially shared symbols, but not in one-way signals, sets up all kinds of 
pragmatic ‘implicatures’ of the type investigated by Grice (1975) concerning 
expectations that other persons will use the conventional means of expression – that 
we both know they know – and not others that are more cumbersome or indirect’ 
(2003: 27). An important consequence of this view is that there is no sharp distinction 
between non-verbal and verbal communication in ontogenetic development. 
Children’s pointing may express intentional meaning in the same way as early 
utterances, for instance (Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007). So, although in 
this thesis implicatures are viewed as strictly verbal, they are not necessarily the start 
of children’s pragmatic inferencing abilities, as shall be discussed when it comes to 
word learning by exclusion. Another consequence is that there is no sharp distinction 
between pragmatic development and lexical or grammatical development, which will 
be pertinent when looking at the connection between implicature skills, and lexical 
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and grammatical knowledge. Finally, it ties children’s language development closely to 
their general cognitive development, and especially social cognition, like Theory of 
Mind, which will also be a topic of investigation.  
This thesis is also focussed on children’s understanding of implicatures. This 
follows the major trend in recent research, though there are a couple of studies on 
children’s production of scalar implicatures (Eiteljörge, Pouscoulous, & Lieven, 2016; 
Tieu, 2017) and a much larger body of work on children’s referential informativeness 
(e.g. Davies & Katsos, 2010). Though there are clearly some common prerequisites 
and skills involved, understanding and production of implicatures are likely to have 
different developmental paths (Hendriks & Koster, 2010), and understanding will be 
the sole focus here.  
1.3 Overview of the thesis 
This thesis investigates children’s development of implicature understanding, 
with three strands running through: the relationship of different types of implicature 
in development; the contribution of different factors, especially structural language 
abilities; and the role of Theory of Mind. It is organised into four main chapters (2 to 
5), each of which presents a review of the relevant literature for that chapter, together 
with an empirical study. Although this renders each chapter self-contained to some 
degree, I assume a basis of preceding chapters, and build on findings and arguments 
from one chapter to the next.  
In Chapter 2, I present a study that examines scalar, ad hoc, relevance and word 
learning by exclusion inferences, to address the questions: 
1. What is the relationship between quantity, relevance and word learning by 
exclusion in development?  
2. What is the nature of word learning by exclusion: pragmatic or lexical?  
With its picture-matching study with 3–5-year-olds, this chapter lays the groundwork, 
in many ways, for the following ones, in being concerned with children’s abilities to 
derive implicatures in a simple, supportive context, and in introducing the 
methodology used as a basis throughout. The findings suggest early competence with 
gradual development of implicature understanding over the preschool years, with 
word learning by exclusion preceding ad hoc and relevance inferences, and scalars 
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proving the most challenging for children.  
Chapter 3 explores additional data collected in the same study as in Chapter 2. It 
considers the relationship of pragmatic abilities with cognitive factors like Theory of 
Mind development and structural language competence on the one hand, and life 
experience factors like socioeconomic status and speaking either one or more than one 
language, on the other. The main predictor of implicature skills turns out to be 
structural language abilities.  
In Chapter 4, I turn to another type of implicature, manner, on which there is 
little existing theoretical or empirical work. I therefore ask:  
1. Are manner implicatures a distinct category, and is there evidence for them 
in adults’ communication?  
2. What are the predictions for their acquisition?  
3. Do manner implicatures develop early or late in children’s communication?  
I lay out some theory behind a working definition of manner implicatures, before 
spelling out the implications for their acquisition, and presenting a first attempt at 
investigating children’s competence with them. There is some evidence that both 
adults and children sometimes derive manner inferences, though teasing them apart 
from quantity inferences remains a challenge. 
In Chapter 5, I address the question of the role of Theory of Mind in implicature 
derivation more directly, by examining children’s ability to integrate the speaker’s 
epistemic state into utterance interpretation. My research questions are: 
1. Do children engage in perspective-taking in implicature derivation?  
2. If not, what does this mean for a Gricean model of pragmatics, and 
implicature in particular? 
 I test whether children, like adults, are able to not derive an implicature when the 
speaker is ignorant, through two experiments – a covered-box task, and a referential 
director task. The results suggest a two-step developmental trajectory: first, children 
learn to derive pragmatic inferences, and then to integrate the speaker’s epistemic 
state into these inferences, particularly when it differs from theirs.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, I offer some conclusions from all four experiments, as well 
as an outlook to future research and applications of the findings. Deriving implicatures 
seems to develop as a skill from age 3, with early competence in straightforward 
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communicative situations. However, there are developmental differences in 
implicature types, and ongoing development in more complex situations where 
information from the context must be taken into account.   
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2 Quantity, relevance and word learning by exclusion inferences – 
pragmatics in the early years  
 
Figure 2.1 Word learning by exclusion 
Learning words – mapping forms to meanings – is one of the great challenges for 
children learning language. In a simple scenario, as in Figure 2.1, children may hear a 
word for the first time, and need to work out its referent. In this case, they are familiar 
with the label for one of the possible referents, so, from their point of view, the new 
label could be a second label for the familiar object, or a label for the new object. The 
latter is children’s preferred strategy – known as word learning by exclusion. In this 
chapter, I present a study that investigates relatively early competence of quantity, 
relevance and word learning by exclusion inferences in an ideal context, with the aim 
of addressing two questions:  
1. What is the relationship between quantity, relevance and word learning by 
exclusion in development?  
2. What is the nature of word learning by exclusion: pragmatic or lexical?  
In the following section, I ground these research questions in pragmatic theory 
by drawing out some possible predictions for children’s development, before reviewing 
the literature on implicature development, and the role of the QUD in children’s 
implicature comprehension. Then, I turn to word learning by exclusion (henceforth 
WLE), presenting conflicting accounts and empirical evidence to date, and explaining 
why it makes sense to examine it along with implicatures. 
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2.1 Pragmatic theory and development 
In Chapter 1, I outlined a Gricean view of pragmatics, in which relevance, 
quantity and manner implicatures are distinct but share some important 
commonalities. In particular, relevance, defined as the degree to which the QUD is 
addressed, is important not only for relevance implicatures, but for quantity and 
manner implicatures as well (Cummins, 2017; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2014; Roberts, 
2012). For one thing, a quantity implicature is derived, or not, depending on the 
context of utterance, and in particular, on whether stronger alternatives that could 
have been said are relevant. For another, the kind of elaborative inferencing involved 
in relevance inferences may also be involved in generating relevant alternatives in 
quantity inferences. Additionally, quantity implicatures involve negation of 
alternatives, a feature shared by WLE inferences – as shall be seen below. This means 
that relevance and quantity inferences involve partially overlapping skills, as do WLE 
and quantity. Manner inferences fit into this schema, too, with much in common with 
quantity but with an additional component of utterance form, and I consider these on 
their own in Chapter 4.  
 WLE Quantity Relevance 
Tracking QUD  ✓ ✓ 
QUD licenses inference1  ✓  
Elaborative inference  ✓ ✓ 
Negation of alternative ✓ ✓  
Table 2.1 WLE, Quantity and Relevance inferences 
1 For quantity, this could be because tracking the QUD leads to generation of relevant alternatives, or it 
could be that the QUD constrains selection of alternatives. In contrast, for relevance inferences the QUD 
plays a different role: the apparent gap between the QUD and the utterance triggers a search for an 
explanatory link.  
This schema has implications for children’s pragmatic development, as the 
learning challenge presented is different in each case. Most basically, quantity 
implicatures might present more of a challenge than either WLE or relevance, whose 
features they incorporate. Further, in a typical WLE paradigm, it is arguably not 
essential to refer to the QUD as the utterance with the novel word is such a strong cue 
to infer its referent in the context, reasoning by exclusion – although the QUD can of 
course sometimes help in determining the referent of a novel word (e.g. Tomasello, 
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Strosberg, & Akhtar, 1996). Different developmental trajectories can therefore be 
expected for different types of inference, with WLE and relevance emerging before 
quantity. This prediction does leave open, though, the possibility that there are many 
factors beyond Grice’s maxims that make particular instances of implicatures or 
subtypes more or less challenging for children (Verbuk & Shultz, 2010). To date, 
however, no study has brought all types together in one paradigm and a single sample 
of children, to answer the question:  What is the relationship between quantity, 
relevance and WLE in development?   
2.2 Learning to understand implicatures 
In this section, I review what is known about children’s development of 
implicatures, through studies that have investigated each in isolation, and, 
importantly, through those that have looked at more than one type. Then, I discuss 
the evidence for the crucial contribution of relevance to that development. I highlight 
the suggestive evidence for an order of acquisition reflecting theoretical predictions 
already in place, and the mounting evidence for the difficulty children have in tracking 
and integrating QUD and generating relevant alternatives for quantity implicatures. I 
also discuss the need for child-friendly methodology that directly taps their 
implicature-derivation skills. 
2.2.1 Relevance  
The study of children’s understanding of relevance inferences has a relatively 
long history thanks to studies of a specific type of inference, the indirect request (e.g. 
Bernicot & Legros, 1987; Elrod, 1987). Many early studies, and even some later ones, 
suggest that children learn to make relevance inferences relatively late (e.g. aged 8 
years and above in de Villiers, de Villiers, Coles-White, & Carpenter, 2009). One 
probable reason for this finding is the nature of the tasks, which require metalinguistic 
reasoning, such as explaining why a character said something or what was meant (e.g. 
Bucciarelli, Colle, & Bara, 2003; de Villiers et al., 2009; Verbuk & Shultz, 2010). That 
is, they are investigating not only children’s comprehension, but their understanding 
of their comprehension, something that develops later in childhood (Lieven, 2006).  
More recent studies have addressed this by trying to directly measure children’s 
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comprehension – their derivation of relevance implicatures – within other 
experimental paradigms, like action-based or picture-matching tasks (S. Lewis, 2013; 
Schulze et al., 2013; Tribushinina, 2012). The evidence suggests that children start to 
derive relevance implicatures at an early age, around 3 years or even younger. This is 
particularly the case when the world knowledge required to make the elaborative 
inference, connecting the utterance with its intended meaning, is intuitively closely 
associated with both.  
For instance, Schulze, Grassmann and Tomasello (2013) and Tribushinina (2012) 
find that German- and Dutch-speaking children as young as 3 years can make 
inferences where negative emotion is associated with dispreference, or where positive 
emotion is associated with preference or desire for something:  
A: Should [child] give you the elephant?  
B: I like elephants. / I don’t like elephants.  
⇸ The speaker wants that item / a different item.  
(Schulze et al., 2013: 2082) 
This is corroborated by Tribushinina (2012), who tests children aged 2;6–3;6 in a 
game based around shopping and the customer’s preferences, and also finds 
competence in understanding indirect utterances with this age group. In Schulze, 
Grassmann and Tomasello’s study, young children can also make intuitively more 
complex inferences such as:  
A: Do you want the cereal or the roll? [for breakfast] 
B: The milk is gone.  
⇸ The speaker wants the roll. (Schulze et al., 2013: 2087)  
Here, the relevance of the utterance is understood via the world knowledge that 
cereal is typically enjoyed with milk for breakfast, and so the precondition for that 
option is not fulfilled. Children aged 3 (2;10–3;1) find the inverse case, when the 
precondition is fulfilled, much more challenging, deriving an implicature at chance 
levels (at a rate of 58%) – compared to above chance for the unfulfilled precondition 
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inference (at 73%). 4-year-olds (3;10–4;1), in contrast, succeed with this kind of 
inference:  
A: Do you want the cereal or the roll? [for breakfast] 
B: I bought milk.  
⇸ I want cereal. (Schulze et al., 2013: 2087)  
The authors suggest that the puzzling difference for three-year-olds has to do 
with the constraints that the utterance places on their action in response: in the 
precondition unfulfilled case, one of the possible objects is excluded, forcing the 
selection of the other object. Possibly, the negative utterance may have highlighted 
the need to access world knowledge to infer relevance. They conclude, therefore, that 
what children are doing in both cases is a relevance inference; it is just that the 
precondition fulfilled case includes some more difficult steps. 
However, given that in both cases the utterance is, on its literal meaning, 
irrelevant to the explicit QUD, one wonders why the search for world knowledge is 
not triggered equally in both cases. Another possibility is that only in the precondition 
fulfilled case is complex reasoning about the speaker’s intended meaning required. 
When the precondition is not fulfilled, an inference could be made purely through 
reasoning about world knowledge without reference to speaker intention – along the 
lines of ‘when there is no milk, one cannot have cereal, therefore the speaker cannot 
have cereal’; this is called a ‘material implicature’ by Jary (2013; see too Kissine, 2016 
and discussion in Chapters 3 and 5). It could even be based on egocentric but 
benevolent reasoning on behalf of the speaker, such as ‘I would not want cereal 
without milk, so I would better give him the roll’. Neither of these options are 
available, however, in the precondition fulfilled case; in that case, the hearer has to 
consider why the speaker has chosen to mention the milk purchase, presumably 
because he finds it relevant to the discourse (a ‘behavioural implicature’, on Jary’s 
(2013) typology).   
Entertaining this kind of explanation obviously rests on the notion that not all 
implicatures are created equal – not all are ‘fully Gricean’ in the sense of requiring 
reasoning about a speaker’s epistemic state and communicative intentions. I will 
return to this idea in the coming chapters.  
21 
 
2.2.2 Ad hoc quantity 
Ad hoc quantity implicatures involve a set of alternatives that are context-
specific. In the simplest case, this could be the alternatives ‹object X, object X and Y›, 
where an utterance like ‘give me X’ would give rise to an exhaustive inference, that the 
speaker means only X. Young children have also been found to be competent with this 
kind of ad hoc inference. Three-year-olds in Stiller Goodman and Frank’s (2015) study 
are able to choose appropriately, for example, which smiley face belongs to the puppet 
when he says ‘my friend has glasses’, selecting the face with only glasses, not glasses 
and a hat. Children in the 3;6–4-year age group are above chance. Similar results come 
from other picture-matching tasks (Grosse, Schulze, Noveck, Tomasello, & Katsos, in 
prep.; Horowitz & Frank, 2015) and eye-tracking studies (Yoon, Wu, & Frank, 2015). 
Again, these all involve child-friendly experimental designs where the alternatives are 
presented visually in context, and children are only asked to choose a picture, not to 
explain their choice. Importantly, they also provide a context where the implicated 
meaning is relevant, through the combination of the picture-matching task – that is, 
reference resolution – and the visual display, where the utterance ‘X’, taken to meant 
‘at least X’, is not a unique identifier.  
Even using such experimental paradigms, though, current findings suggest that 
these inferences are not yet available to two-year-olds: Stiller, Goodman and Frank 
(2015) find that they are performing at chance, even in a simplified version of the 
experiment designed specifically for toddlers, while Yoon, Yu and Frank (2015) find 
they even prefer the distractor alternative in an eye-tracking task. I return to this 
apparent ‘gap’ between early pragmatic competence and the development of ad hoc 
implicatures in the discussion of my own results below.  
2.2.3 Scalar quantity  
Scalar quantity implicatures are beyond doubt the most studied – and best 
understood – type of implicature in children, reflecting in part the theoretical debates 
and adult processing studies centred on them. Most studies concentrate on the scale 
‹all, some›, but a few look at other scales such as ‹and, or› and ‹finish, start›.  
Those that use Truth Value Judgement Tasks or Felicity Judgement Tasks, which 
require the participant to express a decision on whether a speaker has described a 
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situation (to which the participant also has access) correctly or well, find relatively late 
acquisition, at 5 years or much older (e.g. Foppolo, Guasti, & Chierchia, 2012; 
Gotzner, Barner, & Crain, 2015; Guasti et al., 2005; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & 
Tantalou, 2004; Pouscoulous, Noveck, Politzer, & Bastide, 2007; Scrafton & Feeney, 
2006; Skordos & Papafragou, 2016; Verbuk, 2012). In a typical case, a speaker 
describes a picture where a characteristic is true of all items (e.g. all the boys have 
umbrellas), using the quantifier ‘some’: it is semantically true (the logical meaning of 
‘some’ is assumed to be some and possibly all), but under-informative. Adults typically 
reject such utterances, whereas young children are more accepting. However, these 
kinds of tasks may not be tapping into children’s actual pragmatic competence. Not 
only are judgements dependent on metalinguistic skills, but they are also potentially 
measuring only sensitivity to under-informativeness, rather than implicature 
derivation per se, because only sensitivity to informativeness is needed to reject an 
under-informative statement (Katsos & Bishop, 2011). Furthermore, the speaker in 
such tasks is, by necessity, fluctuating in his or her level of cooperativeness, being fully 
informative in control trials, but under-informative in critical ones. Not much is 
known about how children respond to varying levels of informativeness or how 
successfully they track it, though they certainly are sensitive to it (e.g. Chierchia et al., 
2001; Pogue, Tanenhaus, & Kurumada, 2017; Siegal, Iozzi, & Surian, 2009). At best, 
this might create a difference between children and adults’ responses to a varyingly 
co-operative speaker; at worst, it presents a confound that obscures children’s 
pragmatic competence. One formulation of such an issue is Pragmatic Tolerance – the 
notion that children may be more reluctant than adults to say that a speaker is wrong 
or has said something silly, if the utterance can be accommodated as semantically true 
(Katsos & Bishop, 2011; Katsos & Smith, 2010).  
In contrast, studies that use action-based or picture-matching tasks, like the ad 
hoc implicature tasks above, where the speaker is behaving in a pragmatically co-
operative way across trials, find some emerging competence even at age 4 (Horowitz & 
Frank, 2015; Pouscoulous et al., 2007), particularly where the quantifier carries focus 
stress (Miller, Schmitt, Chang, & Munn, 2005)5. As the goal of the present study is to 
                                                 
5 In addition, a couple of studies have examined whole–part scales, that depend to some extent 
23 
 
compare types of inference in development, a picture-matching task is preferred not 
only to avoid the potential confounds of judgement tasks, but also to make 
comparison across inference types more viable (so that cooperativeness is not violated 
in a different way for different conditions).  
Scalar implicatures have been the subject of contrasting theories, with 
implications for development: on a lexical-scales approach, which is sometimes linked 
to a grammaticalist theory of scalars, they are challenging for children because there is 
specific lexical knowledge of scales that children have to acquire, in addition to the 
terms themselves (e.g. Barner, Brooks, & Bale, 2011). On a contextualist or constraint-
based account, scalars are not inherently different from other quantity implicatures, 
and so there is no extra challenge of learning a lexical scale (although acquiring terms 
like quantifiers in itself may be challenging). The lexical-scales approach could lead to 
the prediction that scalars are harder than ad hocs, because of the extra step in 
acquisition. However, it is in principle possible to make the reverse prediction – that 
because they ‘only’ require lexical rather than world knowledge, they could be easier – 
a hypothesis tested by Verbuk (2012). In other words, development is not a simple 
testing ground for competing theories on scalars, but different theories may be able to 
better or worse explain developmental patterns.  
2.2.4 Comparing implicatures 
The diversity in tasks, age groups and languages makes it difficult to compare 
different types of implicature examined in different studies, or at least making any 
comparison can only be suggestive. A few studies, however, have combined two kinds 
of implicature in the same task or experimental session. Katsos and Smith (2010), 
Katsos and Bishop (2011), Grosse and colleagues (in prep.), and Horowitz and Frank 
(2015) all consider ad hoc and scalar quantity implicatures together. The overall 
findings are consistent: ad hoc implicatures are available before scalars in 
                                                 
on contextual relations but to a lesser degree than ad hocs (e.g. I cleaned the kitchen ⇸ The 
speaker didn’t clean the whole house). These suggest a similar development to scalar 
implicatures, such as those with ‘some’, but are too under-powered in terms of stimuli number 
or sample size to draw firm conclusions (Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004; Verbuk & Shultz, 
2010). 
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development (where the scale is ‹all, some›). These studies use a variety of methods: a 
judgement task with 7-year-olds (Katsos & Smith, 2010); judgement and picture-
matching tasks with 5–6-year-olds (Katsos & Bishop, 2011); a picture-matching task 
with 3- and 5-year-olds (Grosse et al., in prep.); and a picture-matching task with 4- 
and 5-year-olds (Horowitz & Frank, 2015).  
What is of interest, too, is the relationship between relevance and quantity 
inferences. Only one study, to my knowledge, combines these. Verbuk and Schulz 
(2010) find no evidence for a difference in children’s performance between quantity 
inferences – in this case using part–whole scales – and relevance inferences. However, 
there are a number of issues with their design: the children’s ages range from 5;1 to 
8;1 but form one group for analysis; the children are asked what happened and why, 
and only score as correct if their explanation indicates that they have drawn an 
implicature (i.e., a heavily metapragmatic task); there is, in addition, a ‘non-verbal’ 
condition in their design, where children have to draw an inference from a picture 
rather than utterance, which could affect expectations about the speaker and the task; 
and both the verbal and non-verbal relevance inferences could arguably be derived 
without reference to speaker intentions (i.e., material implicature type). So, to date, 
we have little idea of how relevance and quantity develop together.  
2.2.5 The QUD and relevant alternatives 
A number of observations on children’s development of quantity implicatures 
converge to suggest that a key step is learning to track the QUD and generate relevant 
alternatives, as Papafragou and Skordos (2016) propose.  
Firstly, those studies that use Truth Value Judgement Tasks or, to a lesser degree, 
Felicity Judgement Tasks show lower rates of sensitivity to informativeness in children 
(and also in adults) than other paradigms, as already mentioned. A further explanation 
for this discrepancy could concern the shifting QUD (as suggested by, for instance 
Skordos & Papafragou, 2016). To give a concrete example, consider the first major 
study on children’s abilities with scalar implicatures: Noveck (2001) asks children to 
judge six different types of sentence: critical true but under-informative some (e.g. 
‘some giraffes have long necks’); true and optimally informative some (e.g. ‘some birds 
live in cages’); true all (e.g. ‘all elephants have trunks’); false all (e.g. ‘all dogs have 
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spots’); ‘absurd’ all (e.g. ‘all chairs tell time’); and ‘absurd’ some (e.g. ‘some stores are 
made of bubbles’). All but the true some conditions arguably imply a QUD of quality, 
not quantity. If children have difficulty tracking the QUD, and stick with one of 
quality, then they will be more likely to accept true but under-informative statements 
with ‘some’.  
In addition, other studies that include some kind of training component or an 
element that highlights quantity also find improved performance, as compared with 
equivalent tasks that do not, which again could be explained in terms of the implicit 
QUD (Foppolo et al., 2012; Guasti et al., 2005; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003). 
Interestingly, Guasti and colleagues (2005) repeat Papafragou and Musolino’s training 
study with a Truth Value Judgement Task, and observe a bimodal distribution in 
children’s performance: training influences some children’s responses so that they 
now reject under-informative utterances, but does not influence others’ at all. One 
possible explanation is that the former group of children are sensitive to 
informativeness (or able to derive an implicature, depending on the interpretation of 
this task), but that without the training phase that highlights informativeness they are 
unaware that it is relevant. In contrast, those studies that present the alternatives, 
visually or in discourse, render them relevant, and children fare better in these.  
Secondly, Barner, Brooks and Bale (2011) set out to test whether children’s 
particular difficulty with scalar implicatures is a result of difficulty with learning the 
quantifiers themselves or learning their relationship on a scale. They use a Truth Value 
Judgement Task that crosses scalar and ad hoc implicature-triggering utterances, with 
explicitly exhaustive utterances containing ‘only’. A critical difference between their 
study and others, though, is their use of questions rather than statements, such as ‘are 
some of the animals sleeping?’. Questions are typically not implicature-triggering 
contexts, which means that their design cannot test children’s derivation of 
implicatures. However, the combination with the explicitly exhaustive questions – ‘are 
only some of the animals sleeping?’ when in fact all are – can identify the problem. 
Children are able to correctly answer with ‘only’ (in the negative) and without 
(positively) in the ad hoc case, but not the scalar case. This suggests that they a) know 
that questions do not typically trigger implicatures, b) know that ‘only’ is an 
exhaustifier, c) can apply this meaning when alternatives are given in context, d) know 
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the logical meaning of some and all (from control trials), but e) cannot apply an 
exhaustive meaning when the alternatives are scale mates ‹all, some›.  
The authors interpret this as evidence that, for scalar implicatures, children not 
only have to learn the lexical items themselves, but also the scale between them, in 
order to derive implicatures. Alternatively, as Papafragou and Skordos (2016) suggest, 
it could be explained by the challenge of generating relevant alternatives: children are 
challenged in generating relevant alternatives for a scalar term like some, both where 
this is required by the semantics of only, and where it is pragmatically appropriate. 
Whereas, for ad hoc scales, the naming of two animals depicted (‘are the cat and the 
dog sleeping?’) draws more attention to the contrasting alternative (‘the cow’). This 
would mean that the negated alternative could be easier to generate for ad hocs, hence 
children’s adult-like performance with ‘only’. 
Thirdly, in his thesis, Skordos (2014; Skordos & Papafragou, 2016) sets out to 
investigate the generation of relevant alternatives directly. Studies like Grosse and 
colleagues’ (Grosse et al., in prep.) find a faciliatory effect of hearing the stronger 
alternative before the critical quantity inference trial for scalars (and not for ad hocs in 
their case, as they were approaching ceiling). It could be that the mention of the 
stronger alternative simply enables it to be generated in the critical trial; the 
developmental challenge is just learning to access relevant alternatives. Alternatively, 
it could be that mention of a stronger alternative highlights it as a relevant stronger 
alternative, with a QUD that relates to quantity. Skordos (2014) attempts to tease 
apart these two options: 5-year-olds provide acceptability judgements on critical some 
sentences in one of two conditions. In the first, they had previously judged sentences 
with ‘all’ that were false because of quantity (some but not all), i.e., there is a 
consistent implicit QUD of quantity from all trials to some trials, but, crucially, still a 
preceding mention of the stronger alternative. In the second, they had previously 
judged sentences with ‘all’ that were false because of quality (all have Xs not Ys), i.e., 
there is a shift in implicit QUD from quality to quantity from all trials to some trials. 
The results are enlightening: only in the first condition are children adult-like in their 
rejection of under-informative some sentences. The same is true in another 
experiment, where the preceding trials contain ‘none’ and a consistent implicit QUD 
of quantity. This clearly suggests that children’s difficulty with quantity implicatures is 
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– at least sometimes – down to tracking the QUD and generating relevant alternatives.  
Clearly, even stronger evidence for this view would come from a study that 
combines a direct measure of implicature derivation like that of Grosse et al.’s (in 
prep.) or Horowitz and Frank (2015) with a manipulation of QUD. However, taken 
altogether, the studies reviewed here strongly suggest that children’s development of 
quantity implicatures is connected to their development of sensitivity to and 
inferencing of relevance (where relevance is understood as addressing the QUD). 
Methodologically, this means that a study that includes mixed conditions across trials 
should also include a context and, ideally, explicit QUD, in order to avoid obscuring 
children’s pragmatic competence. Empirically, it suggests that a relationship between 
relevance and quantity may be expected in acquisition – as outlined above – and that 
an investigation of them would prove fruitful.  
2.3 Word learning by exclusion 
I now turn to examine word learning by exclusion in more detail, to show how it 
may fit into the developmental picture of the first research question – concerning the 
relationship of inferences – and to motivate the second research question – concerning 
the nature of WLE.  
WLE is a much-studied and robust phenomenon. From the first year of life, 
children tend to choose a novel object as the referent for a novel word (Graham, 
Poulin-Dubois, & Baker, 1998; Halberda, 2003; Markman, Wasow, & Hansen, 2003), 
and this tendency strengthens with age (Bion, Borovsky, & Fernald, 2013; Diesendruck 
& Markson, 2001; Hollich et al., 2000; Merriman, Bowman, & MacWhinney, 1989; 
Merriman & Schuster, 1991; Scofield & Behrend, 2007). This is typically tested in one 
of two ways: either a child is presented with one novel and one familiar object, and 
asked to point to, pick up or look at ‘the blicket’, or one of two novel objects is labelled 
(e.g. ‘here is a wug’), and then the child is asked for ‘the blicket’. Note, though, that 
the second methodology may be drawing on the blocking effect of being in common 
ground having been the focus of joint attention (Grassmann, Stracke, & Tomasello, 
2009), rather than in common ground given knowledge of conventional labels. Note, 
too, that, while ‘word learning by exclusion’ is a commonly used term for this 
behaviour, what is really at issue is mapping via disambiguation, not learning per se, 
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though some studies also look at retention of the mapping (e.g. Bion et al., 2013; 
Horst, Scott, & Pollard, 2010; Spiegel & Halberda, 2011; Zosh, Brinster, & Halberda, 
2013). As what I am interested in here is the inferencing process itself – and how it 
relates to pragmatic inferences like implicatures – looking only at mapping is 
sufficient.  
2.3.1 Theories of WLE 
There are two main theories that have been proposed to account for this 
behaviour, in some ways paralleling the two approaches to scalar implicatures. Firstly, 
children may have a lexical-specific bias of mutual exclusivity – a heuristic that each 
(type of) object has only one label (Brosseau-Liard & Hall, 2011; de Marchena, Eigsti, 
Worek, Ono, & Snedeker, 2011; Haryu & Imai, 1999; Jaswal, 2010; Markman, 1994; 
Markman & Wachtel, 1988; Markman et al., 2003; Scofield & Behrend, 2007). Using 
this heuristic, children can reason that if one object already has a known label, the 
novel label cannot refer to it, so it must refer to another one. This kind of heuristic 
therefore implies reasoning by exclusion, but no reference to the speaker’s intentions.  
Secondly, children may be drawing on pragmatic principles, such as those 
originally formulated by Clark – the Principles of Conventionality and Contrast:  
Conventionality: for certain meanings, speakers assume that there is a 
conventional form that should be used in the language community 
Contrast: speakers assume that any difference in form signals a 
difference in meaning  
(E. V. Clark, 2009: 133. See too E. V. Clark, 1988, 1990, 2002, 2004, 
2007) 
Based on these principles, children can reason that if a speaker was intending to 
refer to the known object, she would have used the known label (Conventionality); as 
she did not use that label, but the novel one, she must not intend the known object 
(Contrast); instead, she must intend to refer to the novel object. Note that here, 
speaker communicative intentions are key, as argued too by Bloom (2002) and 
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Tomasello (2000)6. 
Clark herself points to the similarity between her principles and Grice’s Co-
operative Principle (E. V. Clark, 1990; E. V. Clark & Clark, 1979), but does not flesh 
out this connection. The similarities should be clear by now, and have been 
mentioned, at least in passing, by many developmental pragmaticians (Bale & Barner, 
2013; Barner et al., 2011; Katsos & Bishop, 2011; Katsos & Wilson, 2014; Morisseau, 
Davies, & Matthews, 2013; Stiller et al., 2015; Sullivan & Barner, 2011). Both WLE and 
implicature inferences require foundational pragmatic abilities like reference to a 
speaker’s intentions and expectations of cooperativeness, but in addition, in the case 
of quantity and manner, they involve reasoning by exclusion. Indeed, some have 
suggested that WLE is more comparable to a manner inference than quantity 
(Brosseau-Liard & Hall, 2011; de Marchena et al., 2011), because of the key role 
played by the form of the utterance (as opposed to the content, in the case of 
quantity). If Grice’s manner maxim, ‘avoid obscurity’, is interpreted as ‘be 
conventional’, then WLE is an application of manner to the disambiguation problem: a 
speaker avoids obscurity by using terms that are conventionally accepted in a 
linguistic community. However, as shall be seen in Chapter 4, depending how manner 
implicatures are formally defined, there may still be substantial differences between 
WLE and manner.  
I suggest it is more parsimonious to think of WLE in these Gricean terms, than as 
a result of the separate principles of Conventionality and Contrast. Gricean maxims do 
not operate independently but in concert, and sometimes in conflict; relevance and 
quantity may equally play a role in word learning (as Frank & Goodman, 2014 
demonstrate for quantity; and Sullivan & Barner, 2015 for relevance). This provides a 
                                                 
6 There are other accounts. Two notable ones are ‘N3C’ – Novel Name, Nameless Category 
(Golinkoff, Mervis, & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994), whereby children map novel terms to novel objects, 
without any reasoning by exclusion, and an associationist account (Smith, 1999), whereby 
repeated association of cues in the situation – co-present linguistic features or referents – 
leads to the emergence of attentional biases towards these cues, which helps children learn 
faster and more accurately. As these have not featured as prominently in the debate on the 
nature of word learning by exclusion, they will not be considered further here – though, as 
Frank (2014) argues, associationist and pragmatic accounts can be compatible. 
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solution to one criticism of a Conventionality and Contrast approach to WLE, namely 
that one still needs a basic-level bias to end up with the correct referent (Richard 
Breheny, personal communication). Just as the Mutual Exclusivity bias is assumed to 
operate alongside others, such as a whole-object bias and a basic-level bias (Markman 
& Wachtel, 1988), so too Conventionality and Contrast may not be sufficient on their 
own. The steps in reasoning outlined above crucially assume that the label must be 
referring to the whole object, and that it cannot be a hypernym or hyponym referring 
to one of the objects (including the known object).  
On a Clarkian account of Conventionality, one would have to appeal to some 
notion of ‘conventional’ encompassing ‘most frequent’ or ‘most cross-situationally 
stable’. On a Gricean view, one can straightforwardly appeal to expectations of 
Cooperativeness in the context, derived from the maxims of quantity. In a situation 
with two objects of different kinds, using a hyponym is typically over-informative, and 
implies the presence of another object of the same kind; using a hypernym, on the 
other hand, implies speaker ignorance about an object. Imagine a context where the 
possible referents are an apple and an unknown object, and the speaker says ‘give me 
the cox’ – this is over-informative, and implies that the unknown object is also a kind 
of apple. Then, think of the same context, where the speaker says ‘give me the fruit’ – 
this is now under-informative, and either implies that the speaker is ignorant of what 
kind of fruit an apple is, or that the novel object is a kind of fruit (and is the intended 
referent). In both cases, if the novel object is clearly not fruit, then the utterance is to 
be avoided. On the same grounds, the listener can infer that a novel word is neither a 
hyponym nor hypernym of the known object. Of course, this assumes that young 
children are sensitive to speaker cooperativeness, and, specifically, informativeness, 
but this may well be justified based on early evidence of these skills (e.g. Schulze & 
Tomasello, 2015; Tomasello, Strosberg, & Akhtar, 1996).  
Beyond these two theories – lexical heuristic or pragmatic principle – there is a 
third option: a developmental view. It is, of course, possible that children’s WLE 
strategy changes with development, and the same behaviour may be a product of 
different processes at different points. Theoretically, though, either direction of 
change – from pragmatic to lexical or vice versa – is plausible; it could be that a 
general pragmatic principle can become a more efficient lexical heuristic with 
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increasing linguistic experience, particularly of the organisation of the lexicon, or it 
could be that a low-level heuristic turns into more sensitive pragmatic reasoning, as 
that becomes available with cognitive development (cf. Kalashnikova, Mattock and 
Monaghan, 2014, for a similar outline). 
2.3.2 Testing WLE theories 
There have been two main approaches to testing which understanding of WLE is 
correct. Firstly, some studies have looked at how WLE interacts with other ‘pragmatic’ 
cues, such as eye-gaze, pointing or speaker characteristics (Diesendruck, Carmel, & 
Markson, 2010; Grassmann & Tomasello, 2010; Haryu & Imai, 1999; Jaswal & Hansen, 
2006). The problem is that there are conflicting findings, and, moreover, conflicting 
interpretations of the same findings: for example, if a combination of pragmatic cues – 
gaze and point – can ‘override’ mutual exclusivity, is this evidence of the strength of 
the mutual exclusivity bias and that it is a lexical heuristic, not a pragmatic principle 
(Jaswal, 2010)? Or is it evidence that pragmatic interpretation takes into account 
many sources of information, including an expectation of speaker cooperativeness that 
may be weightier than single conflicting cues such as eye-gaze?  
Secondly, other studies have compared WLE with a ‘domain general’ application 
of the same strategy – on the assumption that a lexical heuristic would only apply to 
disambiguation of word meaning, whereas a pragmatic strategy could be applied in 
other communicative situations. Studies have compared WLE to disambiguation of 
reference through facts (de Marchena et al., 2011; Diesendruck & Markson, 2001; 
Kalashnikova et al., 2014; Scofield & Behrend, 2007), and to symbolic gestures 
(Suanda & Namy, 2013). Again, results have been mixed, finding similar performance 
for words and facts (Diesendruck & Markson, 2001), or no relationship (e.g. 
Kalashnikova et al., 2014), depending in part on age, and whether it is a between-
subject or within-subject correlational design. However, such comparisons are 
inherently problematic, because words are by nature conventional, whereas facts are 
not. This is a distinction that young children have already grasped (Behrend, Scofield, 
& Kleinknecht, 2001; Childers & Tomasello, 2003). Indeed, using facts referentially is 
pragmatically uncooperative, unless the facts are already in common ground. For 
instance, if the speaker has identified one object as ‘the one my uncle gave me’, the 
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referential expression ‘the one my dog likes’ could be co-operative by adding 
information about the object already given in the discourse, or by using a new 
description to refer to a new object. There is no way of knowing whether a patterning 
together of WLE and disambiguation of facts used referentially indicates the extension 
of a pragmatic strategy or a different mechanism with the same outcome, while a 
difference in behavior between the two tells us nothing about the nature of WLE. 
Some studies along these lines have found evidence for a developmental change: 
Kalashnikova and colleagues (2014) find increasing disambiguation from children 
(aged 3;7–4;6 and 4;7–5;7) to adults for words but not for facts, and also no significant 
correlation between performance in the two conditions – though this is not positive 
evidence for no relationship, but an absence of evidence either way, that could be 
caused by skew and lack of variation in performance. Even these results are hard to 
interpret: the authors seem to say that they suggest a shift towards a specific lexical 
strategy for words, but that this is not a transformation ‘from a strictly domain-general 
to a strictly domain-specific assumption about word learning’ (Kalashnikova et al., 
2014: 132). Again, there is the confound of what the responses to facts are meant to 
represent.  
What is therefore needed is a comparison between WLE and an indisputably 
pragmatic phenomenon, just like implicature. On the pragmatic view of WLE, one 
would expect to find correlation between WLE and implicature across all ages (same 
strategy for implicature and words); and on the lexical heuristic view of WLE, one 
would expect no relationship between WLE and implicature, given a baseline of 
structural language ability. Alternatively, there may be one of two developmental 
patterns: it may be that WLE starts off as a product of general pragmatic reasoning, 
but becomes more specialised with age and increasing experience of language and the 
conventionality of word meaning, predicting decreasing correlation with age (cf. 
Kalashnikova et al., 2014; Kalashnikova, Mattock, & Monaghan, 2016). On the other 
hand, a lexical constraint could give way to more useful pragmatic reasoning that 
combines multiple contextual cues, as pragmatic competence develops, leading to 
increasing correlation with age.  
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2.3.3 Summary 
Children’s comprehension of implicatures seems to emerge around 3 years of 
age, and there is evidence that ad hoc quantity implicatures precede scalars, and that 
relevance is also early. WLE is observed still earlier in infants. Despite many 
observations of the connections between the two, no existing studies have fleshed out 
a Gricean view of WLE or tested its nature by comparing it to a clearly pragmatic 
phenomenon like implicatures (particularly ad hoc and relevance inferences). There is 
also emerging evidence of the role of QUD in children’s development, which suggests 
an interaction of the development of quantity and relevance inferences, also as yet 
untested.  
2.4 Experiment 1A: Quantity, relevance and WLE inferences in children 
In the first experiment, I therefore aimed to investigate the relationship between 
quantity, relevance and WLE inferences in children’s development, and the nature of 
WLE, by testing children aged 3–5 years in their ability to derive scalar, ad hoc, 
relevance and WLE inferences.  
2.4.1 Method 
2.4.1.1 Design 
The experiment was based on a picture-matching task, which has been 
successfully employed to investigate children’s pragmatic ability in comprehension 
(Antoniou & Katsos, 2017; Gotzner et al., 2015; Horowitz & Frank, 2015; Hurewitz, 
Papafragou, Gleitman, & Gelman, 2006; Katsos & Bishop, 2011; Miller et al., 2005; for 
a methodological review see Schmitt & Miller, 2010). In its basic form, participants 
hear an utterance, see two pictures, and are asked to choose the picture that goes with 
the utterance, i.e., depicts the speaker’s intended meaning. As I have touched upon 
while reviewing the context for this study, it has many advantages that make it a valid 
measure of competence: it does not require metalinguistic reasoning; it provides visual 
cues to alternative utterances; it is not susceptible to a ‘yes’ bias or pragmatically 
tolerant behaviour; and, in general, it is a child-friendly, engaging task.  
In this study, I embedded the picture-matching within a story-based task, both 
because this made it more naturalistic, and because a discourse or visual context tends 
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to facilitate children’s inferencing (e.g. Scrafton & Feeney, 2006). Each item consisted 
of a) a context sentence, b) a question, and c) the critical utterance (an answer to the 
question). The parts (a) and (b) were uttered by the narrator-experimenter, whereas 
(c) was said by a puppet (with recorded voice). For (a) and (b) a single image was 
visible on the page; for (c) two pictures were visible, which the participant had to 
choose between. Having pre-recorded utterances for the puppet had the advantages a) 
of making it clearly different from the experimenter’s, and b) ensuring all children 
heard the critical utterances in the same way. Sets of 6 trials formed ‘stories’, for 
example ‘Bob at the park’ or ‘Bob at home’ (see Table 2.2 for examples).  
The study had a 4 × 2 × 3 design. There were four inference types (within-subject 
condition): relevance, ad hoc quantity, scalar quantity, and WLE. These appeared in 
two conditions (also within-subject): control and critical. In the control condition, 
only one of the pictures was a semantic match for the utterance – this was a measure 
of children’s structural language, and understanding of the task in general. In the 
critical condition, both pictures could be semantic matches for the utterance, but only 
one matched the implicated meaning intended by the speaker. Thus, the participants’ 
picture choices indicated whether they have derived an implicature or not. Finally, the 
participants were divided into 3 age-groups for the main analysis: 2;8–3;11, 4;0–4;11, 
and 5;0–5;11.  
In the ad hoc quantity condition, one picture displayed one object, and the other 
picture displayed the same object and another object. The critical utterance was of the 
form, ‘I V-ed an X’, and the control ‘I V-ed a Y and an X’. The common item was always 
second, so that children had to pay attention to the whole utterance, not just the final 
word, in order to disambiguate. Both pictures therefore matched the literal meaning 
of the critical utterance, at least an X, but only one matched the pragmatically 
enriched meaning only an X. The preceding question was always of the form ‘What did 
you V?’.  
In the scalar quantity condition, one picture showed only some items having 
some property, and the other showed all of them having the same property (i.e., the 
pictures were minimally different on this dimension). The critical utterance was of the 
form ‘I V-ed some of the Xs’, and the control ‘I V-ed all of the Xs’. As with ad hocs, 
both pictures were therefore a match to the literal meaning of the critical utterance, at 
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least some Xs, but only one matched the enriched meaning only some of the Xs. The 
use of ‘some of’ rather than ‘some’ was in line with other developmental studies in 
English and known to improve children’s performance (e.g. Bill, Romoli, Schwarz, & 
Crain, 2014; for adults, see too Degen & Tanenhaus, 2014; Y. T. Huang & Snedeker, 
2009; Katsos & Bishop, 2011; Verbuk, 2012). In the utterance, the quantifier was not 
contrast-stressed, even though this also improves children’s performance, as this 
would make scalar utterances different from ad hoc or relevance utterances. The 
preceding question was always of the form ‘What did you do with the Xs?’. 
For relevance, each picture showed a different item that represented an activity. 
In the control condition, only one of the pictures depicted the utterance’s meaning; in 
the critical condition, on the literal meaning, neither picture seemed relevant, so the 
choice was ambiguous; on the implicated meaning, one of the pictures matched. The 
question always asked about which activity Bob, the puppet, wanted to do, e.g. ‘What 
game shall we play?’. Only ‘fulfilled condition’ inferences were used, to avoid the kind 
of reasoning by exclusion implied by a material implicature that could be the case for 
‘unfulfilled condition’.  
Finally, the WLE trials were based on one standard version of the WLE task (e.g. 
Diesendruck et al., 2010; Jaswal, 2010; Markman & Wachtel, 1988; Markman et al., 
2003), in which there is one novel object and one known object. This format – rather 
than the alternative of two novel objects, one of which is first labelled – was chosen to 
make the WLE trials as similar as possible to the implicature trials, and to avoid 
having to mention either object in prior discourse. The utterances were always of the 
form, ‘I V-ed an X’. Word learning trials were somewhat different from quantity and 
relevance trials, in that there was only a minimal context phrase, such as ‘Bob went 
into the shop’, and no question. This was so that the discourse context did not provide 
a conflicting cue as to the intended referent.  
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 Context sentence Critical 
utterance 
Control 
utterance 
Picture – 
critical 
Picture – 
control 
Relevance It was breakfast 
time. Bob’s dad 
asked, ‘What would 
you like for 
breakfast?’ 
And I said, ‘I’ll 
get the milk.’ 
And I said, ‘I’d 
like toast.’ 
Cereal Toast 
Ad hoc Bob was getting 
ready for school. His 
mum asked, ‘What 
have you packed in 
your bag?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
packed a hat.’ 
And I said, ‘I 
packed a book 
and a hat.’ 
Hat Book and 
hat 
Scalar Bob made a crash in 
the kitchen. His dad 
asked, ‘What have 
you done with the 
pile of plates?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
broke some of 
the plates.’ 
And I said, ‘I 
broke all of the 
plates.’ 
Some 
(not all) 
plates 
broken 
All plates 
broken 
WLE He went further 
inside and… 
‘I picked a 
dax.’ 
‘I picked a 
fork.’ 
Novel 
object 
Fork 
Table 2.2 Experiment 1A example items 
There were 5 stories (See Appendix 8.1). The first 4 stories included relevance, ad 
hoc and scalar trials, with 1 critical and 1 control for each, making 6 in total. There 
were 8 trials per utterance type, with each participant seeing 4 critical and 4 control 
trials for each type. In total, participants saw 32 trials (plus 4 unambiguous warm-up 
trials). All the word learning trials were in one block, and made up the final story, in 
order that the puppet’s use of novel words (and inferred choice of novel items) did not 
affect the participant’s perception of him as co-operative and rational. All stories were 
clearly presented as part of the same activity.  
Participants saw only the critical or control condition for any one item; items 
within each story were rotated across participant lists, and arranged such that no two 
of any utterance type appeared one after the other and no more than two of the 
critical or control condition appeared together; and the first four stories (blocks) 
themselves were rotated. This counter-balanced design produced 2 × 6 × 4 = 48 lists. 
In addition, across lists, the position of the pictures (left or right) was counter-
balanced.  
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2.4.1.2 Participants 
Participants were recruited from Foundation classes in two local primary schools, 
from nurseries and preschools in and around Cambridge, and through personal 
contacts, in the age range 2 years 8 months to 5 years 11 months. Headteachers and 
nursery managers were contacted with information about the study, and asked 
whether they would be willing for their educational setting to participate in the 
project. Parents of the relevant classes or groups were then sent information letters 
and asked either to opt in or to opt out of the study, in line with the school’s policy. 
The recruitment process was approved by the University of Cambridge Psychology 
Ethics Committee, following research ethics guidelines (PRE.2014.98).  
In total, N = 135 children were recruited. Some participants were excluded from 
analysis on the basis of: environment too noisy for stimuli volume (N = 2 in schools), 
failure to finish the task (N = 1 in schools; N = 7 in nurseries); or declared 
developmental disorder (N = 1 in schools, N = 1 in nurseries). In addition, some 
children were recruited (given parental consent) but chose not to take part in the 
study or were absent from school or nursery at time of testing (N = 4 in schools, N = 
13 in nurseries). The responses from 71 monolingual children were included in the 
final analysis in this chapter; 35 bilingual children also completed the task and were 
included in the analysis in Chapter 3.  
In addition, N = 28 children were recruited from Foundation classes in two other 
local primary schools for the pretests and piloting of this study.  
N = 15 adults were recruited as a control group via Prolific Academic, an online 
recruitment platform for research (Prolific Academic Ltd, 2016), and were paid £0.75 
for their participation.  
2.4.1.3 Materials 
The task used laminated picture cards fixed with magnetic strips in a ‘book’, an 
A5 ring-binder, with pages in plastic pockets so that their order could easily be 
changed for different lists. The picture cards were photographs, sourced from the 
BOSS database (Brodeur, Dionne-Dostie, Montreuil, & Lepage, 2010), or online via 
Pixabay (Braxmeier & Steinberger, 2017), a database of Creative Commons CC0 
licensed images, or through an internet image search with filter applied for 
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noncommercial reuse. Each picture card had a clear black border to highlight that the 
two pictures are separate quantification domains. Chosen pictures were placed on a 
magnetic whiteboard by the child.  
 
The context sentence and question were narrated by the experimenter, while the 
critical utterance was prerecorded as the puppet’s voice by an adult male with a 
standard southern British English accent, using Audacity (Audacity Team, 1999). The 
recorded utterances are played from a laptop computer (Apple MacBook) using VLC 
(VideoLAN, 2017), either via the computer’s inbuilt speakers or small USB-powered 
speakers (Logitech), depending on the volume required. The puppet was a soft hand 
puppet of the sort frequently used in classroom settings, sourced from a specialist firm 
(http://aspuppets.co.uk/).  
The utterances were written to be child-friendly, in terms of topic and 
vocabulary. Those for relevance utterances (both critical and control) were devised 
through pretests: first, adults were asked for objects associated with activities to create 
a shortlist, via an online questionnaire, using Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 2016). Then, 4- to 
5-year-old children (N = 9) were asked what a character would need to do an activity. 
For example, ‘Bob wants to go swimming. What does he need to go swimming?’. Those 
pairs of items where there was no significant overlap of suggestions for the two items 
and a strong association with a particular object (mentioned frequently by children) 
were chosen.  
For word learning, the novel words themselves were taken from other 
development studies, with 4 monosyllabic and 4 bisyllabic words with English 
phonotactics (Barner & Snedeker, 2008; Diesendruck & Markson, 2001; Diesendruck, 
Figure 2.2 Story book, stand and magnetic board, showing scalar trial pictures 
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Markson, & Bloom, 2003; Halberda, 2003). Photographs of real objects were used, and 
were tested on adults (via online questionnaires) to find objects that the majority of 
adults did not recognise (where they responded with ‘pass’ or a wrong guess). The 
final list of novel objects consisted of: a dough mixer, a wooden gauge, a climbing 
chock, an aspergillum, a wooden cooking beater (of a type not usually found in UK 
kitchens), a mangosteen, an ackee, and an eccentric rod. Known items were also 
pretested with children to make sure the pictures were clearly identifiable, and 
problematic items were replaced (Appendix 8.1).  
2.4.1.4 Procedure 
Participating children were asked by the researcher whether they would like to 
do an activity with stories. The activity was usually set up in a separate group-work 
room, away from the noise and distraction of the classroom, although owing to UK 
child protection guidelines and space limitations, this was not always possible in 
nurseries. Children recruited through personal contacts were tested in a quiet room at 
their home.  
The child sat at the table opposite the picture-book, which was mounted on a 
book rest with the magnetic board on the table in front. The experimenter sat to the 
side, so that the computer, puppet and picture-book could all comfortably be 
operated.  
The experimenter introduced the activity to children, with the following 
information:  
Today we’re going to listen to some stories about Bob.  
This is Bob.  
I’m going to tell you some stories about what Bob did, but sometimes 
Bob likes to interrupt me; he likes to tell you himself what he did. So 
sometimes you’ll hear Bob speaking and telling part of the story.  
In this book, you will see pictures for the story. Sometimes you will 
see two pictures on one page. Then, choose the picture that goes with 
the story. You can put the picture that you choose on your board. 
Then at the end of each story we will be able to look at the pictures on 
the board and remember what Bob did.  
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Remember, when you see two pictures, choose the picture that goes 
with the story.  
Are you ready? Let’s practice.  
There was then a warm-up story with four trials with the same structure as trials in the 
main task, except that the critical utterance always unambiguously referred to only 
one of the pictures. At the end of the warm-up, the child was encouraged (‘you’ve got 
the hang of that!’) and asked whether they could go on to the next story. At the end of 
each story, the experimenter informed the child that there was another story, so that 
the child had the chance to stop if desired.  
The experimenter looked between the child and the picture during the context 
sentence and question, to establish joint attention, but looked at the puppet during 
the critical utterance, and at the child as he or she chose the picture that goes with the 
story, so that the choice would not be influenced by the experimenter’s eye-gaze. If the 
child was unsure and asked the experimenter for help, the experimenter would 
continue looking straight at the child, and encourage them to ‘choose the picture that 
goes with the story’. If the child tried to choose both pictures, the experimenter gave a 
reminder to choose just one. 
At the end, children were given a sticker as a thank you. At the end of the second 
test session (which consisted of language and theory of mind measures, described in 
Chapter 3), they were given another sticker and certificate of participation. Children 
recruited through personal contacts were also given a small book. In total, the session 
took around 15–20 minutes. 
The children’s picture choices were recorded as photographs of the board, either 
between each story (in the case of most school children), or after the session had 
finished (in the case of most nursery children).  
On the whole, children seemed to enjoy taking part in the task. Their behaviour 
was quite varied – some children enjoyed chatting about the pictures and their own 
experiences (in which case the experimenter would try to gently bring them back to 
the task); others got on with the activity quietly. Most children very quickly 
understood the task, but others needed prompting to choose a picture with the critical 
utterance (‘Can you choose the picture that goes with the story?’). 
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2.4.2 Predictions 
1. What is the relationship between quantity, relevance and word learning by 
exclusion in development?  
Based on the pragmatic theory and extant findings already explored, I make the 
following tentative predictions: 
• WLE and relevance emerge before ad hoc and scalar inferences, across 
children: WLE and relevance scores are higher than AH and scalar, with this 
gap closing with age 
• Relevance inferences emerge before ad hocs, with higher scores for 
relevance, and the gap closing with age 
• Ad hoc inferences emerge before scalar, with higher scores for ad hocs, and 
the gap closing with age 
• There is a positive relationship between quantity and relevance inferences, 
when controlling for core language ability  
 
2. What is the nature of word learning by exclusion: pragmatic or lexical?  
• On a pragmatic view of WLE, WLE scores correlate positively with 
implicature scores 
• On a lexical view of WLE, there is no relationship between WLE and 
implicature scores 
• On a developmental view, the relationship may change over age, either 
becoming a more positive relationship with increasing age (lexical > 
pragmatic), or a less positive one (pragmatic > lexical) 
2.4.3 Coding  
Each child’s picture choices (recorded as photographs of each story picture set), 
were coded as matching the inference or control utterance, and this was then 
converted into ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ based on the target for each item. In control 
trials ‘correct’ choices are ones that unambiguously match the utterance: in the case of 
ad hocs, the picture with two objects; for scalars, where objects have the appropriate 
property; for relevance, the semantic match; and for word learning, the known object. 
In critical trials, ‘correct’ choices are ones that match the pragmatically enriched 
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interpretation: for ad hocs, the picture with only one object; for scalars, where only 
some of the objects have the appropriate property; for relevance, the relevant picture; 
and for word learning, the novel object.  
Children’s ages were calculated based on their date of birth and date of first 
testing session, and children categorised into three age groups (see Table 2.3). In 
addition, based on the background language questionnaires, children were classed as 
monolingual or multilingual. Only monolingual children’s data is considered in this 
chapter; I return to the multilingual children in the next chapter.  
Age group Monolinguals Females Mean age (months) 
2;8–3;11 25 13 40.9 
4;0–4;11 25 11 54.0 
5;0–5;11 21 10 63.8 
Total 71 34  
Table 2.3 Participants in Experiment 1A 
2.4.4 Analysis 
There is a clear developmental trend for ad hoc, scalar and relevance 
inferences, but not the WLE inferences, which are already close to ceiling in the 
youngest age-group tested (Figure 2.3, Figure 2.4 and Table 2.4).  
 
Figure 2.3 Mean correct responses by utterance type, condition and age group 
W = Word learning; R = Relevance; A = Ad hoc; S = Scalar;  
Error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for between-subject comparison 
43 
 
 2;8–3;11 4;0–4;11 5;0–5;11 
 Critical Control Critical Control Critical Control 
WLE .91 .95 .94 .97 .99 .98 
Relevance .71 .90 .83 .95 .90 1.00 
Ad hoc .79 .89 .98 .98 1.00 1.00 
Scalar .56 .76 .71 .88 .82 .90 
Table 2.4 Proportion of correct responses by condition, inference type and age group 
 
Figure 2.4 Mean correct responses by age group, condition and utterance type  
W = Word learning; R = Relevance; A = Ad hoc; S = Scalar;  
Error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for between-subject comparison 
To address the first research question, I use mixed-effects logistic regression 
models to examine developmental trends across all types of inference.  
The second research question requires correlational analyses to specifically 
compare word learning to implicature inferencing. As across age-groups there is 
largely ceiling performance and lack of variation in WLE, I compare WLE and ad hoc 
and relevance inferences, controlling for language, only in the youngest group, for 
whom scores are lower and there is more variation.  
The adult control group perform at ceiling across all conditions and are not 
included in the analysis (Figure 2.5).  
44 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Mean correct responses by adults 
A = Ad hoc; R = Relevance; S = Scalar; W = Word learning 
2.4.4.1 Theory ‘neutral’ – sum coding of contrasts 
In the first analysis, the main predictors – condition (critical or control), 
utterance type (scalar, ad hoc, relevance or WLE), and age group – are entered into the 
model with sum coding: each factor level is compared to the grand mean, so that main 
effects can be examined.  
A mixed-effects logistic regression model was fitted, using the lme4 package as 
part of the R programming language for statistical analysis (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2015; R Core Team, 2016), using RStudio (RStudio Team, 2016)7. The advice 
of Barr, Levy, Scheepers and Tily (2013) for confirmatory hypothesis testing with 
mixed models was followed: the maximal model8 with all random effects would not 
converge (which can be a particular problem when using logistic, rather than linear, 
regression, and where data includes floor or ceiling effects, and possibly small random 
effects), and so separate models with by-item and by-subject random effects were 
fitted. Firstly, a model with condition, utterance type and age group as fixed effects, 
and item by condition, age group and block (or story) number random slopes was 
fitted, with sum coding of fixed effects. This indicates a main effect of condition, such 
                                                 
7 R scripts for all chapters can be found at https://github.com/elspethwilson  
8 Note that the models presented here are not maximal in its proper sense: they do not include 
the factors of item order, story topic or picture location (left/right for critical item). However, 
these were counterbalanced across participants. The random effects included are those 
required by the assumptions of the model (to counteract the assumption of independence of 
predictors). 
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that the control condition is higher than the grand mean (β = .53, p < .001); a main 
effect of scalar inference type, such that the scalar type is lower than the grand mean 
(β = -1.25, p < .001); and an effect of the age group 2;8–3;11, such that it is lower than 
the grand mean (β = -1.02, p < .001) – Table 2.5.  
 
 Estimate SE   z p 
Intercept 2.81 .16 17.1 < .001 
Control .53 .13 4.20 < .001 
Ad Hoc .37 .22 1.72 .086 
Relevance -0.15 .20 -0.78 .44 
Scalar -1.25 .12 -6.56 < .001 
2;8–3;11 -1.02 .16 -6.34 < .001 
4;0–4;11 .014 .14 .10 .92 
Table 2.5 Response ~ Condition + Type + Age group + (1 + Condition + Age group + Block | Item) 
Glmer, family = binomial, optimizer = bobyqa, sum coding 
Secondly, a model fitted with the same fixed effects and Subject by type random 
slope was less conservative, indicating in addition small main effects of ad hoc and 
relevance type, above and below the grand mean respectively. For an alternative 
approach suggested by Barr et al. (2013), see Appendix 8.2.9   
 
                                                 
9 Although neither of these approaches is an ideal implementation of generalised mixed 
models with maximal random effects, they are arguably still better than the alternative non-
parametric variants such a Friedman’s ANOVA, as they avoid the loss of information through 
aggregation (per participant/per item), and can easily accommodate multiple predictors. 
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 Estimate SE z p 
Intercept 3.39 .32 10.66 < .001 
Control .57 .08 7.07 < .001 
Ad Hoc 2.09 .84 2.50 .013 
Relevance -0.81 .032 -2.56 .011 
Scalar -1.84 .31 -5.91 < .001 
2;8–3;11 -0.076 .22 -3.50 .00042 
4;0–4;11 .012 .20 .061 .95 
Table 2.6 Response ~ Condition + Type + Age group + (1 + Type | Subject) 
Glmer, family = binomial, optimizer = bobyqa, sum coding 
2.4.4.2 Theory dependent – successive difference coding of contrasts  
In the second analysis, the factors are coded with successive difference contrasts, 
so that each level is compared with the previous one. The order of levels within each 
factor is based on the predictions made in the opening section of this chapter, such 
that each level is expected to have a lower score than its preceding level. The orders 
were: control–critical, WLE–relevance–ad hoc–scalar, and decreasing age groups. The 
intercept is still the grand mean.  
As per the approach with sum coding, a mixed effects logistic regression model 
was fitted with condition, utterance type and age group as fixed effects, and item by 
condition, age group and block random slopes. This indicates a difference in 
condition, such that the rate of correct responses for critical trials is lower than for 
control trials (β = -1.06, p < .001); a difference between relevance and WLE, such that 
rate of correct response is lower for relevance than WLE (β = -1.18, p = .0024); no 
difference between relevance and ad hocs; but a difference between ad hocs and 
scalars, with scalars lower than ad hocs (β = -1.63, p < .001). There is also a difference 
between age groups: 4-year-olds perform worse overall than 5-year-olds (β = -0.99, 
p = .0024), and 3-year-olds worse than 4-year-olds (β = -1.04, p < .001) – Table 2.7.  
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 Estimate SE z p 
Intercept 2.80 .16 17.1 < .001 
Critical – Control -1.06 .25 -4.20 < .001 
R – WLE -1.18 .39 -3.03 .0024 
AH – R .052 .32 1.64 .10 
S - AH -1.63 .33 -4.89 < .001 
4;0–4;11 – 5;0–5;11 -0.99 .33 -3.04 .0024 
2;8–3;11 – 4;0–4;11 -1.04 .20 -5.05 < .001 
Table 2.7 Response ~ Condition + Type + Age group + (1 + Condition + Age group + Block | Item) 
Glmer, family = binomial, optimizer = bobyqa, backward difference coding 
The same model with Subject by condition and type random slope (nlminbw 
optimizer) confirmed these results, but again was less conservative, with an additional 
significant effect of ad hoc vs relevance, such that ad hoc scores are higher than 
relevance. In the following discussion, I will base comments on the more conservative 
models with by-item random slopes.  
2.4.4.3 Comparison to chance in three-year-olds 
Although three-year-olds perform more poorly than the other two age groups 
overall, they still might be at above chance levels (in this case 50%). To find out 
whether this is the case on inference trials, a model with just the intercept, and 
random intercepts for item and subject was fitted for each type of inference (critical 
trials only). Only scalar implicatures are not above chance in three-year-olds (Table 
2.8).  
Type Estimate SE z p 
Ad hoc 3.04 1.34 2.26 .024 
Relevance 1.48 .69 2.16 .031 
Scalar .25 .21 1.16 .25 
Word learning 3.8 1.46 2.6 .0094 
Table 2.8 Response ~ 1 + (1 | Item.no) + (1|Subject) 
Glmer, family = binomial, optimizer = bobyqa, contrast coding, critical trials only 
2.4.4.4 Relationship between inference types  
To examine the relationship between relevance and quantity inferences, I 
conducted partial correlations (Kendall’s τ) for scores in the critical condition 
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controlling for language (scalar / ad hoc control score) and for age in months 
(Bonferroni correction applied: α level .05/2 = .025). For scalars, there is a significant 
positive relationship of small to moderate size with relevance when controlling for 
language and age: τ = .21, z = 2.5, p = .012. For ad hocs, there is no significantly 
positive relationship: τ = .078, z = .94, p = .35.  
2.4.4.5 Effect of block number 
To examine whether there is a practice effect – that is whether children improve 
in their performance over the experiment – I added the block number as a predictor 
into the model with contrast coding, and conducted model comparison (where the 
blocks are numbered A–D, so that each story appears in each block across lists, 
excluding block E, which is the WLE story) – Figure 2.6. Adding in block did not 
significantly improve the model; there is no main effect of block, though visual 
inspection suggests that different age groups may perform differently for different 
utterance types across blocks – Table 2.9. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Mean correct score by age, inference type, condition and block 
Error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for between-subject comparison 
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Model Df AIC Log Lik Deviance χ2 p 
Score ~ 1 + (1 + Critical + Age 
group + Trial_block | Item) 
37 1476.3 -701.17 1402.3   
Score ~ Critical + (1 + Critical + 
Age group + trial_block | Item) 
38 1473.6 -698.81 1397.6 4.72    .03 
Score ~ Critical + Type +  
(1 + Critical + Age group + 
Trial_block |   Item) 
41 1452.9 -685.45 1370.9 26.71 < .001 
Score ~ Critical + Type + Age 
group + (1 + Critical + Age group 
+ Trial_block | Item) 
43 1419.5 -666.76 1333.5 37.39 < .001 
Score ~ Critical + Type + Age 
group + Trial_block +  
(1 + Critical +Age group + 
Trial_block | Item) 
46 1421.8 -664.9 1329.8 3.71 .29 
Table 2.9 Model comparison for effect of block order 
2.4.4.6 WLE and pragmatic inferencing 
Overall, WLE scores are close to ceiling, so to examine the relationship between 
WLE and pragmatic inferencing, I ran partial correlations (Kendall’s τ) for WLE scores 
(critical condition) compared to relevance and ad hoc scores, controlling for language 
ability (relevance or ad hoc control score), in the youngest age group only. There was 
no significant correlation between WLE and relevance scores (τ = -0.05, z = -0.34, 
p = .73), but a significant, small to moderate one for WLE and ad hocs (τ = .34, z = 2.3, 
p = .021), correcting for multiple comparison (Bonferroni, α level at .025).  
2.4.4.7 Analysis with 6-month age groups  
As other studies suggest that the fourth year of life is a critical one for pragmatic 
development (e.g. Schulze et al., 2013; Stiller et al., 2015), I also conducted an 
exploratory analysis with 6 smaller age groups (Figure 2.7). Note, though, that the 
sample size for each age group is now too small to draw firm conclusions (Table 2.10). 
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Age group Monolinguals Female Mean age (months) 
2;8–3;2 9 5 36.1 
3;3–3;8 12 6 42.6 
3;9–4;2 11 4 48.6 
4;3–4;8 11 4 54.0 
4;8–5;2 16 9 60.1 
5;3–5;10 12 6 65.6 
Table 2.10 Participants in 6-month age groups 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Mean correct responses by inference type, condition and age group (small) 
Error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for between-subject comparison 
 
 
 
2;8–3;2 3;3–3;8 3;9–4;2 4;3–4;8 4;9–5;2 5;3–5;10 
 
Crit Con Crit Con Crit Con Crit Con Crit Con Crit Con 
WLE .83 .97 .98 .92 .91 1.00 .91 .93 .98 1.00 1.00 .96 
R .50 .81 .77 .94 .91 .98 .70 .91 .94 1.00 .92 1.00 
A .64 .78 .83 .96 1.00 .98 .95 .95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
S .44 .61 .65 .85 .58 .86 .80 .84 .76 .90 .81 .92 
Table 2.11 Proportion of correct responses by condition, inference type and age group 
R = Relevance, A = Ad hoc, S = Scalar; Crit = Critical, Con = Control 
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Visual inspection shows that there is indeed substantial change over the fourth 
year (over groups aged 2;8–3;2, 3;3–3;8, and 3;9–4;2). I fitted the same models as 
above, but this time with these smaller age groups as a fixed effect, and corresponding 
random effect for item (Table 2.12).  
 Estimate SE z p 
Intercept 2.9 .18 16.6 < .001 
Control .58 .15 3.9 < .001 
Ad Hoc .46 .25 1.88 .061 
Relevance -0.14 .21 -0.66 .51 
Scalar -1.47 .24 -6.21 < .001 
2;8–3;2 -1.85 .22 -8.4 < .001 
3;3–3;8 -0.53 .22 -3.4 .017 
3;9–4;2 .032 .27 .12 .91 
4;3–4;8 -0.31 .23 -1.38 .17 
4;9–5;2 1.68 .53 3.16 .002 
Table 2.12 Response ~ Condition + Type + Age group (small) + (1 + Condition + Age group (small) + Block 
| Item) 
Glmer, family = binomial, optimizer = bobyqa, sum coding  
 This indicates, again, a main effect of Condition, such that control is higher than 
the grand mean (β = .58, p < .001); a main effect of type, such that scalar trials are 
below the grand mean (β = -1.47, p < .001); and a main effect of the youngest two age 
groups, which are below the grand mean (β = -1.85, p < .001; β = -0.53, p = .016), and 
the 4;9–5;2 group which are significantly above it (β = 1.68, p = .002).  
A model with backward differences confirmed that the youngest group 
performed significantly more poorly than the next youngest (β = -1.31, p < .001) –
Table 2.13.  
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 Estimate SE z p 
Intercept 2.9 .18 16.6 < .001 
Critical – Control -1.17 .30 -3.9 < .001 
R – WLE -1.29 .43 -2.98 .0029 
AH – R .60 .35 1.74 .082 
S – AH -1.9 .40 -4.82 < .001 
4;9–5;2 – 5;3–5;10 .70 .73 .95 .34 
4;3–4; – 4;9–5;2 -2 .68 -2.93 .0034 
3;9–4;2 – 4;3–4;8 .35 .37 .93 .35 
3;3–3;8 – 3;9–4;2 -0.57 .37 -1.5 .13 
2;8–3;2 – 3;3–3;8 -1.31 .25 -5.29 < .001 
Table 2.13 Response ~ Condition + Type + Age group(small) + (1 + Condition + Age group(small) + Block | 
Item) 
Glmer, family = binomial, optimizer = bobyqa, sum coding 
Looking at the very youngest age group (2;8–3;2), a model with just the 
intercept, and random intercepts for item and subject was fitted for each type of 
inference (critical trials only), to test performance against chance (50%). Only WLE is 
above chance (Table 2.14).  
Type Estimate SE z p 
Ad hoc .76 .59 1.29 .197 
Relevance -0.04 .53 -0.083 .93 
Scalar -0.27 .48 -0.56 .58 
Word learning 41.7 12.6 3.3 < .001 
Table 2.14 Response ~ 1 + (1 | Item.no) + (1|Subject) 
Glmer, family = binomial, optimizer = bobyqa, sum coding 
2.5 Discussion 
2.5.1 Findings 
In this study, a novel design was used to examine three different types of 
implicatures in development in children from 2 years 8 months to 5 years 11 months – 
relevance, ad hoc quantity and scalar quantity – together with WLE inferences. It is 
the first study to my knowledge that combines these four inferences in a single study 
and allows for some comparison between them.  
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2.5.1.1 Developmental trend for implicatures  
The results indicate a developmental trend for implicature comprehension and 
for semantic comprehension. There is an increasing rate of correct responses with age, 
whether the correct picture choice requires only a semantic match or the picture 
selected indicates that the pragmatically enriched meaning has been inferred. Each 
age group performs better than the younger preceding one, collapsing over condition 
and inference type.  
In addition, it is clear that implicature comprehension in particular is still 
developing across this age-range, as there is also a main effect of condition, with 
control trials at higher correct rates than critical trials. Note that this is expected in 
this experimental design, where control trials are semantically unambiguous, in 
contrast to some other studies, where the control or baseline condition creates 
ambiguity or uncertainty such that chance or below chance levels are expected (e.g. 
Stiller et al., 2015).  
There is also a difference between types of pragmatic inference, seen in 
differences in rate of correct responses across utterance types (though note this 
includes critical and control conditions): WLE is clearly the easiest; relevance is 
harder, but ad hoc is not harder than relevance; and scalars are hardest. This aligns 
with the predictions made about the relative challenge of the different types and a 
possible developmental order, with the exception of relevance inferences, which were 
not easier than ad hoc ones – I will discuss below why they may have proved 
challenging in this study.  
2.5.1.2 Quantity and relevance inferences 
There is a positive relationship between scalar and relevance inferencing abilities, 
when partialling out age and language (control scores), i.e., children who do better 
with scalar inferences also do better with relevance ones, when the contribution of age 
and language ability (control trials) is also taken into account. There is no evidence for 
a relationship between ad hocs and relevance.  
2.5.1.3 Pragmatic competence at 3 years  
The results also show that 3-year-olds as a whole group (2;8–3;11) already have 
significant pragmatic competence: besides WLE inferences, they are adept at ad hoc 
54 
 
and relevance inferences, scoring above chance level in critical trials. Given the high 
rate of correct response in the control condition, they are also clearly grasping the 
task, and it is largely within their linguistic competence. Scalar inferences are more 
challenging for them, as they are for older children, too.  
However, when the group is split into younger and older groups (2;8–3;2, 3;3–3;8 
and 3;9–4;2) in an exploratory analysis, it can be seen that it is the older groups that 
are driving this effect: the youngest of these groups is only above chance in WLE, and 
there is a main effect of age for the youngest two groups, who are significantly below 
the grand mean.  
2.5.1.4 Word learning by exclusion  
Overall, children excelled in WLE inferences, and performed better with these 
than with any implicature inference. In the youngest age group (2;8–3;11), there was 
no evidence for a relationship between WLE and relevance inferences, when 
controlling for language (relevance control scores), but there was a moderate positive 
relationship between WLE and ad hoc inferences, when controlling for language (ad 
hoc control scores).  
2.5.2 The development of implicatures 
The findings confirm the gradual development of pragmatic skills, as children’s 
performance becomes more adult-like with age. They thus corroborate the findings of 
other studies that employ similar measures for one or two implicature types (e.g. 
Horowitz & Frank, 2015; Pouscoulous et al., 2007; Schulze et al., 2013; Stiller et al., 
2015). While there is evidence for the emergence of the ability to make pragmatic 
inferences during the fourth year of life, children become more and more adult-like in 
their implicature derivation across the preschool years.  
Many features of this study’s design were implemented to support children’s 
inferencing – to make it as easy as possible for them to derive an implicature. For 
example, a picture-matching task does not require metalinguistic or explicit reasoning, 
and it does provide relevant alternatives in the visual context, and a co-operative, 
rather than under-informative, speaker. It was also a naturalistic engaging task, with 
trials with a question-and-answer structure set within a story. In this way, it was 
aimed at revealing their maximal pragmatic competence. Even so, children in the age-
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range I tested show an improvement towards adult-like pragmatic behaviour. 
However, I will also discuss below some features that may have actually masked 
children’s pragmatic abilities by making aspects of the inferencing process more 
challenging.  
The findings also indicate that different types of inferences follow different 
developmental paths, so that children reach adult-like performance earlier or later in 
each. As I outlined above, this is something that neo-Gricean pragmatic theory would 
lead us to expect, as different types of implicature involve different inferential 
processes, and depend on other factors like structural language or world knowledge to 
different extents in different situations. Relevance implicatures involve an elaborative 
inference that renders the utterance relevant; quantity implicatures involve, in 
addition, accessing and negating relevant alternatives. For ad hoc implicatures, 
alternatives are found in context; for scalar implicatures, some lexical knowledge of 
alternatives is required. On this basis, I made a tentative prediction that relevance 
might emerge before ad hoc quantity, which, in turn, might emerge before scalar 
quantity inferences. The results indicate that, after WLE, ad hoc and relevance emerge 
before scalar implicatures, but provide no evidence for relevance emerging before ad 
hocs. 
2.5.2.1 Quantity and relevance  
Across all age groups, there was also a small-to-moderate positive relationship 
between scalar and relevance inference, when also taking language (scalar control 
trials) and age into account. One possible explanation is that there is a common skill 
underlying development in both, namely an ability to track the QUD and make 
elaborative inferences. There is already evidence that this is a challenge for children 
with scalar inferences (Skordos & Papafragou, 2016), and they are aided when the 
QUD is consistent and clear, rendering alternatives salient. It can therefore be 
expected that, while these seem and have been treated as very distinct pragmatic 
inferences, they might develop somewhat in tandem. Of course, a correlation is only 
indicative, and there are many other plausible explanations, such as general 
intelligence and attentional capacity which could be facilitating ability to do the task. 
Further research is needed to isolate the contribution of tracking the QUD and 
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elaborative inferences, for example, through direct manipulation of the QUD and the 
availability of alternatives.  
There was no evidence for a relationship between ad hoc and relevance 
inferences, which could be for a number of reasons. Firstly, children were approaching 
ceiling in ad hocs and there was little variation. Secondly, there were only 4 critical 
items in each condition. Thirdly, while this study had the great advantage of testing all 
children with both quantity and relevance implicatures in the same experimental 
paradigm, there may still have been differing levels of complexity between trials for 
different implicature types. In particular, while the stronger alternative was visually 
presented for ad hocs, for the relevance implicatures, the literal meaning of the 
utterance was not depicted visually, nor was the link in reasoning to the intended 
meaning via some relevant piece of world knowledge. Take the following example:  
Bob’s dad asked, ‘What game do you want to play?’ 
And I said, ‘I brought a ball’ 
[Tennis OR Cards] 
At the point of the critical utterance, only the intended meaning (tennis) was visually 
available (depicted by a tennis racket only), together with an alternative (a card game). 
However, there was no picture of a tennis game in action with the tennis racket and 
ball together – which was necessary so that the picture was not just chosen as a 
semantic match. It also meant, though, that the fact that a ball was needed to play 
tennis was required from world knowledge. This in itself might have made relevance 
inferences more challenging than ad hocs in this particular study, and obscured any 
relationship.  
2.5.2.2 Early pragmatic competence 
The findings fit in with other recent studies that find evidence for competence 
with some implicatures emerging at the age of three years: Stiller, Frank and Goodman 
(2015) observe ad hoc inferences in American-English-speaking children, and Schulze, 
Grassmann and Tomasello (2013) observe relevance inferences in German-speaking 3-
year-olds. In some ways, this is not surprising. Even younger children seem to have 
some pragmatic inferencing abilities in understanding the intended meaning of 
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pointing or requesting (e.g. Grosse, Moll, & Tomasello, 2010; Tomasello et al., 2007). 
The linguistic and processing demands of this task were also minimised as far as 
possible, with no metalinguistic reasoning, explicit judgement or tracking a variably 
co-operative speaker required, as required for Felicity Judgement Tasks. Early 
competence does, though, present a puzzle of whether and how implicatures can be 
derived before standard Theory of Mind tests are consistently passed, which I take up 
in Chapters 3 and 5.  
However, the exploratory analysis with narrower age groups corroborates others’ 
findings that before age 3, children do not seem to be able to derive these 
implicatures, at least in the context of the kind of tasks typically used in experimental 
pragmatics (Stiller et al., 2015; Yoon et al., 2015). This could be a true reflection of the 
competence of two-year-olds, and indicative of key differences between verbal 
pragmatic inferences like implicatures and non-verbal ones, which are available at a 
younger age (for instance, Schulze and Tomasello (2015) find that even 18-month-
olds can interpret non-verbal indirect requests). Alternatively, it could be an artefact 
of task designs, which thus far have essentially been adapted from those used with 
older children, rather than designed afresh based on what is known about toddlers’ 
cognitive capacities and experimental tasks that have been successfully employed with 
them.  
Ad hoc quantity implicatures  
The youngest age group’s (2;8–3;11) high performance with ad hoc inferences 
suggests that they already possess a number of skills. Besides the prerequisite joint 
attention and intention reading for communication, they need to be sensitive to 
informativeness; to be able to conceive of the stronger and weaker alternatives 
provided visually in context as being related but distinct sets in an entailment 
relationship; to recognise the stronger utterance as one that the speaker could have 
said but did not; and to engage in some sort of counterfactual reasoning with negation 
of the stronger alternative.10  
                                                 
10 This rich Gricean interpretation is not the only possibility. The simple ad hoc and relevance inferences 
in this task could in principle be derived via more basic heuristics (e.g. ‘match one uttered label to one 
object’) or associative mappings (e.g. ‘milk goes with cereal’). These alternatives raise questions of their 
own, such as why do 2-year-olds not have these heuristics, when they can do WLE? In Chapter 5, I 
return to the possibility that pragmatic-like communication is possible without full Gricean reasoning.  
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If, as suggested by some other studies and by the analysis with smaller age groups 
here, two-year-olds are unable to derive ad hoc implicatures (Stiller et al., 2015; Yoon 
et al., 2015), one possibility is that some of these skills (or their integration) develop at 
around this age. Counterfactual reasoning is already firmly in place in word learning 
(e.g. Halberda, 2006) and in understanding others’ attention to objects (Moll, Koring, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2006). It is closely linked to the ability to recognise the 
stronger utterance as one that the speaker could have said but did not, and a related 
skill is also required in WLE: accessing the label associated with the known object and 
recognising it as one that the speaker could have said but did not. This requires 
productive knowledge of that label, which is indeed a predictor of an exclusion 
inference (Grassmann, Schulze, & Tomasello, 2015). Sensitivity to informativeness is 
also evident even in two-year-olds, for instance in their ability to distinguish between 
test and genuine questions based on the situation (Grosse & Tomasello, 2012). It 
might be, then, that it is the ability to conceive of the alternatives as contrasting but 
related sets which develops, enabling the inference of ad hoc implicatures.  
Another possibility, mentioned by Yoon, Yu and Frank (2015) is a task factor: the 
salience of the alternative is such that young children struggle to inhibit it as a choice. 
The tasks used by Stiller, Frank and Goodman (2015), and Yoon, Wu and Frank 
(2015), as well as in this study, always had a single object in the target picture and two 
objects in the distractor picture for ad hoc trials. Two objects are unavoidably more 
visually salient than one, and the picture with two objects includes one that is unique 
across the whole visual array. This is clearly a difference from the WLE inference, 
where alternatives are both single objects. What to my knowledge has not yet been 
tested, is whether carefully controlling the salience of the two pictures would boost 
performance in toddlers. One way of doing this would be to use several objects of the 
same type, as used by Horowitz and Frank (2015) with 4- and 5-year-olds, and 
adopted in Experiment 4 here. The overall number of objects could therefore be the 
same on both cards or the relative numbers manipulated to vary salience. An 
alternative would be to vary object size. If, with salience controlled for, children are 
still at or below chance, then it is more likely some aspect of the inference process 
itself, yet to be acquired, that is causing children’s difficulties.  
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Relevance implicatures  
In this study the youngest age group (2;8–3;11) are also competent with 
relevance inferences, performing above chance. This corroborates Schulze, Grassmann 
and Tomasello’s (2013) findings with German-speaking children: their younger group, 
aged 2;10–3;1, were not above chance with relevance inferences based on a fulfilled 
precondition (mean = 58%), whereas their older group, aged 3;10–4;1, were above 
chance (mean = 62%). In this study, the age range of the youngest group is wider, 
encompassing both younger and older three-year-olds who were above chance overall, 
but in the exploratory analysis with narrower age groups (2;8–3;2, 3;3–3;8 and 3;9–
4;2), the same pattern is seen, as the youngest group is at chance. It therefore seems 
that the fourth year of life is a crucial time for the development of competence with 
this kind of relevance inference, with other kinds, such as nonverbal indirect requests, 
emerging even earlier (Schulze & Tomasello, 2015).  
One problem with this study is that the associations for the elaborative inference 
were only pretested with the older children, and so it could plausibly be lack of 
relevant world knowledge that is restricting the youngest children’s performance. This 
was not a problem in Schulze, Grassmann and Tomasello’s study, however. One way 
to mitigate this could be, for example, a warm-up phase in which the relevant facts are 
in some way recapped with the child, so that they are, to some extent, part of the 
common ground and shared experience with the speaker. Alternatively, intuitively 
easier relevance inferences – such as from preference to desire, as in Schulze et al. 
(2013) – could be employed.  
A further observation about a difference between the stimuli in these two studies 
is worth noting. In Schulze, Grassmann and Tomasello’s task, 4 of the 8 stimuli use the 
first person (e.g. ‘I bought milk’, ‘I’ve got a leash’) and the other 4 are impersonal 
constructions (e.g. ‘The toothpaste is in the bathroom’), whereas in this study they are 
all of the first type (e.g. ‘I’ll get the milk’). It could be that the use of the first person, in 
referring to an intentional action of the speaker, is a clearer cue to the speaker’s 
intended meaning than an impersonal description. Perhaps an explanation such as ‘a 
person buys / brings / gets something necessary for what he wants’ is easier for 
children to arrive at than ‘a person mentions the existence of something necessary for 
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what he wants’, which might explain why the older three-year-olds do much better in 
this study (3;9–4;2 score 91% compared to 62% in Schulze and colleagues’ study). Of 
course, this proposal would need testing systematically with a larger sample of 
children, but it highlights the many factors involved in a relevance implicature that 
have to be acquired.  
2.5.2.3 Development of scalar implicatures  
Children aged 4 and 5 years were beginning to be able to derive scalar 
implicatures, comparable to other studies that use picture-matching or action-based 
tasks (Horowitz & Frank, 2015; Pouscoulous et al., 2007), with competence with the 
stronger alternative – in control trials – preceding competence with the implicated 
meaning of the weaker term – in critical trials. So, while scalar implicatures, in this 
case with ‹all, some›, present particular challenges in development, the age gap 
between competence with ad hoc or relevance inferences and scalars is not as great as 
once thought. As predicted, though, it is the hardest type of inference for children.  
Various specific features of the task may have boosted children’s performance: 
the visual availability of the stronger alternative; the absence of numeric alternatives 
in the subitizing range which would compete as alternatives; and the control trials 
providing the stronger alternative in the discourse context. Indeed, if one looks only at 
the scalar trials for the first block (i.e., the first two scalar trials for each participant, 
one critical and one control), then it seems from the numerical pattern that scalar 
inferences receive a particular boost from a preceding trial with ‘all’ for the 4-year-olds 
(Figure 2.8).  
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Figure 2.8 Proportion correct responses for first block scalar trials only 
There are other aspects of the task, though, that may have made it more challenging 
than other tasks: the changing QUD across trials (cf. Horowitz & Frank, 2015, who 
find worse performance when ad hoc and scalar trials are mixed); the more complex 
pictures containing more items, well above the subitizing range; and the lack of 
explicit QUD about quantity – questions in scalar trials were of the form, for example 
‘What did you do with the plates?’. 
An alternative explanation for children’s high performance is that what they are 
doing here is not a scalar implicature per se – reasoning about informativeness – but 
purely a contrastive inference, as proposed by Katsos and Wilson (in prep.) and, 
independently, by Sullivan, Davidson, Wade and Barner (submitted), following Bale 
and Barner’s (2013) observations about evasive relevance inferences. On this account, 
when children are given alternatives, like some and all (either in discourse or visually), 
they are able to reject under-informative some on the basis that it is not all, rather 
than because it is less informative than all. In other words, they are performing an 
exclusion inference, as in WLE. Sullivan and colleagues (submitted) set out to test this 
possibility, but their results seem inconclusive. The studies they choose to cite imply 
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that they might expect this to be an issue not only for contrast in discourse (for 
example, ‘Did you feed all the ducks? I fed some of them’), but also when there is 
visual contrast only (as in the present study, and other picture-matching tasks). 
However, their experimental design instead assumes that exclusion is only possible 
with alternatives contrasted in discourse. 4–7-year-old children do not reward Puppy 
when he has coloured all the stars when he was requested to ‘colour some of them’ 
(unlike adults, i.e., a scalar entailment relation). They check that this is not due to 
children deriving a scalar implicature at the point of request through a nonverbal 
condition, where participants are only shown what Puppy did – and in this case, they 
now reward him just as adults do. When there is both an utterance and a picture, 
there is no change in performance from the utterance-only condition. The question, 
then, is whether a picture-matching task like this is more like the picture-only 
condition – remembering that, in my task, participants have not heard the stronger 
term immediately before – or more like the picture-and-words condition. Furthermore, 
the fact that there is not the same effect for ad hoc entailment trials – they do not 
improve in the picture-only condition – is intriguing (and not discussed by the 
authors). Could it be that children are indeed deriving an inference at the point of 
request, but are more willing to cancel it in the case of scalars rather than ad hocs? 
More work is needed to find out whether children do use a contrastive inference 
strategy for quantity and relevance inferences, before ascribing it as an explanation to 
the findings here.  
In my study, the youngest age group are not above chance performance when it 
comes to scalars, and a histogram of child scores (Figure 2.9) reveals that this reflects 
a modal score of 50%, rather than a bimodal distribution, as in some other studies 
(Guasti et al., 2005; Skordos & Papafragou, 2016): either children are largely unable to 
derive the implicated meaning, and so are guessing, given that the literal meaning of 
some matches both pictures, or they are not attending to the quantifier, which also 
leaves them having to guess.  
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Figure 2.9 Histogram of scores by inference type and condition, for 2;8–3;11 
This age group do seem, however, to be largely on the way to acquiring the 
stronger alternative ‘all’ (with 100% the modal score for control trials), which suggests 
that not all the children are simply ignoring the quantifier. This pattern could fit in 
with either of two accounts of scalar implicature acquisition. On the lexical scales 
account, children here may have learnt the literal meaning of terms on the scale but 
not how they relate to the scale, so they are not yet able to derive scalar inferences 
(e.g. Barner et al., 2011). On a more general pragmatic account, they have acquired 
the scalar terms, but are unable to generate the relevant alternative in this context 
(Skordos & Papafragou, 2016). This is likely, as the context statement and question 
preceding the critical utterance do not highlight quantity.  
2.5.2.4 Word learning by exclusion  
The youngest children in this study certainly excel in WLE inferences, confirming 
that this is a strategy that children develop very young, perhaps even in the second 
year of life (e.g. Graham et al., 1998; Halberda, 2003; Markman et al., 2003). Precisely 
because of this high performance, this study cannot offer much firm evidence for the 
nature of the WLE inference – whether it is a pragmatic inference, akin to an 
implicature derivation, or a low-level word learning heuristic. However, examining the 
youngest age group in the study (2;8–3;11) reveals a positive association between ad 
hoc and WLE inferences, when language (ad hoc control score) was partialled out, but 
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provides no evidence for a relationship between relevance and WLE.  
On a pragmatic view of WLE, the association between WLE and ad hoc 
inferences could be explained by the shared inferencing process: both include 
reasoning with reference to the speaker’s intentions about what the speaker could 
have said, but did not, and excluding these alternatives to derive the speaker’s 
intended meaning. In this case, children could be doing particularly well in WLE in 
this study overall because the first four stories involving quantity and relevance 
inferences are effectively pragmatic training that provides relevant practice in 
inference making and reasoning about speaker intentions. Remember that the word 
learning trials were placed in a single block which was always presented last, in order 
that the puppet’s use of novel words and choice of novel items did not affect the 
participant’s view of him as co-operative and rational. 
On a lexical heuristic view of WLE, one could argue that the association between 
ad hoc and WLE inferences is not a result of their shared pragmatic reasoning, but 
instead the shared mechanisms of reasoning by exclusion, which, at least in the case of 
WLE, may not involve reasoning about speaker intentions. The fact that no association 
with relevance was found – which crucially is pragmatic but does not involve 
reasoning by exclusion – supports this explanation. Children would then be doing well 
in WLE overall because of domain general factors like being engaged in a naturalistic 
task, and because the lexical heuristic is available even in the second year of life – well 
before any current evidence for implicature derivation.  
A future study into the nature of WLE that adopts this promising approach of 
comparing a clearly pragmatic phenomenon like implicature with word learning 
inferences therefore needs to a) test children at a younger age where there is more 
variability in their abilities, and b) consider the influence that each inference type 
might have on the other. Testing a younger age group, though, requires a type of 
implicature that at least some children have acquired. One option might be ad hoc 
implicatures, if indeed balancing visual salience improves performance; another could 
be the kind of nonverbal indirect request demonstrated by Schulze and Tomasello 
(2015). Counterbalancing the order of the two conditions would also reveal whether 
there is more of a training effect from word learning to implicatures or vice versa. 
Another option could be to compare the training effect on WLE inference rates of a 
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clearly pragmatic task (like relevance implicature derivation) and an unrelated one.  
2.5.3 Improvements to task 
I have already raised several issues with the task design in the course of 
discussion, as well as some possible improvements, and so here I simply summarise 
and add some improvements to the task which could be used to follow up on my 
findings. 
In order to address the question of the nature of WLE by comparing it with a 
pragmatic phenomenon, there are two possibilities:  
i. Use an inference that is available at a younger age, such as nonverbal 
indirect requests (Schulze & Tomasello, 2015) and compare this to WLE, in 
counterbalanced block order 
ii. Use a training study design to look at difference in performance before and 
after pragmatic training, compared to an unrelated task 
To examine the developmental trajectory of and relationships between different 
inference types, a new study could ensure that:  
i. Ad hoc trials have equally salient images 
ii. Scalar trials involve a question that more explicitly involves a quantity 
QUD, and avoids over-informative repetition of the nominal phrase 
iii. Relevance trials are normed for world knowledge at the youngest age of 
testing 
iv. There is a larger sample and more trials per condition 
In addition, inference types could be tested in separate blocks (to avoid shifting 
the QUD), although this compromises the more naturalistic design. Finally, minimally 
different trials could be used across inference types, as in Figure 2.10 (inspired by 
Horowitz & Frank, 2015), although this itself might introduce a new challenge, as a 
changing QUD is not indicated by the image type. 
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Figure 2.10 Example of improved stimuli for implicatures task 
2.6 Conclusion  
In a study that combined four inference types in one testing session and in a 
single experimental paradigm – a picture-matching study with 2;8 to 5-year-olds – I 
corroborated developmental trends previously seen across different studies: WLE is in 
place early, followed by ad hoc and relevance inferences, and finally scalars. This 
pattern also fits in with the computational complexity of each type, viewed within a 
Gricean framework, although I found no evidence for relevance inferences emerging 
before quantity ones, as predicted. There is some evidence of patterning together in 
development across scalar and relevance, as might be expected from their shared 
features. There is likewise some evidence of relationship between WLE and ad hoc 
inferences in children aged 2;8–3;11, which could either be indicative of a pragmatic 
basis for WLE, or due to the reasoning by exclusion evident in both (for WLE see 
Halberda, 2006). The question of how much pragmatic reasoning is involved in 
children’s word learning strategies, including WLE, therefore invites future research, 
potentially in the spirit of the study presented here.  
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3 Factors in implicature development 
The development of pragmatic skills – including implicature comprehension – 
does not, of course, happen in isolation, but in interaction with children’s cognitive 
and social development, and their environment. To date, those studies looking at 
children’s development of implicatures within the stream of experimental pragmatics 
have largely focussed on when children acquire certain abilities, possibly to test 
theory-driven hypotheses. This is certainly useful, but looking, in addition, at 
pragmatic development in the context of the child might not only reveal something 
about how children learn to comprehend implicated meaning but, further, eventually 
have implications in educational or clinical settings.  
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between implicature and word 
learning inferences with aspects of cognitive and linguistic development, namely 
Theory of Mind and structural language knowledge, and with two aspects of life 
experience – speaking one or more than one language and socioeconomic status (SES). 
The latter two have been widely demonstrated to be associated with developmental 
patterns in other areas of language, like vocabulary and syntax – so what about 
pragmatics? And how do structural language skills relate to pragmatics in 
development? And, as we shall see, Theory of Mind is implicated in (post-)Gricean 
pragmatic theory, so is there empirical evidence?  
This chapter constitutes an exploratory study to begin to address such questions. 
It is exploratory, firstly because existing pragmatic theory and evidence do not give 
rise to clear-cut predictions, and, secondly, because the data was collected primarily 
for the study presented in Chapter 2, rather than to target any one of these 
associations. However, it is amenable to exploring these issues as well, and I follow up 
one of the interesting observations – on the association between Theory of Mind and 
implicatures in development – in Chapter 5. I first outline some relevant evidence for 
each cognitive, linguistic and environmental factor, before presenting the measures, 
analysis and findings.  
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3.1 Background 
As mentioned, in general there seems to have been little direct focus on these 
issues. However, various outlines for ‘prerequisites’ for pragmatics have been put 
forward – that is, those skills that children are supposed to need, and therefore to have 
acquired previously, to understand something like a quantity implicature. For 
instance, for Tomasello (2003) word learning is largely a pragmatic phenomenon, and 
he lists the ‘prerequisite processes’ of segmenting speech and conceptualising 
referents as well as the ‘foundational processes’ of joint attention, intention-reading, 
and cultural learning (see, too, Stephens & Matthews, 2014 for pragmatic 
development in particular). To these can be added for implicature: expectations of 
cooperativeness, tracking common ground, and, in the case of quantity inferences, 
generating alternatives which might involve domain restriction and conceptualisation 
of contrasting sets (Katsos, 2014), as well as structural language and world knowledge 
(Katsos & Wilson, in prep.). Some of these are taken as self-evident, given the adult 
experience of implicatures; some are derived from pragmatic theory; and some are 
supported by empirical evidence from acquisition – though few studies do this directly 
for implicatures.  
In this section, I present an overview of how the four factors that are the focus of 
this chapter may interact with children’s pragmatic development, and specifically with 
implicatures. I discuss Theory of Mind, which will be important for Chapter 5 as well, 
before turning to structural language knowledge, multilingualism and socioeconomic 
status, in turn.  
3.1.1 Theory of Mind 
First, I explain briefly what is meant by Theory of Mind (ToM) or mindreading;11 
then I show how it is implicated in Gricean approaches to pragmatics; and finally, take 
                                                 
11 Various terms are employed across the psychological, linguistic and philosophical literature, 
including Theory of Mind, mindreading, folk psychology and social cognition, each reflecting 
a particular stance (see, for instance, Apperly, 2010, on the use of ‘mindreading’ or Carpendale 
& Lewis, 2015, for ‘social cognition’). Here, I predominantly use the term ‘Theory of Mind’, 
reflecting the major use in linguistic pragmatic approaches to child development, and the fact 
that debate has often centred on acquisition of a ‘theory’ as indicated by passing a False Belief 
test. 
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a look at studies that have looked at their relationship in children.  
Theory of Mind is a much-researched concept in cognitive psychology as well as 
philosophy. Simply put, it constitutes ‘the capacity to attribute mental states to oneself 
and to others, and to reason on the basis of this information in order to interpret and 
predict others’ behaviors’ (Zufferey, 2010: 6). These mental states may involve beliefs, 
desires, intentions and affect. Apperly (2010) explains how there have been two basic 
approaches: ‘theory-theories’, where ToM ‘depends on us having mental state concepts 
and principles that describe their interactions’, and ‘simulation theories’, where ‘we 
use our own minds to model (i.e., simulate) those of others’’ (2010: 5). From 
psychological and philosophical perspectives, questions of the nature and 
development of ToM are very much still open.  
In practice, the focus has often been on the development of ToM in children, 
assuming that at a certain point children ‘get’ the necessary concepts, and attempting 
to identify when and how. On a modular view of its development, there are several 
precursors to full ToM, like gaze-tracking, shared attention, and intention detection 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; see also Tomasello, 2003). There are even aspects of reasoning 
about others’ epistemic states that emerge early, like level 1 perspective-taking, which 
I will return to at much more length in Chapter 5 (San Juan, Khu, & Graham, 2015). 
Furthermore, second-order ToM tasks, as well as combining conflicting aspects of 
another’s mind like belief and desire, emerge later in childhood (Apperly, 2010).  
However, the gold standard test for Theory of Mind has often been taken to be 
the ability to reason about others’ beliefs, where an agent’s epistemic state does not 
match reality, as measured by False Belief tasks. The Sally-Anne, or Change of 
Location, task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), requires 
children to track the beliefs of two protagonists about where an object is, and, 
crucially, realise that one has a false belief about the object’s location, when it has 
been moved in her absence. In the Unexpected Contents, or Smarties, task (Perner, 
Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987), children are shown a tube of sweets, only to find out – 
what a disappointment – that it instead holds pencils or paperclips; they are then 
asked what they thought was in it, what really is in it, and what a friend will think is in 
it. Robustly, cross-culturally, children under 4 years tend to fail these tests (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001).  
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Why does this matter for pragmatic development? Since the dawn of the ‘Gricean 
era’, Theory of Mind has been implicated, firstly, in pragmatic communication in 
general, and, secondly, in implicature inferencing, specifically.  
Grice (1957) introduced the notion of ‘non-natural meaning’, which, in the very 
way he elaborates it, assumes that speakers reason about their own beliefs and 
intentions, and the hearers’ beliefs: ‘I must intend to manipulate or add to my 
audience’s mental representations in some way… The audience must recognise that I 
have these intentions… I should intend that my audience believes it, and they should 
believe it at least in part because they recognize that this was my very intention’ 
(Scott-Phillips, 2014: 22–23). Scott-Phillips (2014) forcefully argues that for such 
ostensive-inferential communication to take place at all, the hearer has to recognise 
both the speaker’s informative and communicative intentions, and the speaker has to 
intend this recognition. He is approaching pragmatics within a Relevance Theory 
framework (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), but the analysis still stands as an interpretation 
of Grice’s proposal. This means that any communicative act, not just those involving 
implicatures, irony, reference resolution or other classic ‘pragmatic phenomena’, 
requires ToM.  
Secondly, concentrating on the belief or epistemic state component of ToM, it is 
clear that it is inherent in Grice’s Co-operative Principle. The maxim of quality – with 
its supermaxim, ‘try to make your contribution one that is true’ – involves two 
submaxims – ‘do not say what you believe to be false’, and, importantly here, ‘do not 
say that for which you lack adequate evidence’ (Grice, 1975). Further, it involves the 
supposition, on the part of both the speaker and the hearer, that the speaker is 
adhering to the Conversational Principle, and its ensuing maxims. Under normal 
circumstances, then, the hearer assumes that the speaker does have adequate evidence 
for the utterance – that they are knowledgeable (on the relevant matter). This in itself 
implies an aspect of epistemic state tracking on the part of the hearer. Further, Grice 
introduces the notion that maxims may clash with one another, so that the speaker is 
unable to fulfil both, giving an example where the inference itself concerns the 
epistemic state of the speaker:  
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A: Where does C live?  
B: Somewhere in the South of France.  
⇸ The speaker does not know in which town C lives.  
(Grice, 1989: 32) 
Here the hearer has to suppose that the speaker cannot be more informative (and 
therefore follow the maxim of quantity), if she also wants to follow that second 
submaxim of quality, and therefore there is no quantity implicature from the apparent 
under-informativeness – the hearer does not conclude that the speaker intends that C 
does not live in a specific place, but instead that the speaker is not sure. This invites us 
to think about the inverse case: where hearer and speaker both know that the speaker 
lacks evidence for the relevant utterance, so there is no need to make an inference 
about the speaker’s epistemic state. What might happen with the quantity 
implicature?  
Theorists following Grice have fleshed out Grice’s proposals, concentrating on 
the two key elements of reasoning involved in implicature derivation: the Competence 
Assumption (Geurts, 2010) and the Epistemic Step (Sauerland, 2004). Consider the 
following example: 
1. The speaker said that the puppet picked the card with rabbits.  
2. Given what the speaker said, the puppet may have picked the card 
with rabbits only or the card with rabbits and ducks (or other relevant 
alternatives). 
3. Given that the QUD is which card the puppet picked, and that we 
both assume we are being informative (following the Co-operative 
Principle), the speaker is giving as much information as is relevant 
and true.  
4. If the speaker knew that the puppet picked the card with rabbits 
and something else, he would have said so. 
5. The speaker did not say so, therefore he does not know whether the 
puppet picked the card with rabbits and something else.  
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6. However, assuming that the speaker does know all relevant 
information, specifically whether the puppet picked the card with 
rabbits only or the card with rabbits and something else… 
7. Given (6), and that the speaker did not say anything more than ‘the 
puppet picked the card with rabbits’, the speaker means that the 
puppet did not pick up the card with rabbits and something else. 
8. The speaker means that the puppet picked the card with only 
rabbits. 
9. And he intends me to reason in this way. 
(Adapted from Breheny, Ferguson & Katsos, 2013: 424; example based 
on Kronmüller, Morisseau & Noveck, 2013) 
Here, the Competence Assumption is in step (6) – that the speaker is fully 
knowledgeable with regards to the QUD. The Epistemic Step is then in step (7): from 
the ‘weak’ inference that the speaker does not know whether X, or X and Y, to the 
strong inference that the speaker knows that only X and nothing else (to use Geurts’, 
2010, term; the ‘weak’ inference is also known as an ignorance inference). 
Later pragmatic theorists have diverged on this view of implicature 
interpretation. Levinson (2000) focusses on so-called Generalised Conversational 
Implicatures, where the form of the utterance provides a short-cut to its intended 
meaning. For these, he suggests, an aspect of the context such as the speaker’s 
epistemic state can cancel an implicature, but it can never stop it being inferred in the 
first place. On the other hand, a different view comes from theories that treat scalar 
implicature in particular as a grammatical phenomenon (e.g. Chierchia, 2004; 
Chierchia et al., 2008): in this case, the context – and particularly semantic 
information in the utterance, like upward- or downward-entailment – contributes to 
the disambiguation of the utterance, namely whether it contains an exhaustivity 
operator or not. This means that the speaker’s epistemic state may not play a role in 
reasoning about what was said, as above, but it does still come into consideration at 
the point of interpretation, with a grammatical exhaustivity operator or not (Chemla & 
Singh, 2014b, 2014b). On the other hand, other Neo-Gricean approaches see the 
speaker’s epistemic state as licensing or suspending an implicature (e.g. Breheny et al., 
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2013: 424) or one of many factors that constrain pragmatic inferencing in a 
probabilistic model (e.g. Degen & Tanenhaus, 2014).  
The key point, therefore, is that – whatever the exact mechanism – all pragmatic 
theories following from Grice’s original postulations expect that the hearer takes into 
account the speaker’s epistemic state when deriving Particularised Conversational 
Implicatures, such as ad hoc quantity implicatures; most agree that this is also the case 
for Generalised ones, too, such as scalar implicatures, with the exception of Levinson’s 
(2000) Default view. 
This brings me to the conundrum: pragmatic theory has overwhelmingly 
implicated ToM in communication. ToM, indicated by passing traditional False Belief 
tasks, emerges around age 4. Some implicatures, like ad hocs and relevance inferences, 
appear earlier, and other pragmatic inferences – possibly WLE – earlier still. How can 
this be reconciled? As Scott-Phillipps (2014) puts it, it seems that either pragmatics 
does not involve ToM, or infants have ToM. Actually, there are two flavours to the first 
solution: a developmental and a life-long one. It could be that children look as if they 
are doing ostensive-inferential communication, but really they are using some other 
strategy that they will grow out of (Breheny, 2006). Alternatively, adults have more 
than one strategy available to them, not all involving full ToM (Jary, 2013, 2013; 
Katsos & Andrés-Roqueta, 2015; Kissine, 2016). I will return to these options in 
Chapter 5.  
This conundrum is obvious to the pragmatician – leading to the proposal of these 
possible workaround solutions. I wonder, though, whether cognitive psychologists and 
philosophers might not be so perplexed: after all, what ToM is and how it develops is 
still a matter of debate (Apperly, 2010). There are other plausible solutions, based on 
the signs of early emergence of ToM, and its gradual development. It could be, as well, 
that those children who are performing well in implicature tasks at age 3 also happen 
to be early ToM passers too. This can be tested in a correlational study such as I 
present here.  
A few studies have investigated the link between pragmatic competence and 
ToM, and have mostly found some sort of association: Veenstra (2010) found a 
correlation between reaction time for detecting under-informativeness and ToM in 4–
8-year-olds (but not with under-informativeness scores themselves); Filippova and 
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Astington (2008) find that explicit justification for advanced ToM response predicts 
irony comprehension (together with vocabulary); and Gollek and Doherty (2016) 
observe an association between performance in a word-learning task with a pragmatic 
cue (indicating that the referent of a novel word is the familiar object) and ToM, 
partialling out vocabulary score. No published study to date has looked at ToM with 
implicature comprehension, however, despite implicature comprehension being a key 
pragmatic competence.  
3.1.2 Structural language 
By structural language I mean syntax and vocabulary knowledge. There are two 
ways this could be related to implicature inferences in development: specifically 
related to utterances that trigger implicatures, and generally related to pragmatic 
development.  
Implicatures, as I have defined them in this study, are verbal and linguistic – in 
the sense that speakers use the conventional code of language in producing an 
utterance implicating their intended meaning. To infer any given implicature, then, 
hearers have to comprehend the literal content of the utterance. (In saying this, I do 
not mean that actual processing has to take place by first interpreting the literal 
content, then deriving the implicated meaning, as steps in Gricean reasoning are 
elucidated; instead, top-down anticipation of the implicated meaning may be taking 
place, but at least at some point or sometimes, the literal content will still play a role.) 
Moreover, for some types of implicature, rather specific lexical or syntactic knowledge 
is required. In the previous chapters, I have mentioned diverging accounts of quantity 
implicatures, with some taking scalar implicatures as a special case for which the 
trigger word in the utterance (e.g. ‘some’) and its alternatives (‘most’, ‘all’), sit on a 
scale, which is part of lexical knowledge (e.g. Chierchia et al., 2008). This scale then 
has to be learned, and children may struggle with scalars because they have learned 
the alternatives as lexical items but not how they form a scale (Barner et al., 2011).  
However, even ad hoc quantity implicatures require lexical knowledge of 
alternatives – what the speaker could have said but did not, in the context – even if 
this is simply knowing that a strawberry is a ‘strawberry’, not an ‘orange’, or that 
‘mother’ and ‘father’ equate to ‘parents’, in the following example:  
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A. Did you meet his parents? 
B. I met his mother.  
⇸ i. I met only his mother, not his father.  
⇸ ii. I did not meet his parents, instead I met his mother 
Without this lexical knowledge, only a contrastive inference is available, as I discussed 
in relation to scalars in the previous chapter. In this case, though, it would lead to the 
(actually incorrect) inference (ii). Likewise, for manner implicatures, knowledge of 
syntactic constructions may be important, for instance, knowing that ‘make the door 
close’ has the lexicalised alternative ‘close the door’ (an issue I cover in Chapter 4). For 
WLE inferences, this idea has been tested empirically. Productive knowledge of the 
label for the known object does predict the rate of exclusion inference: in Grassmann, 
Schulze and Tomasello’s (2015) study, productive knowledge of the competitor is a 
better predictor of using a WLE strategy than age in German-speaking 2-, 3- and 4-
year-olds.  
Secondly, structural language knowledge may be related to pragmatic inferences 
in development in a more general way – and this is what I am interested in for this 
study. This means a relationship between total lexical or syntactic knowledge and 
implicature abilities. This might be an extrapolation of the specific relationship I have 
just discussed: if a child has a larger vocabulary in general, it is more likely that he will 
know or have productive knowledge of the relevant alternatives for any given 
utterance, as well as comprehending its literal content. It might also be a consequence 
of a child’s language development trajectory in general: one might expect that 
structural language would facilitate pragmatic development or processing. That is, the 
more structural language knowledge children have acquired, the more they can access 
at least some meaning in context, and the more possibility they have to learn how 
expectations of co-operativeness function in conversation. Alternatively, on a usage-
based, pragmatics-first account of language acquisition, better pragmatic skills would 
facilitate lexical and syntactic acquisition, which in turn make more pragmatic 
strategies available (Tomasello, 2003). In either case, an association between 
structural language and pragmatics is predicted.  
In studies that have examined this relationship to date, structural language does 
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turn out to be a predictor of competence deriving implicatures. Antoniou & Katsos 
(2017) test structural language (in this case only vocabulary, receptive and expressive, 
plus sentence comprehension scores from control trials) as well as quantity, manner 
and metaphor inferences, in 6- to 9-year old speakers of Greek, Cypriot Greek and 
English. They find that language was a predictor of implicature performance for 
monolinguals and bilectals (but not bilinguals, for whom only age was a predictor). 
Similarly, Davies, Andres-Roqueta & Norbury (2016) find that for both children with 
Specific Language Impairment and typically developing children (Spanish-speaking, 
aged 5–11 years), language skills predict implicature performance: in the typically 
developing group, only receptive grammar is a predictor of production of optimally 
informative referential utterances, whereas in the Specific Language Impairment 
group sentence recall and vocabulary scores are also predictive. There also turns out to 
be a relationship between WLE and overall lexical knowledge: vocabulary score is a 
predictor of WLE, whether receptive or productive. For instance, Kalashnikova, 
Mattock and Monaghan (2016) find that 17- to -19-month-old English-speaking 
children with larger receptive vocabularies use a WLE strategy more than their peers 
with smaller vocabularies (see too Graham et al., 1998; Mervis & Bertrand, 1994; 
Suanda & Namy, 2013).  
The focus of this study is to examine whether this relationship exists for 
implicature understanding in younger children, as well as to look at the link between 
WLE and vocabulary in older children than previously tested. It is beyond the scope of 
a correlational study to establish the directionality of the link – whether structural 
language affects pragmatics, or vice versa, or indeed whether the influence is mutual.  
3.1.3 Socioeconomic Status 
Socioeconomic status (SES), as well as multilingual development, has 
connections to ToM and structural language, as well as – potentially – pragmatic 
inferencing. Indeed, there is a vast body of research on the relationship between SES 
and cognitive development, as well as between SES and language acquisition in 
general, with its important ramifications for education and welfare policy.  
SES is a complex concept, referring to ‘one’s access to financial, educational, and 
social resources, and the social positioning, privileges, and prestige that are derived 
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from these resources’ (Pace, Luo, Hirsh-Pasek, & Golinkoff, 2017: 287). It is typically 
measured by a proxy, such as income, income–need ratio or maternal education, the 
latter of which has been the most frequently used as the most reliable predictor for 
child outcomes (Hoff, Laursen, & Bridges, 2012). Many studies report a connection 
between SES and child language development, particularly concentrating on 
vocabulary (for a US focussed overview see Hoff, 2006; for a UK study see Locke, 
Ginsborg, & Peers, 2002). Striking differences are observed between SES groups, with 
lower SES children lagging behind their higher SES peers (although note that this 
effect may be partly a result of the test design favouring middle-class children: E. V. 
Clark, 2009; Hoff, 2006).  
When it comes to pragmatics, the evidence to date is much more scant: social 
pragmatic abilities like narrative skills may or may not be associated with SES, 
depending on assessment criteria (Pace et al., 2017: 287), although there is evidence 
for a difference in early gesture contributing to later SES differences in vocabulary 
(Rowe & Goldin-Meadow, 2009). In experimental pragmatics studies, SES is typically 
not mentioned, or only to explain an assumption of middle-class participants (e.g. 
Diesendruck et al., 2010; Y. T. Huang & Snedeker, 2009). However, Antoniou and 
Katsos (2017) do measure SES through the Family Affluence Scale (Boyce, Torsheim, 
Currie, & Zambon, 2006) and parental education, and do not find any evidence for a 
relationship with implicature comprehension. There is also some indication that SES 
and ToM may be associated (e.g. Cutting & Dunn, 1999, but Hughes, Deater-Deckard, 
& Cutting, 1999, did not replicate the effect).  
The reasons for the relationship between SES and language acquisition are likely 
to be multi-faceted and complex, and, as Pace and colleagues (2017) point out, have 
received less attention from a psycholinguistic approach. They identify three non-
mutually exclusive possible factors where more research is needed: differences in 
processing; differences in quality of input; and differences in learning materials 
available. Multilingualism adds an extra layer, as these factors may differ across a 
child’s languages (Scheele, Leseman, & Mayo, 2010). This means that the predictions 
for pragmatics are not yet clear. From the empirical evidence available, it could be that 
pragmatics patterns with other areas of language acquisition, like vocabulary and 
grammar, in terms of SES, especially as children’s pragmatic performance tends to 
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correlate with their structural language. However, it could also be the case that SES 
has no additional effect on pragmatic skills, once structural language is controlled for 
– much like multilingualism.  
3.1.4 Monolingualism vs multilingualism 
Another aspect of children’s lived experience – and cognitive development – is 
the number of languages they grow up with. The debate over the ‘bilingual advantage’ 
for cognitive function has become complex and nuanced (Bak, 2016). For structural 
language, and particularly vocabulary, there has been a long-reported effect that 
bilingual children’s vocabulary size or acquisition rate in each language tends to be 
lower than monolinguals’ (e.g. Bialystok & Feng, 2011; Bialystok, Luk, Peets, & Yang, 
2010; Hoff, Core, et al., 2012). However, this general finding is now being questioned, 
with factors such as sequential versus simultaneous bilingualism, or other variations in 
input, being implicated in any differences, rather than bilingual exposure per se. 
Whether one or both languages are tested, whether receptive or productive vocabulary 
is tested, and other variation in testing methods may also contribute to findings of 
difference. For instance, De Houwer, Bornstein and Putnick (2014) do not find 
evidence for a difference in matched samples, where bilinguals were exposed to rich 
input in both languages from birth. Similarly, Bialystok and colleagues (2010) 
compare vocabulary related to the school context and to the home context, and do not 
find differences between bilinguals and monolinguals for the school-related words 
(where they have similar exposure), but did for home-related words (where bilinguals 
have most exposure in the home language).  
For pragmatic abilities, the evidence is similarly mixed, depending on the skill 
being examined. Some studies employing judgement tasks for sensitivity to Gricean 
maxims find a bilingual advantage, across an age range of 3–10 years (Foppolo, 2015; 
Siegal et al., 2010, 2009; Siegal, Matsuo, Pond, & Otsu, 2007; Stateva et al., 2015). For 
instance, in Siegal and colleagues’ (2010, 2009) studies, children listen to two puppets 
respond to a question, a co-operative and an uncooperative one (in the Gricean sense 
of being informative and relevant), and have to identify which puppet says something 
silly. Others testing implicature comprehension directly via picture-selection tasks 
have not found evidence for a difference between monolingual and bilingual children, 
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once language and SES are controlled for, in older children aged 6–9 years and 10–13 
years (Antoniou & Katsos, 2017; Antoniou, Veenstra, Katsos, & Kissine, 2016). In 
addition, there is some evidence for an advantage for bilingual children in ToM 
abilities (Goetz, 2003; Kovács, 2009); repairing miscommunication (e.g. Wermelinger, 
Gampe, & Daum, 2017); using ‘pragmatic’ cues like eye-gaze or pointing for 
comprehension (Brojde & Colunga, 2011; Yow & Markman, 2011b); and sensitivity to 
speaker emotion (Yow & Markman, 2011a). Given the paucity of the studies for any 
one pragmatic phenomenon, the relationship between multilingual acquisition and 
implicature skills, though, is still an open question.  
Turning to WLE in particular, there are two additional factors that come into 
play. Firstly, as mentioned, bilinguals tend to have smaller vocabularies in any one 
language, associated with use of WLE strategy, as I explained above. Secondly, 
bilinguals have more linguistic experience of overlapping labels – they may know a 
label in both languages. Some studies have found that bilinguals fare worse on WLE 
tasks (Bialystok, Barac, Blaye, & Poulin-Dubois, 2010; Davidson, Jergovic, Imami, & 
Theodos, 1997; Davidson & Tell, 2005; Healey & Skarabela, 2009; Houston-Price, 
Caloghiris, & Raviglione, 2010), and factors like the precise contents of bilinguals’ 
vocabularies might also be important (Byers-Heinlein & Werker, 2013). Some studies 
have also found different developmental pathways for monolingual and bilingual 
children, with bilingual children using WLE less as they get older (Davidson & Tell, 
2005; Kalashnikova, Mattock, & Monaghan, 2015). Kalashnikova and colleagues 
(2015) used a variation of a word-learning task in which two puppets gave different 
labels to the same novel object, as well as the standard task: their older bilingual 
children (mean age 4;11) were worse at WLE but better at accepting lexical overlap 
than their monolingual peers. Extant studies therefore give a stronger indication for 
WLE than implicatures – and possibly in the opposite direction – that multilingual 
acquisition is negatively associated with WLE, whereas it may be positively associated 
with implicature inferencing.  
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3.2 Experiment 1B: the relationship of implicatures with structural 
language, SES, ToM and languages spoken 
3.2.1 Method 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Participants were a subset of the group recruited for Experiment 1A: of the 71 
monolinguals and 35 bilinguals not excluded for other reasons, 58 monolinguals and 
26 bilinguals completed all parts of the test sessions and their caregivers returned the 
background questionnaire, and they were included in the analysis in this chapter.  
The unequal numbers of monolingual and bilingual children reflect the 
predominantly monolingual population of the area: in 2013, 10.6% of primary school 
children in Cambridgeshire had a first language other than English (Department for 
Education statistics, 2016).  
3.2.1.2 Materials 
Implicature task 
The data from the implicature task presented in Chapter 2 were used, except that 
for this analysis, inference types were split into two groups: the first contained scalar, 
ad hoc and relevance implicatures; and the second, WLE. Also, only the critical trials 
are included in this analysis.  
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) 
The BPVS-3 (Dunn et al., 2009) was used to test receptive vocabulary. It is a 
picture-matching task, in which children are asked to point to one of four pictures 
that matches the word the experimenter says. The pictures are presented in a colour 
flip-book. The items are arranged in blocks of 12, and the test continues until children 
have made 8 or more mistakes in a block. Children received one warm-up trial. The 
raw scores, rather than standardised scores, were used in the analysis, as the 
comparison of interest is an individual’s vocabulary and inferencing ability, rather 
than vocabulary on a normal distribution for that age.  
Mini Test of Receptive Grammar (TROG) 
A reduced version of the TROG II (Bishop, 2003) was used, with 20 items (one 
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from each block of the full TROG, where blocks consist of four items each, with each 
block testing the same syntactic and semantic competence using different lexical 
items), plus two warm-up trials. This version was previously used, though not 
reported, by Reetzke and colleagues (2015). Children were asked to point to the 
picture that matched what a lady (pre-recorded) says: pictures were presented and 
recordings played on a laptop computer. Raw scores out of 20 were used. For the 
analysis, the BPVS and the TROG scores were centred and scaled, and then a mean for 
each participant calculated, to provide a composite structural language score.  
Theory of Mind tests 
Two tasks testing False Belief were used: the Change of Location, or Sally-Anne, 
task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), and the unexpected 
contents, or Smarties, task (Perner et al., 1987). The Sally-Anne task was acted out 
with finger puppets and props (a box, a bucket with a cloth on top, and a marble), and 
the unexpected contents task was administered using a Smarties tube and three small 
pencils (Figure 3.1, Appendix 8.4). There was a score of 0 or 1 for the Sally-Anne task, 
and 0, 1 or 2 for the Unexpected Contents task, making a total score of up to 3.  
 
Figure 3.1 Materials for Sally-Anne test 
Languages and SES questionnaire 
The background questionnaire (Appendix 8.3) included questions on 
socioeconomic status and multilingualism. The socioeconomic status questions 
consisted of a) the Family Affluence Scale (Boyce et al., 2006), and b) parental 
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education, adapted from the questionnaire used in Antoniou (2015). SES scores for 
each of the two parts were first centred and scaled, and then a mean calculated for 
each participant, so that the two components were equally weighted. The 
multilingualism section included questions on other languages spoken by the child in 
addition to English, age of exposure, frequency of use, and fluency (scores 0–4), taking 
inspiration from the Alberta Language Environment Questionnaire (Paradis, 2011) 
and the Alberta Language Development Questionnaire (see too Antoniou & Katsos, 
2017; Paradis, Emmerzael, & Duncan, 2010).  
3.2.1.3 Procedure 
The BPVS, TROG and ToM tasks were administered in a single session, always in 
that order. This was the second session with the child (with the implicature task 
carried out in the first session). The experimenter kept track of BPVS and TROG 
picture choices on scoresheets, and noted the child’s responses in the ToM tasks at the 
end of the session. The session was also audio-recorded, so recordings could be 
checked if there was any doubt about the child’s ToM response. The child was given a 
sticker and a thank you certificate at the end of the session. The background 
questionnaire was sent to parents along with the information and consent form, and 
returned to the school or nursery.  
3.2.2 Results 
The implicature scores for bilingual and monolingual groups can be seen in 
Figure 3.2. Note that they do represent different sample sizes (N = 58 monolinguals, 
N = 26 bilinguals), and, for the monolinguals, are a subset of the data considered in 
the last chapter, with scores from only those participants for whom data for all 
variables is available.  
The bilingual group is mixed in terms of the other languages spoken with English 
(see Table 3.2 Languages spoken by multilingual children), with a range of ages of 
exposure to English, although less so to the home language (Table 3.1). The exposure 
and fluency scores suggest overall balanced to English-dominant bilinguals, as would 
be expected from children in part- or full-time education in UK.  
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Multilingual participants 21 bilinguals – 5 trilinguals 
Fluency of English 3.6/5 mean; 4/5 median; range 1–5 
Fluency of Language A 2.4/5 mean; 2.5/5 median; range 0–5 
Place of Birth 5/21 born outside UK 
Age of Exposure to English Range 0–52 months, mean 7.5; median 0  
(9 children not from birth) 
Age of Exposure to Language A Range 0–24 months 
(2 children not from birth) 
Frequency of Exposure to English Mean 3.9/5, median 4/5 
Frequency of Exposure to Language A Mean 3.4/5, median 4/5 
Table 3.1 Characteristics of multilingual children in complete data subset (N = 26) 
Language Children Language Children 
Afrikaans 1 Korean 1 
Brazilian Portuguese  1 Lithuanian 1  
Cantonese  1 Malayalam 1  
Czech 1 Marathi 1 
Dutch 2 Polish 1 
Finnish 1 Portuguese 3 
French 3 Spanish 3 
Greek 1 Swiss German  1 
Hebrew 1 Telugu 2 
Hindi 1 Turkish 1 
Hungarian 2 Vietnamese  1 
Italian 1   
Table 3.2 Languages spoken by multilingual children 
The monolingual and bilingual groups do not differ on mean inference score or 
SES, but they do differ on vocabulary and grammar, such that monolinguals score 
higher than bilinguals (Table 3.3).  
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  Mean  Estimate SE t p 
Critical 
score 
Monolinguals 85 % Intercept .85 .02 47.09 < .001 
Bilinguals 83 % Bilingual -0.02 .03 -0.77 .45 
SES 
(centred, 
scaled) 
Monolinguals -0.016 Intercept -0.01 .1 -0.16 .88 
Bilinguals .035 Bilingual .05 .17 .29 .77 
Grammar 
(TROG 
raw score) 
Monolinguals 12.7 Intercept 12.72 .46 27.87 < .001 
Bilinguals 11.1 Bilingual -1.65 .821 -2.01 .048 
Vocabulary 
(BPVS raw 
score) 
Monolinguals 76.18 Intercept 76.12 2.35 32.4 < .001 
Bilinguals 66.66 Bilingual -9.46 4.23 -2.24 .028 
Table 3.3 Means and differences between monolingual and multilingual groups for implicature score, SES, 
Grammar and Vocabulary 
lm; dummy coding (monolingual as intercept) 
 
Figure 3.2 Mean correct score for critical inferences, by age and monolingual vs multilingual 
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2;8–3;11 4;0–4;11 5;0–5;11 
 
Mono- Multi- Mono- Multi- Mono- Multi- 
WLE .96 .84 .93 1.00 .99 .98 
Relevance .68 .77 .82 .90 .90 .88 
Ad hoc .82 .74 .99 1.00 1.00 .98 
Scalar .56 .52 .72 .47 .82 .78 
N =  17 8 21 8 20 10 
Table 3.4 Proportion of correct responses for critical condition only, by inference type, age group and 
mono- vs multilingual 
  
Figure 3.3 Boxplots showing TROG, BPVS, SES and ToM scores (from top, left to right) by age group and 
monolingual vs multilingual. 
Note that the age groups are of unequal size – see Table 3.4.  
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3.2.3 Analysis 
To examine the relationship between SES, structural language, ToM, and number 
of languages spoken, mixed-effects logistic regression models were fitted, with 
implicature scores in the critical condition (excluding word learning) as the outcome 
variable. Age, gender, SES, structural language, ToM and number of languages spoken 
(monolingual/multilingual) were added in turn as fixed effects, and all fixed effects by 
item random slopes (following Field, Miles and Field, 2012, and Wieling, 2015), using 
the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2015; R Core Team, 2016; RStudio Team, 2016). 
Age (in months), structural language, ToM and SES scores were each centred and 
scaled; Gender and monolingual/multilingual were coded with sum contrasts. The 
models were built up adding in the fixed effects to an intercept-only model, and then 
compared using the anova function; the fixed effects were added in the order: age, 
gender, SES, structural language, ToM, monolingual/multilingual.  
The factors were added in this order, as I wanted to examine the effect of mono- 
vs multilingualism, having controlled for the other factors that might vary between the 
two groups of participants independently of their mono- or multilingualism. Then, I 
looked at the effect of ToM, accounting for age, gender, SES and language; and finally, 
language, controlling for Age, Gender and SES.  
To look at WLE, structural language and number of languages spoken, I used the 
BPVS score only (as vocabulary knowledge is clearly associated with WLE, and has 
been tested in other studies).  
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3.2.3.1 Language, ToM and number of languages spoken 
Age, SES and language significantly improve the model (χ2(1) = 27.93, p <.001; 
χ2(1) = 4.96, p = .03; χ2(1) = 6.82, p = .01) but not gender (given age), ToM or 
monolingual/multilingual (Table 3.5). 
Model Df AIC Log Lik Deviance χ2 p 
Score ~ 1 + (1 + Age + Gender + SES 
+ Language + ToM + 
Mono/Multilingual | Item.no) 
29 861.05 -401.52 803.05   
Score ~ Age + (random effects) 30 835.12 -387.56 775.12 27.93 < .001 
Score ~ Age + Gender + (random 
effects) 
31 836.79 -387.40 774.79 .33 .57 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES 
(random effects) 
32 833.83 -384.92 769.83 4.96 .03 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES + 
Language + (random effects) 
33 829.01 -381.50 763.01 6.82 .01 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES + 
Language + ToM + (random effects) 
34 829.63 -380.82 761.63 1.38 .24 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES + 
Language + ToM + 
Mono/multilingual + (random 
effects) 
35 831.52 -380.76 761.52 .11 .74 
Table 3.5 Model comparison for Age, Gender, SES, structural language, ToM and mono- vs 
multilingualism 
glmer, family = binomial, bobyqa optimizer; anova  
  
88 
 
When the order SES and language are entered in the model comparison is 
reversed, only language remains a significant predictor of implicature score (χ2(1) = 
8.43, p = .004) – Table 3.6.  
Model Df AIC Log Lik Deviance χ2 p 
Score ~ 1 + (1 + Age + Gender + SES + 
Language + ToM + 
Mono/Multilingual | Item.no) 
29 861.05 -401.52 803.05   
Score ~ Age + (random effects) 30 835.12 -387.56 775.12 27.93 < .001 
Score ~ Age + Gender + (random 
effects) 
31 836.79 -387.40 774.79 .33 .57 
Score ~ Age + Gender + Language + 
(random effects) 
32 830.37 -383.18 766.37 8.43 .004 
Score ~ Age + Gender + Language + 
SES + (random effects) 
33 829.01 -381.50 763.01 3.36 .07 
Score ~ Age + Gender + Language + 
SES + ToM + (random effects) 
34 829.63 -380.82 761.63 1.38 .24 
Score ~ Age + Gender + Language + 
SES + ToM + Mono/multilingual + 
(random effects) 
35 831.52 -380.76 761.52 .11 .74 
Table 3.6 Model comparison for Age, Gender, structural language, SES, ToM and mono- vs 
multilingualism 
glmer, family = binomial, bobyqa optimizer; anova 
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When only monolinguals are considered (with variables centred and scaled for 
this data subset), the structural language remains the factor which significantly 
improves the model, once age, gender and SES are taken into account (χ2(1) = 4.53, 
p = .03) – Table 3.7. For bilinguals, though, the only factor which does so is ToM 
(χ2(1) = 7.7, p = .01) – Table 3.8.  
Model Df AIC Log Lik Deviance χ2 p 
Score ~ 1 + (1 + Age + Gender + SES 
+ Language + ToM | Item.no) 
22 609.62 -282.81 565.62   
Score ~ Age + (random effects) 23 582.00 -268.00 536.00 29.62 < .001 
Score ~ Age + Gender + (random 
effects) 
24 583.79 -267.90 535.79 .21 .65 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES 
(random effects) 
25 582.14 -266.07 532.14 3.65 .06 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES + 
Language + (random effects) 
26 579.61 -263.81 527.61 4.53 .03 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES + 
Language + ToM + (random effects) 
27 580.98 -263.49 526.98 .63 .43 
Table 3.7 Model comparison for Age, Gender, SES, structural language, and ToM for monolinguals 
glmer, family = binomial, bobyqa optimizer; anova 
Model Df AIC Log Lik Deviance χ2 p 
Score ~ 1 + (1 + Age + Gender + SES 
+ Language + ToM | Item.no) 
22 308.17 -132.09 264.17   
Score ~ Age + (random effects) 23 305.42 -129.71 259.42 4.75 .03 
Score ~ Age + Gender + (random 
effects) 
24 307.24 -129.62 259.24 .17 .68 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES 
(random effects) 
25 308.82 -129.41 258.82 .43 .51 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES + 
Language + (random effects) 
26 307.70 -127.85 255.70 3.12 .08 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES + 
Language + ToM + (random effects) 
27 302.00 -124.00 248.00 7.70 .01 
Table 3.8 Model comparison for Age, Gender, SES, structural language, and ToM for bilinguals 
glmer, family = binomial, nlminbw optimizer; anova 
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Indeed, in a partial correlation (Kendall’s τ) with SES and structural language, 
controlling for age, there is a small positive correlation for monolinguals (τ = .15, 
p < .001, z = 6.02), but not for bilinguals (τ = -0.11, p = .002, z = -3). 
3.2.3.2  Word learning, vocabulary and number of languages spoken 
To examine the relationship between WLE and vocabulary score and speaking 
more than one language, mixed effects logistic regression models were fitted, with age, 
gender, SES, vocabulary score (BPVS) and monolingual/multilingual as predictors, and 
item by age, gender, SES, vocabulary and monolingual/multilingual random slopes, 
and the models compared with the anova function. Only vocabulary is a significant 
predictor (χ2(1) = 10.3, p = .001) – Table 3.9.  
Model Df AIC Log Lik Deviance χ2 p 
Score ~ 1 + (1 + Age + Gender + SES 
+ Vocabulary + Mono/Multilingual | 
Item.no) 
22 156.01 -56.00 112.01   
Score ~ Age + (random effects) 23 156.21 -55.10 110.21 1.80 .18 
Score ~ Age + Gender + (random 
effects) 
24 158.06 -55.03 110.06 .15 .70 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES+ 
(random effects) 
25 156.63 -53.32 106.63 3.43 .06 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES + 
Vocabulary + (random effects) 
26 148.33 -48.17 96.33 10.30 .001 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES + 
Vocabulary + Mono/multilingual + 
(random effects) 
27 148.65 -47.33 94.65 1.68 .20 
Table 3.9 Model comparison for Age, Gender, SES, structural language, and ToM 
glmer, family = binomial, optimx.L-BFGS-B optimizer; anova 
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For monolinguals only, this pattern remains, with vocabulary significantly 
improving the model (χ2(1) = 12.5, p = .0004) – Table 3.10; for bilinguals, only SES 
significantly improves the model (χ2(1) = 12.37, p = .0004) – Table 3.11. 
Model Df AIC Log Lik Deviance χ2 p 
Score ~ 1 + (1 + Age + Gender + SES 
+ Vocabulary + | Item.no) 
16 106.01 -37.01 74.01   
Score ~ Age + (random effects) 17 106.46 -36.23 72.46 1.55 .21 
Score ~ Age + Gender + (random 
effects) 
18 107.93 -35.97 71.93 .53 .47 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES+ 
(random effects) 
19 107.64 -34.82 69.64 2.29 .13 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES + 
Vocabulary + (random effects) 
20 97.14 -28.57 57.14 12.50 .0004 
Table 3.10 Model comparison for Age, Gender, SES, structural language, and ToM for monolinguals 
glmer, family = binomial, bobyqa optimizer; anova 
Model Df AIC Log Lik Deviance χ2 p 
Score ~ 1 + (1 + Age + Gender + 
SES + Vocabulary + | Item.no) 
16 71.05 -19.52 39.05   
Score ~ Age + (random effects) 17 68.68 -17.34 34.68 4.37 .04 
Score ~ Age + Gender + (random 
effects) 
18 70.68 -17.34 34.68 0 1 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES + 
(random effects) 
19 60.31 -11.16 22.31 12.37 .0004 
Score ~ Age + Gender + SES + 
Vocabulary + (random effects) 
20 62.26 -11.13 22.26 .05 .82 
Table 3.11 Model comparison for Age, Gender, SES, structural language, and ToM for bilinguals 
glmer, family = binomial, nlminbw optimizer; anova 
3.3 Discussion 
3.3.1 Summary of findings  
Once children’s age was taken into account, the only significant predictors of 
children’s implicature score were their structural language score and SES, which are 
correlated. Their gender, ToM and monolingualism/multilingualism did not have a 
significant association with implicature abilities. For monolinguals only, this pattern 
remained with structural language as the main predictor of implicature score; for 
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bilinguals, only ToM improved the model, once age, gender, SES and structural 
language were taken into account. For WLE inferences, vocabulary was the only factor 
that improved the model for the whole group, and monolinguals only; for bilinguals, 
SES did.  
Note the lack of effect of gender, which is in keeping with development 
implicature and WLE studies that report it (e.g. for WLE Akhtar, 2002; Diesendruck et 
al., 2010; Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011; Kalashnikova et al., 2014; and for pragmatics Katsos 
et al., 2016; Loukusa, Leinonen, & Ryder, 2007; Schulze & Tomasello, 2015; Sobel, 
Sedivy, Buchanan, & Hennessy, 2012). Exceptionally, Stiller, Goodman and Frank 
(2015) do find an effect, such that male children made fewer implicature-correct 
responses.  
3.3.2 Implicatures and structural language knowledge 
The results show a positive association between structural-language knowledge 
and implicature-inferencing skills, and this adds to the findings of Antoniou and 
Katsos (2017), who find that structural language is a predictor of a composite of 
scalar, relevance and manner implicature and metaphor comprehension. The present 
study shows that this association exists with younger children (aged 2;8–5;10 years in 
this study, compared to 6–9 years in Antoniou and Katsos’), with quantity and 
relevance implicatures only, and with English-speaking children. Also similarly, this 
effect seems to be driven by the monolingual children: when they alone are 
considered, the pattern remains; when only multilingual children are considered, 
structural language no longer predicts implicature skills, although this could also be 
due to the small sample size.  
These findings join a growing pool of evidence for the relationship between 
structural language and pragmatic abilities, particularly coming from studies on 
atypical development. A recent meta-analysis found that the difference between 
typically developing and Autism Spectrum Disorder groups disappeared for figurative 
language tasks once they are matched on structural language abilities – though this 
study concerned a much wider range of phenomena than implicature, including 
metaphor, irony and metonymy (Kalandadze, Norbury, Nærland, & Næss, 2016). 
These studies tend to conceptualise the relationship in terms of ‘the critical role of 
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core language skills’ for pragmatics (Kalandadze et al., 2016), structural language 
being ‘implicated in the success with pragmatics’ (Andrés-Roqueta & Katsos, 2017), or 
pragmatic ability that ‘largely depends on children’s language abilities’ (Antoniou & 
Katsos, 2017: 30). In other words, structural language underpins pragmatic skills, like 
implicature inferencing.  
However, as I have already mentioned, this is not the only possible direction of 
influence, and a cross-sectional correlational study like this cannot determine whether 
structural language aids pragmatics or vice versa. It could be that better structural 
language skills help children in their pragmatic processing, at least with processing the 
literal content and also generating relevant alternatives; but it could be that better 
pragmatic skills enable children to acquire structural language knowledge at a faster 
rate. Or, it could be that both of these are the case in development. Of course, a third 
option is that there is some third factor underlying the relationship, especially given 
the similarity of the tasks, which all involve picture-matching. Teasing these options 
apart is a challenge for future research.  
3.3.3 Implicatures and SES  
The results indicate that SES is a significant predictor of pragmatic scores, once 
age and gender have been taken into account. There is a significant positive 
relationship between SES and structural language, indicating that the sample here is 
typical in reflecting the widespread finding of an association between SES and 
structural language (Hoff, Laursen, et al., 2012; Pace et al., 2017). However, it seems 
that SES does not independently contribute to implicature inferencing skills, because 
when language is also taken into account, the effect disappears. This suggests that the 
relationship between SES and pragmatic skills is mediated through language 
knowledge. This finding is different from that of Antoniou and Katsos (2017), who did 
not find evidence for an effect of SES on implicature skills in development.  
Although there was a range of Family Affluence Scale scores (3 – 9 / 9, mean 6.2) 
and Education (3 – 6 / 6, mean 4.4), the sample was not planned primarily to 
investigate this factor, and Cambridge, where the research was carried out, has a high 
level of SES, on average, compared with the national level (Office for National 
Statistics, 2016), so an independent effect of SES may not have been captured. In 
94 
 
addition, using a measure such as the Family Affluence Scale had the advantage of 
providing a standardized and valid measure. However, it might have been preferable 
to update or adapt it to the situation. For example, given the preponderance of tablet 
computers, it is now more likely that households might have 2 or more devices. Or, 
again, in Cambridge not having a car or children sharing a bedroom is not necessarily 
an indicator of lower SES, given the popularity of cycling as the primary mode of 
transport in the city and some of the highest house prices in the country, respectively. 
Given that so few studies have addressed this issue, it is clearly one for future research 
– to find out if this observation is reliable, and, if so, to investigate why pragmatic 
skills are more robust than vocabulary or syntactic knowledge. For vocabulary, for 
example, there is a clear link with input, which can vary with SES (Hoff, 2006). Is 
input such an important factor for development of pragmatic skills like implicatures? 
Are other factors like prosociality more important? Or are pragmatic tests more 
‘robust’ to stylistic differences across SES? A more targeted investigation might yield 
both an insight into the prerequisites for pragmatic development, and applications in 
terms of useful interventions.  
3.3.4 Implicatures and monolingualism vs multilingualism  
There is also no evidence for a difference in competence with implicatures 
between monolingual and bilingual groups, once age, SES, gender, structural language 
and ToM have been controlled for. This extends the findings of other recent studies 
(Antoniou & Katsos, 2017; Antoniou, Veenstra, et al., 2016) to younger children. One 
possibility is that the high scores overall are masking any difference between 
monolingual and bilingual groups (scoring a mean of 82% and 79%, respectively, for 
critical implicature trials). However, even among the youngest age-group, where there 
is much more variability in scores, which are lower overall, there is no numerical 
difference (69% vs 68%).  
These results suggest that the diverging findings between Antoniou and Katsos’ 
study (2017), and Siegal and colleagues’ studies (2010, 2009) – which indicate a 
bilingual advantage – are perhaps not a result of the age difference in their 
participants, after all (Antoniou and Katsos tested 6–9-year-olds, and Siegal and 
colleagues, 3–6-year-olds). Instead, it could be due to the different competencies 
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being tested: implicature comprehension via a picture-selection task, as opposed to 
sensitivity to cooperativeness via a Conversational Violations Test.  
The puzzle here is that, although bilinguals may tend to lag behind their 
monolingual peers in structural language acquisition for each language, and structural 
language seems to be related to pragmatic abilities, bilinguals’ pragmatic abilities do 
not seem to be affected (and, indeed, nor does structural language predict implicature 
skills in bilinguals). One possible reason is that the required lexical and syntactic 
knowledge for this and other similar tasks is simply not challenging enough to 
distinguish monolingual and bilingual children; it is within the competence of both 
groups, so their pragmatic processing is not impacted. Alternatively, it might be that 
other factors contribute more to pragmatic abilities in bilinguals. That is, the picture 
presented here is one where several aspects of a child’s development are connected to 
their pragmatic abilities – structural language, social cognition or ToM, world 
knowledge, linguistic experience – and it is possible that these are weighted differently 
depending on the child’s experience. For example, some have posited that bilinguals’ 
conversational experience plays a role – such that bilinguals compensate for their 
language deficit by paying more attention to pragmatic cues (e.g. Groba, De Houwer, 
Mehnert, Rossi, & Obrig, 2017; Siegal et al., 2010) – as well as potentially enhanced 
ToM. Indeed, ToM is a predictor of implicature scores in bilinguals, on top of 
structural language, in this study.  
However, if structural language is either a proxy for amount of linguistic 
communicative experience, or itself based on pragmatic skills, then there is no reason 
to expect a difference between bilinguals and monolinguals per se, as seen here. 
Although the least interesting option, this is intuitively likely: pragmatic skills are, 
after all, the skills of using language in context, and bilinguals may not have any less 
communication experience across their languages than monolinguals do in their one 
language. The nature of the communicative interaction that a child receives is more 
likely to be a factor affecting pragmatic development. SES, which is linked to the kind 
of communicative interaction that parent–child dyads engage in (e.g. for contingent 
talk: McGillion, Pine, Herbert, & Matthews, 2017), was not a significant predictor of 
pragmatic skills in this study, though, once structural language skills were taken into 
account. Admittedly, this proposal ignores the very experience itself of engaging in 
96 
 
communication in more than one language and the effects that this might have.  
However, the reasons for bilinguals’ and monolinguals’ similar pragmatic 
development with implicatures must at the moment remain speculative. Given that all 
studies to date involve relatively small sample sizes, much more research is needed to 
establish whether there is indeed no effect of the number of languages spoken on 
pragmatics. Once a better understanding is gained of how multilingual language 
experience affects pragmatic development, why it does so can also be investigated, 
including what aspects of their linguistic experience or cognitive skills are involved. 
Given findings on other cognitive abilities in bilinguals, results might be expected to 
vary depending on the measures used, the pragmatic skill in question, and the 
bilinguals’ profile (Bak, 2016; Green, 2011).12  
3.3.5 Implicatures and ToM 
There was no evidence for an association between Theory of Mind and pragmatic 
skills overall, or in the monolingual group, when controlling for age, gender, language 
and SES. It does not seem to be the case that those doing well in the implicature task 
are necessarily those passing the ToM tests as well. ToM was a factor, though, for 
bilinguals’ performance, which is a surprising result. On the one hand, one could 
imagine that ToM might be more important where structural language knowledge is 
less helpful; on the other, one wonders why ToM should be any more necessary for 
bilinguals’ pragmatic competence than monolinguals’. This requires further 
investigation, with a larger and more homogenous, matched bilingual sample. 
For a Gricean outlook on pragmatic skills, the overall result is surprising: on that 
view, reasoning about others’ intentions and beliefs is seen as a prerequisite for 
implicatures. Instead, it seems to fit in with new proposals that pragmatic inferencing 
may not require full ToM; inferential mechanisms and the ability to track common 
ground may develop separately or not necessarily be always used together (Breheny, 
2006; Jary, 2013, 2013; Katsos & Andrés-Roqueta, 2015; Kissine, 2016; Sperber, 
                                                 
12 For example, I included in the questionnaire here questions about frequency of use and 
code-switching, but was unable to use this level of detail in the analysis due to the small 
sample size and also the variable quality of answers to these questions – the questions either 
need to be made simpler or administered in person by the experimenter. 
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1994). I will explore these options in much greater detail in Chapter 5. Remember, 
though, that no strong conclusions can be drawn from this kind of null result.  
Here, instead, I consider the issues with this methodological approach to the 
question of ToM and its role in implicature inferencing. The Sally-Anne and 
Unexpected Contents tasks are testing a particular instantiation of Theory of Mind, 
namely explicit reasoning about other’s false beliefs about the world. They also have 
their own linguistic and cognitive demands which may obscure children’s actual 
abilities with false belief. Rubio-Fernández, for instance, argues from a series of 
experimental demonstrations that it is the attentional challenges which pose a 
problem for young children in a Change of Location task: tracking the protagonist’s 
beliefs while the test questions increase the saliency of the object, its location and the 
wrong answer (Rubio-Fernández, 2013; Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013, 2016). On 
this hypothesis, the Unexpected Contents task would be predicted to be even more 
challenging, as there is no option of associating the protagonist with the object’s first 
location, and nor is the correct answer physically present (Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 
2016).  
The implicature picture-matching task would seem to present far fewer 
challenges: there are not two conflicting sources of information that participants have 
to track (such as the protagonist’s beliefs, or their former beliefs, and the actual 
world), as all they know is what the protagonist – in this case Bob the puppet – tells 
them. That is, they only have to update their beliefs with information from what the 
puppet says, and this is adding new information, not resolving conflicting information. 
Further, in this context, there is no reason to think that there is a reason to be 
cautious in interpretation, for example due to an uninformed or unreliable speaker; 
the puppet shows himself to be a co-operative speaker, and is talking about what he 
did. Finally, there are no distracting test questions, but simply a picture selection.  
In other words, the two tasks potentially, and problematically, differ along too 
many dimensions, which means that an association between ToM and implicatures 
may be easily missed. Crucially, no false belief understanding is required for tasks that 
are typically used to test children’s understanding of implicature – only joint attention 
and intention-reading. What is needed is a test of both implicature comprehension 
and Theory of Mind at the same time – and this is what I attempt in Chapter 5’s study.  
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3.3.6 Word learning, vocabulary and mono-/multilingualism 
There was a significant positive relationship between WLE and overall vocabulary 
size in monolinguals, in addition to a relationship between WLE and age. This adds to 
the findings of Kalashnikova, Mattock and Monaghan (2016), who observe a similar 
relationship in much younger children. They use a slight variation on the WLE 
paradigm, with two initially novel objects, one of which is then labelled, before 
another novel term is then introduced as the test item. They suggest that, using this 
paradigm, any association with vocabulary size cannot be said to be a result of the 
productive knowledge of alternatives (Grassmann et al., 2015) or general cognitive 
abilities (Horst, Samuelson, Kucker, & McMurray, 2011). Instead, abstract knowledge 
about word-referent mappings from vocabulary acquisition in general contributes to 
the development of WLE as an abstract concept (Graham et al., 1998). They find that 
looking time at the target object (their outcome measure, given that their participants 
are infants aged 17–19 months) is positively associated with receptive vocabulary size, 
and conclude that WLE ‘is not likely to be a necessary precursor of early vocabulary 
acquisition [but] becomes reliable when infants have acquired more extensive lexical 
competence’ (2016: 10).  
However, a possibility they do not seem to have fully considered is that the 
infants with larger vocabularies have them because they are better at word learning 
strategies, like WLE, possibly because of better pragmatic skills. In other words, their 
design – as well as mine here – cannot identify the direction of causality, if there is 
one, underlying the association. Based on available evidence so far, it seems that both 
directions are likely: the better at WLE a child is, the higher the rate of word learning, 
and larger the vocabulary size; the larger the vocabulary size, the more confidence in 
WLE as a strategy in general, and in applying it in a particular situation. Further 
research is required to understand the dynamics of this developing strategy.  
There was no evidence for an effect of number of languages spoken on WLE. This 
is at odds with those studies that find a difference between bilinguals’ and 
monolinguals’ use of exclusion as a word learning strategy (see Table 3.12 for 
examples). This has been observed not only in infants (Houston-Price et al., 2010), but 
also in preschoolers and young children aged 3–6 years, using the same basic 
methodology (Bialystok, Barac, et al., 2010; Davidson et al., 1997). Also, some of these 
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other studies have used a mixed bilingual group, as I have done here (Bialystok, Barac, 
et al., 2010; Houston-Price et al., 2010).  
Study Age of participants Results  
monolingual vs bilingual 
This study 2;8–3;11 years (younger group) 
4;0–4;11 years (middle group) 
5;0–5;11 years (older group) 
91% vs 80%  
94% vs 100% 
99 vs 98%  
Bialystok et al., 2010 
– one familiar and one 
novel object 
Av. 3 years N = 20/40/27  
(mono French, Mono English, 
bilingual) 
Av. 4.5 years N = 17/29/29  
c. 75% vs 20% girls;  
c. 20% vs 20% boys  
 
c. 60% vs 60% girls;  
c. 50% vs 15 % boys 
Davidson et al., 1997 
– familiar and novel 
object 
3–4-year-olds N= 16/16/16 
5–6-year-olds N= 16/16/16 
(mono- / Greek / Urdu) 
69 % vs 65 / 60 %  
92% vs 67 / 71%  
(Greek/Urdu)  
Kalashnikova et al., 
2015 – two novel 
objects 
Younger group mean 4;0 N = 25/13 
Older group mean 4;11 N = 24/12 
66% vs 80%  
93% vs 71%  
Davidson & Tell, 2005 
– known object with 
novel part 
3–4-year-olds N = 20/20 
5–6-year-olds N = 20/20 
90% vs 82%  
97% vs 65%  
Table 3.12 Examples of WLE studies comparing monolinguals and bilinguals 
One difference that might account for the discrepancy in findings could be the 
lower scores in other studies with older children, versus the ceiling effect in this study 
(overall mean of 95% for monolinguals and 95% for bilinguals), although in other 
studies, monolinguals are approaching ceiling, ahead of bilinguals. Several of the other 
studies find a developmental effect, such that the difference between monolinguals 
and bilinguals emerged with age, either using a classic WLE task, or another test for 
avoidance of lexical overlap. If anything, though, the pattern seems to be the opposite 
in my study. Another reason might be different paradigms – some employ two novel 
objects, one of which is labelled, and others one novel and one known object. 
However, even those with the same paradigm find different results. This is, again, an 
area where future research is required, with careful control of bilingual experience and 
testing language.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
This study contributes an investigation of the effect of SES, structural language 
skills, ToM and multilingualism on implicature inferencing abilities in children aged 
3–5 years, a key time for the development of pragmatic skills. It extends the findings of 
similar studies for older children (Antoniou & Katsos, 2017; Antoniou, Veenstra, et al., 
2016), by showing that structural language knowledge is a predictor of pragmatic 
skills, controlling for the effect of age, gender and SES, and by not finding any 
evidence for a difference between monolingual and bilingual children for implicature 
inferencing, once these factors plus ToM are accounted for. However, the effect of SES, 
patterning with structural language, and of ToM for bilinguals are new and intriguing, 
and merit further investigation. In addition, the relationship between WLE and overall 
receptive vocabulary was found to persist from infancy, although in this study there 
was no evidence for a difference between monolinguals and bilinguals for WLE, likely 
due to overall high performance.  
In this study, standard and readily available tests were used for the additional 
factors. However, in future research, they could be better matched. I discussed, in 
particular, how using standard ToM measures like the Change of Location task may 
not reveal what competencies are required for implicature understanding. Before 
giving up on a Gricean model, in which ToM is central to implicatures, other 
approaches should be taken. I therefore follow this chapter up in a task that combines 
perspective-taking with implicature derivation in Chapter 5.  
To date, experimental pragmatics studies have tended to collect only the minimal 
information about participants, and measure only the target pragmatic skill. The 
findings here suggest that on the whole, this may not be problematic if the 
participants do indeed form a homogenous group in terms of SES, and as long as 
lexical and syntactic complexity of the stimuli is carefully controlled. However, until 
we know more about the effects of SES and language experience on pragmatic skills, it 
would be beneficial to collect this kind of information as well, so that comparisons 
across studies and meta-analyses are more meaningful. Certainly, for the effects of 
multilingual experience on cognitive functions or SES on vocabulary acquisition, a vast 
number of studies in different contexts and different design variants has been 
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necessary to begin to understand them (e.g. for overviews Bak, 2016; Hoff, 2006), and 
there is no reason to expect any less is needed for pragmatics. 
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4 The development of manner implicatures 
Since Grice’s first enumeration of the maxims within his Co-operative Principle, 
manner implicatures have been assumed to be part of a speaker’s pragmatic toolbox 
(e.g. Y. Huang, 2017). As shall be seen, they have been taken up in neo-Gricean 
theories, particularly by Levinson (2000) and Horn (1984, 2004), and more recently 
by probabilistic approaches to pragmatics in the same spirit of a rational and prosocial 
speaker and hearer (e.g. Franke, 2009). However, there has been relatively little 
empirical investigation of manner, or, compared to other implicatures, detailed 
empirical or theoretical debate. In this chapter, I seek to address the questions:  
1. Are manner implicatures a distinct category, and is there evidence for them 
in adults’ communication?  
2. What are the predictions for their acquisition?  
3. Do manner implicatures develop early or late in children’s communication?  
I hope to demonstrate that manner implicatures are theoretically plausible, then I 
spell out some implications for acquisition, and, finally, present some tentative 
evidence for manner implicature comprehension in both adults and children. 
However, I also show how in practice they are challenging to investigate empirically 
and difficult to extricate from quantity inferences.  
4.1 Background – manner implicatures in theory and in adults 
Despite the preponderance of theoretical and experimental pragmatic research 
on implicature in recent decades, there has been a dearth of studies focussing on 
manner implicatures, either with adult speakers or children. In this section, I briefly 
overview the various theoretical approaches to manner within the Gricean tradition, in 
order to draw out some minimal criteria that distinguish manner from quantity 
implicatures, at least in principle. I then review the empirical evidence available for 
manner implicatures in adults, to suggest that some of the intuitions in the literature 
are borne out.  
4.1.1 Theory of manner implicature 
Grice’s (1975) formulation of the maxim of manner was rather heterogeneous, 
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including as it did the submaxims ‘avoid obscurity of expression’, ‘avoid ambiguity’, ‘be 
brief’, and ‘be orderly’. He thus included literary ambiguity and puns among cases of 
manner implicatures – as flouting the second submaxim – and iconic aspects of 
language use – following the fourth submaxim. Subsequent work has focussed on the 
first and third maxims, and in particular the length of the utterance or its 
‘markedness’. Consider Grice’s own example:  
Miss X produced a series of sounds that corresponded closely with the 
score of ‘Home Sweet Home’.  
⇸ Miss X’s performance suffered some hideous defect  
(contrast with the ‘concise and nearly synonymous sang’)  
(Grice, 1975, in Davis, 1991: 313) 
The idea is that if the speaker has gone out of his way to use a prolix or marked 
expression when a less prolix or unmarked alternative is available, the rational hearer 
can infer that in doing so he meant something by choosing that expression, and meant 
something different from what he would usually mean by the alternative. Grice’s key 
contribution is that manner inferences involve reference not to ‘to what is said but, 
rather, to how what is said is to be said’ (in Davis, 1991: 313). It is the form of the 
utterance, not its informational content, which differs from the alternative of what the 
speaker could have said. Now this immediately raises the question of what constitutes 
a marked expression, and how it relates to its alternatives, and I return to this issue 
below.  
Following Grice, Horn (1984, 2004) streamlines the maxims into two antinomic 
principles, Q and R, with R subsuming the second maxim of quantity (‘do not make 
your contribution more informative than is required’) as well as the second two 
manner submaxims (‘be brief’ and ‘be orderly’). The R principle states, ‘say no more 
than you must, modulo Q’, while Q states ‘say as much as you can, modulo Quality 
and R’. Thus, both the form and content of the utterance depend on the same two 
principles; Horn’s insight is that both pattern together as part of a cost–benefit 
approach to communication. 
While this is theoretically elegant, Levinson (2000) argues that it is a conflation 
of two separate characteristics of language use, the content and the form. He instead 
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suggests that speakers can use the form of the language as a shortcut to the intended 
meaning, in the case of Generalised Conversational Implicatures (GCIs), separately 
from the content of an utterance. His version of Grice’s manner – the M heuristic –
states the following for speakers and hearers:  
Speaker’s maxim: Indicate an abnormal, nonstereotypical situation by 
using marked expressions that contrast with those you would use to 
describe the corresponding normal, stereotypical situation.  
Recipient’s corollary: What is said in an abnormal way indicates an 
abnormal situation, or marked messages indicate marked situations. 
(Levinson, 2000: 38)  
The M heuristic therefore takes the ‘formal aspects’ of the first and third 
submaxims (‘avoid obscurity of expression’ and ‘be brief’). Interestingly, this is in 
contrast to Horn’s bifurcation (third and fourth submaxims) but seems intuitively 
sympathetic to Horn’s own minimax approach: an obscure or less frequently used 
expression is surely ‘costly’ just as a prolix one is, and therefore within the scope of 
Horn’s Q, as well. Levinson (2000), though, concentrates on markedness. This, at his 
own admission, is taken to consist in a heterogenous set of features, such that a 
marked expression is ‘more morphologically complex and less lexicalized, more prolix 
or periphrastic, less frequent or usual, and less neutral in register’ (Levinson, 
2000: 137). In other words, marked expressions are longer than their alternatives and 
less frequent – both properties of the form of the expression, and the form–meaning 
pairing in language use – as well as carrying some kind of sociolectal information. 
Following the weight of examples and discussion in the literature, I will take only the 
relationship between what is said and its utterance in terms of length and frequency to 
be at stake here; however, I do return to some interesting parallels with sociolinguistic 
phenomena in the general discussion below.  
Crucially, in Levinson’s conception, marked forms sit in contrast to unmarked 
forms, which give rise to inferences to the stereotypical, or ‘I-inferences’. He therefore 
puts forward a view of manner for which the inferential mechanism is similar to 
quantity (based on the first maxim of quantity, like scalar implicatures), even if the 
relationship of the alternatives is different. Both are essentially ‘metalinguistic’ and 
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‘negative’, in that they involve generation of alternatives, and negation of some aspect 
of the alternatives. However, while for quantity, it is the content of the stronger 
alternative that is negated, for manner, it is the stereotypical implication of the less 
marked alternative that is negated. For instance, the implicature some but not all is 
derived by generating the more informative alternative all and negating its semantic 
content; the implicature closed the door in an unusual way from the utterance ‘made 
the door close’ is derived by generating a less marked but semantically similar 
alternative closed the door, and negating its stereotypical implication (not its semantic 
content). I take this distinction as a clear reason to take manner inferences as a 
discrete category of implicature at least on theoretical grounds, inviting an empirical 
examination. 
Remember that Levinson’s theory was intended for Generalised implicatures, 
which are default inferences, or ‘shortcuts’ to meaning.13 However, his examples of 
manner inferences range from those which seem conventionalised, as he comments, 
to those which intuitively seem to be highly context-dependent, contra his general 
framework. To illustrate, I have arranged the following examples from intuitively less 
to more context-dependent, together with their alternatives:  
a) An old, old church  
⇸ a very old church 
(An old church) 
                                                 
13 Note that in Levinson’s account of GCIs, he suggests that the heuristics can be instantiated 
in a type of Default Logic, with extra-logical rules (2000: 47). For scalar implicatures, he 
proposes a meta-rule such as: 
α(WEAK): M(α(not STRONG)) 
α(not STRONG) 
That is, ‘if α(WEAK) is true, and α(not STRONG) is consistent with what is known, then 
assume α(not STRONG)’.  
One supposes that he might have something similar in mind for manner inferences, such as:  
α(MARKED form): M(α(not UNMARKED)) 
α(not UNMARKED) 
This is a key difference of Levinson’s account: the knowledge of specific rule-like heuristics, 
rather than use of more general reasoning by exclusion and elaborative inference, which 
restricts Levinson’s account to GCIs. But, I do not set out to test this directly here.  
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b) She went to the school  
⇸ not for lessons / as a pupil 
(She went to school)  
c) The Spanish caused the Aztecs to die 
⇸ indirectly 
(The Spanish killed the Aztecs) 
d) A not unreliable service  
⇸ A sort of reliable-ish service 
(A reliable service) 
e) You are permitted to leave 
⇸ but you may stay  
(You may leave ⇸ and please do so) 
f) The corners of Sue’s lips turned slightly upwards 
⇸ Sue grimaced or smirked 
(Sue smiled) 
(Levinson, 2000: 138–152) 
It seems that the utterances (d–f) at least might mean rather different things in 
different contexts. Consider, for example, the following contexts for utterance (e):  
a) The headmaster told off the naughty pupils, then he said, ‘You 
may leave / You are permitted to leave.’  
b) At the party, the host said, ‘I’m having such a great time, but 
you may leave / you are permitted to leave.’ 
The intuition seems to be that both alternatives have the implication ‘and please 
do so’ for (a) and ‘but you may stay’ for (b). Similarly, the relationship between the 
semantic content and the implicated meaning seems to vary across contexts: for 
instance, the negation of the contradictory can convey the mediocre or the 
extraordinary.  
a) A not unreliable service 
⇸ sort of reliable 
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b) It took a not inconsiderable effort. 
⇸ a very great effort 
In other words, from these examples it is not clear that Levinson’s framework and 
insights are only useful for GCIs. Indeed, it has been influential on theories which do 
not make such a categorical distinction between GCIs and Particularised 
Conversational Implicatures (PCIs): there are models of manner implicatures within 
game-theoretic frameworks which are simpler still in terms of criteria (Bergen, Levy, & 
Goodman, 2016; Franke, 2009). They suggest that there is a lengthier alternative 
which is semantically equivalent, equating markedness with length of form. 
Interestingly, the original and dominant models on this approach – the Rational 
Speech Act and Iterative Best Response models (Frank & Goodman, 2012; Franke, 
2009) – have to be adapted to correctly model manner implicatures, reflecting their 
more complex nature (Bergen et al., 2016). I, also, draw substantially on Levinson 
(2000) in this chapter, without ascribing to the default view of some implicatures. 
A final precautionary observation on Levinson’s examples will become relevant 
for discussion later: it seems that some examples could plausibly be analysed as 
quantity, not manner. For (f), where there is no systematic alternation between what 
is said and its alternative, the alternative could be placed on an ad hoc scale of 
informativeness, not markedness: ‹smile, turn lips slightly upwards›. Thus, the 
inference is that ‘the corners of Sue’s lips only turned slightly upwards but she did not 
smile’, on the understanding that smiling involves more than turning one’s lips slightly 
upwards, and more than just one’s lips. Grice’s own example of the singer is actually 
comparable here:  
Miss X produced a series of sounds that corresponded closely with the 
score of ‘Home Sweet Home’.  
Again, it could be that the presumed singer only produced sounds, but did not 
sing – or that the sounds corresponded only ‘closely’, not ‘exactly’. In both of these 
cases, the use of a kind of scalar adverb is particularly problematic, but even without 
them, some kind of informativeness scale is conceivable. It is hard to tell purely on 
intuition which maxims should be modelled as playing a role in such cases – or indeed 
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whether both manner and quantity might. 
There is therefore an interesting paradox across the theoretical work on manner 
implicatures. On the one hand, those like Horn (1984) have noted the close parallel 
between manner and the second maxim of quantity: both are principles that enjoin 
speakers of the language to not say more than is necessary in the context. On the 
other hand, when it comes to examples of utterances that give rise to manner 
implicatures, it is often unclear whether they are manner or a case of the first maxim 
of quantity – the potential violation is saying not enough, rather than more than 
enough. In other words, there is already a hint here that manner implicatures may not 
be as clear cut in practice as in theory. 
4.1.2 A working definition for manner 
This survey has therefore shown that theoretical work can provide a basis for 
treating manner implicatures as an identifiable and distinct category of pragmatic 
inference, and understandings of markedness have become simpler with iterations of 
theory. For the purposes of this chapter, I would like to propose a set of minimal 
criteria for manner inferences, while acknowledging that the actual picture may be far 
less simple. I take criteria from Levinson’s and formal game-theoretic models, but 
assume, like the latter, that these may not apply only to GCIs but also to PCIs. My 
working definition of manner is therefore formulated as:  
Manner implicatures are derived when what is said contrasts with a less 
marked alternative that has equivalent semantic content.14  
I suggest thinking of markedness minimally as frequency in context (following 
Haspelmath, 2006), although this typically has length of form as a corollary. Thus, 
markedness is rooted in the conventionality of language: linguistic knowledge is 
social, intersubjective and arbitrary knowledge, such that speakers expect it to be 
shared by others in the community (Diesendruck, 2011; Kalish & Sabbagh, 2007; D. 
Lewis, 1969). This is often taken to mean that speakers expect certain meanings to be 
                                                 
14 What counts as ‘equivalent semantic content’ is, of course, not straightforward, and a range 
of interpretations has already been seen in the examples cited. In this chapter I work within 
the spirit of examples given in the literature, while submitting that future work needs to 
provide a more measurable implementation of this criterion. 
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expressed using certain forms (e.g. E. V. Clark, 2007). In one sense, both marked and 
unmarked forms are obviously conventional, in that the semantic content is accepted 
by the linguistic community; in another sense, marked forms are less conventional – 
speakers do not expect them to be used for that meaning as much as the unmarked 
form, because they are less frequent in the context.15 I also assume that, like quantity 
implicatures, elaborative inferences play a role, both in generating alternatives and in 
enriching the implicated meaning in terms of how something is atypical: a manner 
inference can involve not only an implicated meaning of ‘non-stereotypical’, but also 
how the object or action described is unusual. This conception of manner inferences is 
minimal and may be simplistic, but does provide a working definition.  
If manner implicatures can be defined theoretically, the question is then whether 
manner implicatures are actually used by speakers and hearers in communication.  
4.1.3 Evidence for manner in adults 
There are very few experimental studies to date investigating whether adult 
speakers are sensitive to manner and can derive manner implicatures. Current studies 
suggest that they do not seem to be as robust as the most robust quantity 
implicatures, and are certainly more challenging to test. I first briefly consider three 
sets of studies that are related to manner implicatures, before recapping previous work 
in which I tried to examine manner inferences directly.  
Firstly, Bergen and colleagues (Bergen, Goodman, & Levy, 2012; Bergen et al., 
2016) test ‘non-linguistic’ manner inferences, through artificial language paradigms. 
In these speaker–listener games, there are three possible referents (pictures of shapes) 
and three possible labels (symbols) which were more or less frequent and more or less 
costly (literally), respectively. Participants have to work out how to communicate and 
interpret a reference to one of the objects, given limitations of length (one ‘word’) and 
cost. The results suggest that speakers and hearers do align frequency and costliness, 
which is taken by the authors as evidence for sensitivity to manner. However, the 
                                                 
15 It is necessary to model frequency in context, since, for example, what may be marked in the 
context of a chat by the coffee machine may be completely unmarked in a business meeting of 
lawyers. A challenge for future research is to make this definition quantifiable, so that it can 
be submitted to empirical testing. 
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highly metalinguistic task might not be capturing the same processing as in typical 
communication (for example, it included literal cost of utterances in dollars). While 
they also conclude that it is rooted in social reasoning, given that it is evident in 
nonlinguistic novel situations, the task is completed by linguistically competent 
people, who may be drawing on their linguistic experience to do so. It is therefore 
suggestive but by no means firm evidence for manner implicatures.  
Secondly, one of the flagship manner examples has been an alternation available 
in English: the periphrastic causative construction, such as ‘make the plate break’, 
with a lexicalised causative alternative, ‘broke the plate’ (e.g. Antoniou & Katsos, 2017; 
Franke, 2009; Levinson, 2000). A set of experimental studies investigating the 
meaning and use of syntactic constructions expressing causation has found that adults 
seem to prefer to use a lexical causative (‘break’) for intentional actions, and a 
periphrastic (‘make break’) for unintentional actions or where the agent is inanimate, 
in both production and comprehension (Song & Wolff, 2005; Wolff, 2003). They also 
have better memory for manner of motion or state change when they have heard a 
periphrastic phrase (e.g. ‘make the truck roll’), and better memory for result when 
hearing the simple transitive (‘roll the truck’), in a spot-the-difference task without 
manipulation of intentionality (Kline, Muentener, & Schulz, 2013). These are both 
different from – though not incompatible with – Levinson’s (2000) proposal that a 
lexical causative gives rise to a stereotypical interpretation, and a periphrastic one to a 
marked interpretation – where both can be intentional. The pattern of usage is 
obviously complex, and sits at the contested boundary between semantics and 
pragmatics, and, indeed, semantics and syntax. One way of reconciling the two 
perspectives, for example, is to imagine that if the periphrastic is more often used for 
unintentional actions, then when it is used for intentional actions (i.e., in a marked 
way), listeners can pragmatically infer that this usage must be for some particular 
reason, such as to indicate an unusual or indirect manner of causation – although this 
requires a richer view of markedness than frequency. This work, though, obviously 
only applies to one case of purported manner implicatures, but suggests that similar 
complex usage patterns might be relevant for others, too.  
Thirdly, work on referential pacts and speaker-specific adaptation is closely 
related to manner (e.g. Brennan & Clark, 1996). A referential pact is an instantiation 
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of conventionality on a local, discourse-specific scale: once two interlocutors have 
‘agreed’ (implicitly) on a referring label in discourse, they persist in doing so, and 
comprehension is affected if this is deviated from. Following it is like adhering to 
manner: there is a semantically equivalent alternative that could be used in the 
context (say, ‘settee’, when the interlocutors are using the term ‘sofa’), and it is more 
marked in the discourse context, as the already established term is more salient, more 
frequently used in the discourse, and therefore less marked. Breaking the referential 
pact, then, is somewhat like flouting manner – the more marked term is used, but, 
importantly, not necessarily to mean anything different. Metzing and Brennan (2003) 
found that adults respond more slowly when the same interlocutor uses a new term 
for a referent already in common ground in discourse.  
So, adult speakers seem to be sensitive to markedness in utterance production 
and comprehension; use semantically equivalent expressions in different ways; and 
expect speakers to be conventional on a local as well as global level. But do they 
actually derive manner implicatures? In previous work, I attempted to adopt 
experimental paradigms that have been used with scalar implicatures (by Degen, 
2015) to test out the kind of manner implicatures cited in the literature, both GCI and 
PCI (E. Wilson & Katsos, 2016). I devised short scenarios, ending with either a marked 
or unmarked utterance, which were pretested to check equal naturalness of a marked 
or unmarked ending (with the stereotypical meaning or manner-implicated meaning 
explicitly stated) – see Table 4.1 for examples.  
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Context Marked utterance  
⇸ marked meaning 
Unmarked utterance  
⇸ unmarked meaning 
Nick and Dan were watching 
a history programme, but 
Nick fell asleep. Afterwards 
he asked, ‘What happened at 
the end?’ Dan replied… 
‘The invaders caused the 
villagers to die.’ 
⇸ The invaders killed the 
villagers but indirectly, by 
introducing disease. 
‘The invaders killed the 
villagers.’  
⇸ The invaders killed 
the villagers directly.  
Jamie got home from his 
grandmother’s. His mum 
asked, ‘Did she give you a 
drink?’ He answered… 
‘She put a teabag into a cup 
and poured over boiling 
water.’ 
⇸ She gave me a cup of tea, 
only it didn’t taste like tea.  
‘She gave me a cup of 
tea.’ 
⇸ She gave me a 
normal cup of tea. 
Table 4.1 Example stimuli from Wilson & Katsos (2016) 
In the first experiment, participants read each scenario, and chose which 
sentence was most similar to the highlighted ending – the unmarked or marked 
meaning. There was a significant difference between the rate of unmarked meaning 
chosen for unmarked utterances, and marked meaning chosen for marked utterances 
(92% vs 56%), but no difference between PCIs and GCIs (GCIs were causatives, 
modals, and negation of contradictory). A similar pattern of results was found in a 
follow-up rating task. Note that the explicitly stated meaning of unmarked utterances 
and the utterances themselves tended to be extremely similar, contributing to the 
near-ceiling score.  
The interpretation of these findings depends on what behaviour is expected as 
default, in the case that no manner inference is derived from the marked utterance, 
while the unmarked interpretation is derived for unmarked utterances. The most 
straightforward prediction would be that participants would simply guess, as both 
options are compatible with what was said (or, in a ratings task, average across trials 
and participants at the midpoint) – remember that the semantic content of the 
alternatives is equivalent. This would mean that the results, at chance, suggest that 
participants are not sensitive to manner.  
However, I would argue that chance selection as the null hypothesis is 
unconvincing in this case; what is instead more likely is that hearers tend to choose 
the most stereotypical (unmarked) interpretation unless there is reason to think 
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otherwise. For instance, if no inference is derived on hearing ‘the invaders caused the 
villagers to die’, then there is little to lead a hearer to pick an explicitly stated 
implicated meaning like ‘The invaders killed the villagers but indirectly, by 
introducing disease’. On this interpretation, if they are not sensitive to manner, one 
would expect similar rates of selection of the marked meaning for both the marked 
and unmarked utterances – high selection of unmarked meaning. This is not the 
pattern seen in these studies, which would mean that where the marked interpretation 
is selected, or rated preferably, this can be taken as an indication that a manner 
inference has indeed been derived. A third experiment indicated that this is indeed the 
more plausible interpretation: adults were asked to simply explain what they thought 
the speaker of the marked or unmarked utterance meant. Around 40% of responses to 
marked utterances suggested that participants had derived a manner implicature, 
though there was significant variety in the precise enrichment.  
This study constituted the first indication from experimental evidence that 
manner implicatures are part of adults’ pragmatic competence. They also call into 
question the distinction between GCIs and PCIs for manner. However, there are a 
number of drawbacks. While a binary selection or rating task using the ‘spelt out’ 
implicated meaning might be serviceable for scalar implicatures where there is a clear 
and minimal difference between what is said and what is implicated (e.g. ‘some’ vs 
‘some but not all’), they are more problematic for manner. For manner, the 
relationship between what is said and what is implicated is more complex – the 
meaning of ‘not in the usual way’ can be enriched via an elaborative inference in a 
number of ways. Indeed, the items used in the experiments reflected this, based on 
those found in the literature. Furthermore, there were notable differences in responses 
across items. On the one hand, this is enlightening, and suggests that the marked 
utterances given in the literature (particularly by Levinson, 2000) may differ in 
interesting ways, such as in context-dependency, or even whether they constitute 
manner implicatures at all. On the other hand, this makes the comparison between 
marked and unmarked conditions less reliable and less representative – and is 
certainly not comparable with, say, scalar or ad hoc experiments, where participants 
tend to respond more consistently across trials. Finally, neither the experimental 
design nor the items themselves were at all suitable for use with children, owing to the 
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written mode, metalinguistic judgements, and complex syntax and vocabulary, driven 
by examples in the literature. The challenge is therefore to learn from these studies, 
and design a child-friendly experiment, for which the items are better normed, in 
order to compare adults’ and children’s competence with manner.  
4.1.4 Manner in development 
As there is some – albeit extremely limited – evidence that adults are sometimes 
sensitive to the maxim of manner in communicating their intended meaning and 
interpreting others’ utterances, the question arises as to how children develop this 
ability. I now review what research there is, and then present two opposing 
hypotheses for a developmental trajectory. For the first, I build on the theoretical 
framework and predictions I put forward in Chapter 2, to hypothesise that manner 
inferences may develop late, because of their unique features. Secondly, drawing on 
what is known of children’s developing understanding of conventionality, I suggest 
that, alternatively, some manner inferences may be available early.  
4.1.4.1 Existing studies 
One exception to the dearth of work specifically on manner is Clark & 
Kurumada’s (2013) overview chapter, in which they concentrate on the submaxim ‘be 
brief’ in production. However, in doing so they bring together manner, quantity and 
relevance – both the form and informational content – by using a rather approximate 
measure of brevity (mean utterance length). Their chapter therefore opens up the 
discussion on this topic, but the need remains to bring together theory and existing 
evidence on manner implicatures, and to spell out the implicatures for acquisition. 
Two studies investigate manner implicature comprehension empirically. Firstly, 
Antoniou and colleagues include manner implicatures in a battery of picture-selection 
tasks also testing relevance, scalar, metaphor and irony inferences (Antoniou, 
Grohmann, Kambanaros, & Katsos, 2013; Antoniou & Katsos, 2017). They use only 
one case of manner – the causative ‘make X Y’ construction (or rather, its equivalent in 
Greek – the language of testing). In that study, monolingual Greek-speaking children 
aged 6;2 to 9 years (mean 7;4) score on average 1.9/3 in manner trials, which is 
comparable to their scalar implicature scores, but worse than relevance. However, 
they find no evidence for a correlation with scalar scores, only with relevance, plus 
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age, IQ and working memory.  
Secondly, Okanda, Asada, Moriguchi & Itakura (2015) aim to use a 
Conversational Violations Test to investigate the developmental trajectory of various 
types of implicature (relevance, quantity, manner and politeness). They explicitly 
motivate the inclusion of manner implicatures, citing Siegal’s observations (2008) 
about the possible effect of manner in standard developmental tests, for example in an 
appearance–reality distinction task where subtly different wording in the 
experimenter’s questions may ‘violate the maxim of manner’. However, in the example 
they give, it is not clear that what is being violated is the maxim of manner – 
understood in terms of markedness – as the experimenter is not using a marked form 
when an unmarked one would have been co-operative, but simply obscurely or subtly-
phrased questions that children may misunderstand. Okanda and colleagues do not 
provide a more definite set of criteria for manner maxims than Grice’s original 
catalogue, and their stimuli would only fit within the broadest conception of manner, 
and certainly not within the criteria I have outlined here. To take two examples of 
items:  
a) Have you ever taken the train?  
I may or may not have / Yes, it was fast.  
b) With whom will you play today?  
I am not sure / I will play with Yuko.  
For (a), the uncooperative answer is clearly under-informative, with the more 
informative alternative ‘I have’; for (b), there is either no violation – if the speaker 
really does not know – or violation of quality. Manner is simply not at stake here. 
In sum, how and when children learn to comprehend manner implicatures 
remains an unanswered question. 
4.1.4.2 Hypothesis 1: Children learn to derive manner inferences relatively late, after 
quantity and relevance  
Manner implicatures can be seen as the most complex of implicatures, and 
therefore are expected to emerge late in development. Given the criteria for manner 
implicatures that I outlined above, manner and quantity share certain features. Like 
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quantity, manner implicatures involve some sort of inferential mechanism that 
includes the generation of alternatives, negation of alternatives, and consequent 
derivation of intended meaning. Like quantity, too, manner implicatures require 
recognition or generation of relevant alternatives in context, which requires tracking 
aspects of the context, such as the QUD. It could therefore be expected that manner 
inferences would emerge at least around the same time as quantity implicatures in 
development. 
In addition, though, manner inferences require an appreciation of the 
conventionality of language at a global level; an ability to detect marked expressions at 
the local level; and productive knowledge of a semantically equivalent but less-marked 
expression. For instance, on hearing ‘the man made the door close’, a child has to 
recognise that this is not the expected less-marked expression, and that this would be 
the alternative ‘closed the door’, given the context, including the interlocutors’ 
language usage; to assume that the marked expression has been used intentionally to 
convey a different meaning; to infer or know from linguistic experience that the 
unmarked alternative is typically used to mean the stereotypical action; and to negate 
that alternative implicated meaning to infer that the speaker therefore intends the 
meaning not of the stereotypical action, but an atypical one. What makes an 
alternative relevant in the context may for manner not (just) be the QUD, but 
expectations about language use, including stylistic or sociolinguistic variation, or 
speaker-specific traits like language-learner status. On Levinson’s model, the 
derivation is also more complex, involving the negation of the alternative’s implicated 
meaning, not its semantic content.  
It might therefore be expected that manner inferences emerge late – after 
relevance and quantity – firstly, because of the potentially more complex inference 
that involves negation of the enriched meaning of the alternative, not its semantic 
content, and secondly, because of the additional knowledge required of markedness, 
gained through linguistic experience. The table presented in Chapter 2 could therefore 
be extended as in Table 4.2.  
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 WLE Q R M 
Tracking QUD  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Tracking language use    ✓ 
QUD licenses inference   ✓  ✓ 
Elaborative inference  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Negation of alternative ✓ ✓   
Negation of alternative’s 
implication 
   ✓ 
Table 4.2 WLE, Quantity, Relevance and Manner inferences 
This schema might be surprising, given what I mentioned in Chapter 2, that 
some have compared WLE inferences to manner (e.g. Brosseau-Liard & Hall, 2011; de 
Marchena et al., 2011). However, I think there are important differences that justify it. 
In a typical WLE situation, a novel label has the alternative of the known label for the 
known object in the context, say ‘strawberry’. The label ‘strawberry’ is the 
conventional and unmarked label, because it is the most commonly used label for 
strawberries (in this kind of context) – just like manner. There is no way for the 
listener to know, though, whether it has the equivalent semantic content to the 
utterance, given that the uttered label is, of course, novel. Given that in a typical WLE 
situation, the two available referents are obviously different objects, not more or less 
typical instantiations of a single type of object, it seems implausible that the hearer 
might reason that the novel word is a marked alternative with the same semantic 
content (unless, of course, the reference is resolved as referring to the familiar object). 
Further, while I have given a minimal definition of markedness as frequency of use in 
context, it very often co-occurs with length, which also is not met in the WLE 
scenario. WLE inferences can therefore be seen as certainly related to manner 
inferences – in that they involve reasoning about alternative forms – but distinct. It is 
therefore possible that WLE emerges early in children’s development, while manner 
inferences emerge late.  
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4.1.4.3 Hypothesis 2: Children may be able to derive some manner inferences early, or even 
be more sensitive than adults  
Alternatively, there are three related competences that might suggest a different 
picture, that manner could emerge early in children’s pragmatic development, around 
the same age as relevance and quantity (3–5 years): appreciation of conventionality, 
referential pacts, and markedness in gestures.  
Studies of children’s development of an understanding of the conventional 
nature of certain phenomena show it to be early and robust – they are able to expect 
others to share their knowledge appropriately. In his overview, Diesendruck (2011) 
highlights how young children expect words to be conventional knowledge among 
speakers of the same language (e.g. Diesendruck & Markson, 2001 and see discussion 
of WLE in Chapter 2), but do not expect proper names to be (Diesendruck, 2005); 
how 2- and 3-year-olds expect the rules of games to be shared (Rakoczy, Warneken, & 
Tomasello, 2008), but not preferences or knowledge of facts (Diesendruck & Markson, 
2001; Graham, Stock, & Henderson, 2006); how preschoolers expect object function to 
be conventional – recognising that the designer of an object does not have a privileged 
influence on their understanding of an object function, compared with any other user, 
in contrast to object categorisation (Defeyter, Hearing, & German, 2009). Various 
theories have been proposed to account for this early development of conventionality 
(Kalish & Sabbagh, 2007). Sabbagh & Henderson (2007) propose that it is precisely 
children’s lack of Theory of Mind that leads them to assume shared knowledge; in 
pedagogy theory it is suggested that there is a special kind of ‘teaching’ through 
ostensive communicative cues such that children assume that knowledge acquired 
this way is generic (Csibra & Gergely, 2009); and with social–cultural theories it is 
argued that it is through participation in social practices at a local level that 
conventionality at a global level emerges (e.g. Rogoff, 2003). All three have in 
common the possibility that an expectation of conventionality can emerge early in 
development without full reasoning about others’ beliefs, and they therefore propose 
some kind of ‘shortcut’ – a cue or cognitive characteristic which allows children to 
assume conventionality and practise it.  
Gricean pragmatics has, by contrast, assumed the need for complex mind-
reading for inferencing, although evidence for some implicatures aged 3 calls this into 
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question (a puzzle I consider at greater length in Chapter 5). It is therefore possible 
that the extra skills required for manner implicatures, including knowledge of 
conventionality, are already in place as implicature understanding develop. Further, 
suggestions that children might even have a heightened sense of conventionality 
(whether because of their lack of Theory of Mind, or as a learning strategy) would 
allow for the possibility that some manner implicatures could be available for children 
early, or even where not intended. Of course, this relies on an ability to keep track of 
the frequency of labels and constructions – their markedness – but cross-situational 
statistical learning is precisely one strategy argued to be pervasive in language 
acquisition (e.g. Yu & Smith, 2007).  
Appreciation of conventionality is a prerequisite for manner inferences, but more 
persuasive evidence for potential early competence comes from a referential pact 
study, in which 3-year-olds are found to be as sensitive to referential pacts as adults, if 
not more so (Matthews, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2010). This can be interpreted as an 
appreciation of conventionality at the local level. Like adults, children are found to be 
slower to respond when the same speaker referred to an object with a different label 
from that previously. For children, however, unlike for adults, this also extends to a 
new speaker. In other words, children in this study have a stronger sense of 
conventionality than adults, with a normative component. Matthews and colleagues 
suggest that one contributing factor could be children’s lesser linguistic experience, 
resulting in ‘more specific memories of previous encounters with referents’ (Matthews 
et al., 2010: 757). As suggested above, one way of viewing referential pacts is as 
observance of conventionality – and the maxim of manner – at a local level, so in this 
study children are demonstrating an awareness that there is a ‘normal’ way of 
expressing something, a skill that is also required for manner inferences.  
Finally, an insightful study finds that children perform a similar kind of inference 
to manner with gestures: Liebal, Carpenter and Tomasello (2011) investigate 
children’s responses to a pointing gesture in the context of a clearing-up game. It 
could either be unmarked (a normal, simple pointing gesture, most frequently 
encountered), or marked (a less frequent pointing gesture involving movement and 
facial expression). Three-year-olds interpret the marked point as intending an action 
involving a hidden part of an object (e.g. its contents) more often than they do for the 
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unmarked point (for which they put the whole object away). One interpretation of this 
is to see it as akin to a manner implicature: arguably, in the context of a clearing-up 
game, the two points could share the same ‘semantic content’, of referring to an object 
that is to be involved in the dyad’s activity, differing in markedness. The marked point 
is therefore interpreted as not referring to the stereotypical ‘meaning’ of the unmarked 
point (moving the whole object), but to an atypical meaning. Alternatively, what could 
be going on here is a contrastive inference, more similar to a referential pact or WLE: 
the unmarked point ‘means’ ‘put away the whole object’, and so by contrast the 
marked point must ‘mean’ something different. Either way, it is further evidence for 
early expectations of conventionality. 
These all suggest that some of the additional skills for manner inferences may be 
in place early, and so manner implicatures may also be available, as long as the 
prerequisite knowledge of alternative forms is in place for any case, at the same stage 
as other implicatures.  
4.2 Experiment 2A: manner implicatures 
To open the investigation of children’s development of manner implicatures, as 
well as to further our understanding of adults’ comprehension, I conducted two 
picture-matching experiments, to test whether children make manner inferences at 
rates similar to or different from inferences to the stereotypical (I-inferences).  
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Design 
The experiment was a picture-matching task, similar in principle to the one used 
in Experiment 1A. As explained there, this kind of task has been successfully employed 
with children to test pragmatic comprehension skills, and has a number of advantages 
that make it particularly child-friendly.  
This study was a very simple instantiation of such a task: the participants heard 
an utterance (a single sentence) and had to choose the picture that matched (cf. 
Horowitz & Frank, 2015, for quantity implicatures). There were only two within-
subject conditions – critical and control, or marked and unmarked utterance – and 
two age groups. In the critical (or M) condition, participants heard a marked 
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utterance, such as ‘The man made the door close’; in the control condition (or ‘I 
condition’, adopting Levinson’s terminology), participants heard the unmarked 
alternative, such as ‘The man closed the door’. In both cases, they saw two pictures, 
one of which depicted the stereotypical instantiation of the action, and the other an 
atypical one.  
Each participant heard each item in only one condition – critical or control. 
There were two pseudo-randomly constructed orders (such that no more than two 
trials in any one condition appeared consecutively), making 4 lists in total, each with 9 
trials. Across lists, the position of the pictures (left or right) was counterbalanced. 
Some items could be viewed as PCIs, and others as GCIs (with the construction ‘make 
X Y’). This made it a 2 × 2 (× 2) design: condition × age group (× type).  
4.2.1.2 Participants 
Children were recruited from Year 1 classes in two local primary schools around 
Cambridge (aged 5;10 – 6;10), and through personal contacts.16 Following 
headteachers’ consent, parents were sent information letters and asked to opt in to the 
study. The recruitment process, and study, was approved by the University of 
Cambridge Psychology Ethics Committee, following research ethics guidelines.  
In total, 32 children were recruited. One participant was excluded due to 
experimenter error, and 6 as they were multilingual, leaving 25 children whose data 
are included for analysis (N = 9 girls). Given that for manner implicatures, the form of 
the utterance is important, only monolingual children were included to avoid the 
effect of language experience or differing competence in English.  
Adults (N = 22) were recruited via Prolific Academic, an online recruitment 
platform for research (Prolific Academic Ltd, 2016), and were paid £0.25 for their 
participation, which took on average 2 minutes (a rate of £7.50/hour). 4 were 
excluded as multilingual. In addition, N = 32 adults participated in the pretests, also 
via Prolific Academic, and were paid £0.40 for their participation. Adult participants 
were filtered as being born and resident in UK and first language English speakers.  
                                                 
16 As some parents only returned the consent form and not the background information 
questionnaire, the exact age of some children was not collected. These children also 
completed Experiment 3 in a separate testing session. 
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4.2.1.3 Material 
Using the items from my previous work as a starting point (E. Wilson & Katsos, 
2016), I devised a list of 12 items all of a PCI nature, which were child-friendly in 
terms of subject matter and vocabulary, and tested these with adults, informally and 
online via Prolific Academic. Of these, I selected 6 which had not been ruled out as 
visually unclear or unlike manner inferences by responses in the pre-test. In addition, I 
added 3 GCIs, all with the construction ‘make X Y’, following Antoniou and Katsos 
(Antoniou & Katsos, 2017). See Appendix 8.5 and Table 4.3.  
The final stimuli therefore consisted of 9 items: 6 PCIs and 3 GCIs. These were 
paired with colour picture cards with cartoon-like illustrations sourced from an online 
free image database (Braxmeier & Steinberger, 2017). There was also one 
unambiguous warm-up item.  
M utterance I utterance PCI/GCI 
The boy put paint on his face. The boy did facepainting. GCI 
The girl dipped her brush in paint and 
put it on the paper. 
The girl painted a picture. PCI 
The girl used a knife to make small 
pieces of apple. 
The girl cut the apple. PCI 
The man made the plate break. The man broke the plate. GCI 
The boy pushed a cloth across the table. The boy cleaned the table. PCI 
The man picked up some things and 
moved them around the room. 
The man tidied the room. PCI 
The girl made the bag tear. The girl tore the bag. GCI 
The girl put a duvet on top of the bed. The girl made the bed. PCI 
The man made the door close. The man closed the door. GCI 
Table 4.3 Items used in Experiment 2A 
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Figure 4.1 Example picture cards for 'The girl used a knife to make small pieces of apple' / 'The girl cut the 
apple' 
4.2.1.4 Procedure 
The task was conducted as part of a longer experimental session, and it was 
always the first task in the session. Children were told that they were going to play a 
guessing game; the experimenter would describe one of the picture cards, and their 
job was to choose which one the experimenter was describing or thinking of. (The 
experimenter was either the author or a summer intern supervised by the author.)  
The picture cards were presented in a pile, and turned over by the experimenter 
for each trial. The picture card chosen by the child was then put in one new pile, and 
the other card discarded in another new pile.  
After the end of the experimental session, the cards chosen by the child were 
recorded by taking a photograph of the selected picture cards, and the list noted.  
Adults completed an online version of the task; they were told that another 
participant had described one of the pictures, and their job was to choose the picture 
he or she was describing, by clicking on it. They read the utterances rather than heard 
them. At the end, adults were asked for some information about their languages, to 
check whether they were indeed native British English speakers.  
4.2.2 Predictions 
As in the sentence-selection task (E. Wilson & Katsos, 2016), there are two 
possible behaviours that might indicate lack of M implicatures: guessing (which would 
manifest itself as chance performance across participants) or preferring the 
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stereotypical, most frequent meaning. This leads to two alternative sets of predictions, 
which I cast here only in terms of selection of the marked picture.  
On an unbiased interpretation, that no inference leads to random guessing:  
• if participants do not make any inferences at all, either marked or unmarked, 
then chance in both critical or control condition is expected 
• if participants only make an inference to the stereotypical for unmarked 
utterances, but no inference for the marked utterance, then below chance 
selection of the marked picture is expected for the unmarked utterance, and 
chance for the marked one  
• if both inferences to the stereotypical and manner implicatures are derived, 
then below chance selection of the marked picture is expected for the 
unmarked utterance, and above chance for the marked utterance.  
If instead, and as already argued is more likely, there is a general bias to the 
stereotypical, then:  
• if participants do not make any inferences or only inferences to the 
stereotypical, then below chance selection of marked pictures is expected in 
both conditions  
• if participants derive manner implicatures, then a higher rate of marked picture 
selection is expected for marked utterances than for unmarked ones.  
In addition, for the comparison between adults and children:  
• if manner implicatures emerge very late, then more marked picture selection 
for marked utterances is expected for adults than children 
• if manner implicatures are comparable to scalar and other implicatures in 
development, then equivalent performance is expected  
• if children have a stronger sense of conventionality than adults, then more 
marked picture selection for marked utterances is expected for children than 
adults 
The last option is extremely unlikely at the age chosen, given that children 
already have significant linguistic experience and competence with other types of 
implicature by 6 years.  
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4.2.3 Results 
Note that there were two minor experimenter errors: for one participant, the left-
right orientation of the pictures was swapped; for another, two trials were swapped in 
the list order. Both participants are included in the present analysis.  
Picture selection is coded as M picture (marked) selection or not, in keeping with 
the predictions. Note that this means that in the unmarked (I) condition, very low 
rates of M picture selection are expected.  
For both children and adults, this is the case; there is also higher rate of M 
picture selection for marked utterances than unmarked utterances (Figure 4.2, Figure 
4.3).  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Mean selection of M picture by condition (utterance) and age group 
Error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for between-subject comparison 
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Figure 4.3 Mean selection M picture by Type (PCI/GCI) and condition (utterance) 
Error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for between-subject comparison 
  
child adult 
I GCI .45 .26 
M GCI .46 .19 
I PCI .11 .10 
M PCI .46 .58 
I Total .22 .15 
M Total .46 .46 
Table 4.4 Proportion of M picture selection by type and age group 
To examine the effect of condition (marked M vs unmarked I utterance), type 
(PCI vs GCI), age group (child vs adult), and their interaction, mixed-effects logistic 
regression models with item (by condition) random slopes and dummy coding were 
fitted using the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2015; R Core Team, 2016; RStudio 
Team, 2016). The child age group, manner inference and PCI type were set as 
baseline. 
There was a significant effect of condition, such that for children and PCIs, there 
are fewer M picture selections in the I condition than in the M condition (β = -2.07, 
p < .001); an interaction of condition and type, such that for children, the difference of 
I minus M was less negative for GCI than for PCI (β = 2.01, p = .003); and an 
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interaction of type and age group, such that for the M condition, the absolute 
difference between GCI and PCI was less for children than adults (β = -1.92, p = .008) 
– Table 4.5. There was no effect of age group for M and PCI.  
 
Estimate SE    z p 
 
-0.15 .34 -0.45 .65 
I -2.07 .46 -4.55 < .001 
GCI -.02 .59 -.03 .98 
Adult .54 .37 1.47 .14 
I:GCI 2.01 .67 3.02 .003 
I:Adult -0.67 .71 -.95 .34 
GCI:Adult -1.92 .73 -2.64 .008 
I:GCI:Adult 1.10 1.08 1.00 .32 
Table 4.5 Condition ~ Type ~ Age group + (1 + Type | Item)  
Glmer, family = binomial, optimizer = bobyqa, contrasts = dummy, baseline = M / PCI / Child 
4.2.4 Discussion 
From the results, there is no evidence of a difference between adults and children 
in interpretation of marked and unmarked utterances, when all items are examined 
together. Both groups choose the marked (M) picture more often for marked 
utterances than for unmarked ones. When the distinction between PCIs and GCIs 
(‘make X Y’) is also examined, then age group does play a role: while children and 
adults pattern together for PCIs, for GCIs they are different, with adults having an 
overall preference for the unmarked pictures, and children choosing roughly equally 
between marked and unmarked pictures.  
On the assumption that without deriving an implicature, hearers would interpret 
both unmarked and marked utterances as having an unmarked meaning, this can be 
taken as evidence that children as well as adults are sometimes sensitive to manner. 
They are sometimes able to infer that the speaker used a marked utterance 
intentionally in order to refer to a non-stereotypical performance of an action.  
The results also suggest that there is no distinction between so-called GCIs and 
PCIs. For both adults and children their response rate to GCIs are the same for marked 
and unmarked utterances, contra predictions extrapolated from Levinson (2000), 
although for children this rate was much higher than for adults. Note, though, that 
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there were few GCI items (N=3), and the difference between GCI and PCI was 
confounded with utterance length for many items.  
However, there are a number of problems with this experiment. Visual inspection 
of by-item responses shows that there is wide variation across items (Figure 4.4). This 
could reflect something about how marked the utterance is, but it could also indicate 
that there is some item artefact having an effect, such as irrelevant picture details.  
Indeed, some comments from child participants as to why they chose particular 
pictures indicated that it was sometimes for reasons unrelated to manner. One issue 
might have been that the picture card pairs varied in how similar they were to each 
other, meaning that the key difference between stereotypical and non-stereotypical 
meaning depicted in the pictures may have been obscured. Therefore, making the 
picture pairs as similar as possible and testing the items with adults to see what factors 
are affecting their choice, would improve the task. This is what I did in the second 
experiment.  
Figure 4.4 Mean selection of M picture by item and condition 
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4.3 Experiment 2B: manner implicatures  
4.3.1 Method 
4.3.1.1 Design 
The design was the same as in Experiment 1, with differences only in the 
materials and procedure, explained below.  
4.3.1.2 Participants 
Children were recruited from Year 1 and 2 classes in a primary school in Sussex, 
and through personal contacts (age range 5;8–7;4, mean = 6;817). Following 
headteachers’ consent, parents were sent information letters and asked to opt in to the 
study. Alternatively, parents who were personal contacts of the researchers were sent 
information letters directly by the researcher. The recruitment process, and study, was 
approved by the University of Cambridge Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, 
following research ethics guidelines.  
In total, 17 children were recruited. 2 children were multilingual, but English 
dominant, and so were included in the analysis for the sake of the sample size; 2 were 
excluded as they were Chinese-dominant.  
Adults (N = 48) were recruited via Prolific Academic, an online recruitment 
platform for research (Prolific Academic Ltd, 2016), and were paid £0.30 or £0.45 for 
their participation, which took on average 2 minutes or 5 minutes (depending on the 
length of the task, with or without justifications, as I explain below). An additional 7 
were excluded as multilingual. In addition, N = 184 adults participated in the pretests, 
also via Prolific Academic.  
4.3.1.3 Material 
The materials were similar to those used in Experiment 1, except that the items 
had been pre-tested more extensively. Experiment 1 was run again with (different) 
adult participants, with participants asked to explain their picture choice, in order to 
identify features of the pictures themselves that were eliciting selection for irrelevant 
                                                 
17 Age data for one 7-year-old is missing. 
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reasons (e.g. size of apple pieces, amount of paint on the paper, age of protagonist). In 
addition, all the pictures were made as similar as possible (for instance, same person 
and object where possible). This process was iterated until there was a set of items for 
which only a minority of responses were coded as due to irrelevant picture details or 
other irrelevant reasons based on participants’ explicit justifications (for the final data, 
≤ 36%,18 mean 7%, and < 20%, mean 1%, N = 24).  
Secondly, the items were included in an utterance-choice task, again with 
selection justifications, in order to a) identify any aspects of the utterances themselves 
which were leading to irrelevant inferences (e.g. because of unnatural wording), and 
b) to ensure that the I utterance is always preferred (> 70% responses). Again, this task 
was iterated, in conjunction with the first.  
Ultimately, a set of 8 items was created, of which 7 were based on those from 
Experiment 1, and 1 was a new GCI type (‘made the jar open’). In addition, the warm-
up item was changed so that it had an implicit QUD of quality rather than quantity (a 
choice between a blue and orange wall, and a green and pink wall, rather than an all-
blue wall). See Table 4.6 and Appendix 8.6.  
M utterance I utterance PCI/GCI 
The woman dipped her brush in paint 
and put it on the paper. 
The woman painted a 
picture. 
PCI 
The woman made small pieces of apple. The woman cut up the 
apple. 
PCI 
The man made the plate break. The man broke the plate. GCI 
The boy pushed a cloth across the table. The boy cleaned the table. PCI 
The man picked up some things and 
moved them around the room. 
The man tidied the room. PCI 
The man made the jar open. The man opened the jar. GCI 
The girl put a duvet on top of the bed. The girl made the bed. PCI 
The man made the door close. The man closed the door. GCI 
Table 4.6 Items used in Experiment 2B 
                                                 
18 Although note that this turned out considerably higher than in the final pretest, where it 
was ≤ 12.5% for any one item. 
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4.3.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1, except that some children 
were tested by another researcher at the end of an experimental session including 
other pragmatic and language tasks (N = 12), or as a stand-alone task (N = 2) while 
others completed the task online under parental supervision (N = 3)19, as with adults. 
Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee approval was given for the amended 
procedure. 
In addition, two versions of the online task were carried out with adults: one with 
justifications, and one without. As there was no difference in the results, the data is 
collated for analysis.  
4.3.2 Results 
Note that there was an experimenter error: for six participants, the arrangement 
of picture pairs as left/right was not counterbalanced as specified in the item lists. 
They are included in the analysis below.  
As in Experiment 2A, picture selection is coded as M picture (marked) selection 
or not, in keeping with the predictions.  
 
Figure 4.5 Mean selection M picture by condition and age group 
                                                 
19 Parents were clearly instructed not to help their children; they were all known to the experimenter 
and had taken part in previous experiments, so were familiar with this idea.  
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Error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for between-subject comparison 
 
Figure 4.6 Mean selection M picture by Type, condition and Age group 
Error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for between-subject comparison 
  
child adult 
I GCI .46 .32 
M GCI .29 .35 
I PCI .11 .06 
M PCI .51 .45 
I Total .25 .15 
M Total .43 .41 
Table 4.7 Proportion of M picture selection by condition, inference type and age group 
To examine the effect of condition (marked M vs unmarked I utterance), type 
(PCI vs GCI), age group (child vs adult), and their interaction, mixed-effects logistic 
regression models with item (by condition) random slopes and dummy coding were 
fitted using the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2015; R Core Team, 2016; RStudio 
Team, 2016). The child age group, manner inference and PCI type were set as 
baseline. 
There was a significant effect of condition, such that for children and PCIs, there 
are fewer M-picture selections in the I condition than in the M condition (β = -2.47, 
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p = .002); and an interaction of condition and type, such that for children, the 
absolute difference between I and M was greater for PCI than for GCI (β = 3.22, p = 
.004). There was no effect of age group, for M and PCI, and no other interactions 
(Table 4.8). 
 
Estimate SE z p 
 
.05 .33 .16 .87 
I -2.47 .78 -3.16 .002 
GCI -0.98 .60 -1.63 .10 
Adult -0.26 .38 -0.67 .50 
I:GCI 3.22 1.13 2.85 .004 
I:Adult -0.41 .78 -0.53 .60 
GCI:Adult .55 .67 .82 .41 
I:GCI:Adult -0.53 1.08 -0.49 .62 
Table 4.8 Condition ~ Type ~ Age group + (1 + Type | Item)  
Glmer, family = binomial, optimizer = bobyqa, contrasts = dummy, baseline = M / PCI / Child 
4.3.3  Discussion 
The pattern of results for Experiment 2B is similar to that of 2A. Both adults and 
children choose pictures showing a marked interpretation more for marked than for 
unmarked utterances, and there is no evidence for a difference between adults and 
children. There is, though, an effect of the type of implicature – PCI vs GCI with the 
‘make X Y’ construction. Given the improvements to this task, these findings give 
more confidence that adults and children do sometimes derive manner inferences. 
However, I discuss some remaining shortcomings with this methodology below. Given 
the small sample size for children in this study, the findings must also be taken with 
caution.  
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4.4 General Discussion 
4.4.1 Manner implicatures in adults  
This picture-matching study provides evidence that adult hearers do sometimes 
derive manner implicatures. However, in comparison to ad hoc and scalar quantity 
implicatures in similar experimental paradigms, they do so at low rates – for instance, 
when compared with findings in Chapter 2, or other studies without discourse context 
(Skordos & Papafragou, 2016; Stiller et al., 2015). This is not as a result of adults 
responding consistently with either the marked or unmarked picture for marked 
utterances (‘pragmatic’ and ‘semantic’ responders, Figure 4.7).  
Overall, adults choose a marked picture for a marked utterance around half the 
time. A chance performance without bimodal distribution in this kind of task would 
typically be taken as an indication of guessing – of lack of competence. However, I 
suggest that in the case of manner implicatures, it can instead be taken as 
representative of the rate of manner implicature derivation. Firstly, it is reasonable to 
assume that, without reason to think otherwise, hearers will arrive at the stereotypical 
interpretation (I), rather than choose at random. Secondly, the pretests established 
that the unmarked (I) utterance was preferred for both pictures – in other words, it is 
possible to refer to the marked picture with the unmarked utterance, so one can make 
the assumption that the unmarked alternative is available, when the marked utterance 
Figure 4.7 Histogram of participant scores for M condition, for children (left) and adults (right) 
for Experiment 2B 
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is heard, and therefore derivation of a manner implicature is, in principle, possible. 
Thirdly, explicit justifications in the pretests and data collection revealed that choices 
were largely not based on irrelevant features, and in some cases seem to be based on 
the form of the utterance leading to a marked interpretation (see Table 4.9). 
Utterance Example justification for M picture 
The girl put the duvet on top of the 
bed. 
This is not how you would typically 
describe the action of making a bed 
The woman dipped her brush in paint 
and put it on the paper. 
The painting is more messy, looks more 
like just paint on paper rather than a nice 
finished picture 
The woman dipped her brush in paint 
and put it on the paper. 
The statement had a random feel about it 
The man picked up some things and 
moved them around the room. 
The sentence suggests a rather haphazard 
action 
Table 4.9 Examples of reasons for choosing M picture for M utterance 
Generalised vs Particularised implicatures  
In this study, there were items that could be called GCIs, with the construction 
‘make X Y’, and others that were PCIs. Some have operationalised Levinson’s (2000) 
default approach to GCIs as predicting higher rates and faster processing of GCIs in 
non-cancelling contexts because they go through by default, rather than being 
facilitated by the context (e.g. Breheny et al., 2006; Degen, 2015). On this view, the 
present results either provide evidence against default inferences, or demand an 
explanation as to why manner but not quantity implicatures are cancelled in a picture-
matching task with single-sentence utterances: adults’ performance was similar in the 
critical utterance condition for GCI and PCI trials.  
However, there was an interaction with condition: for children, the difference in 
M picture selection between M and I utterance conditions is greater for PCI than GCIs, 
and the pattern looks similar for adults. This is surprising, but points to the more 
complex nature of these quasi-conventionalised expressions. Remember that for 
Levinson, a marked expression such as ‘made the door close’ indicates an unusual or 
indirect way of doing so. However, studies on the expression and comprehension of 
causative constructions have indicated that agency and animacy of the agent are 
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among other factors that affect expression choice (Song & Wolff, 2005; Wolff, 2003). 
Numerically, the two items that were driving this pattern in Experiment 2B were: ‘the 
man made the plate break / broke the plate’ and ‘the man made the jar open / opened 
the jar’ (Figure 4.8). Particularly for the first, an accidental action is likely to be normal 
or stereotypical, and an intentional one unusual, which might be why a reverse pattern 
is seen. This indicates that for such cases, extricating the pragmatic inference from 
semantic and syntactic usage patterns is complex, and depends not only on linguistic 
but also world knowledge factors.  
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Figure 4.8 Mean selection of M picture by item, condition and age group 
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Low rates: QUD  
Taking the results altogether, though, the question of why the rates of inference 
are so low still needs to be addressed. One possibility is that if participants are not 
confident about the interpretation, they are more likely to go with the picture of the 
stereotypical, more frequent activity. In addition, though, the way different factors 
contribute to the inference is likely to be more complex than the minimal criteria I set 
at the outset. In particular, it is worth exploring how manner relates to two aspects of 
the discourse context: the QUD, and expectations of language use.  
In Chapters 1 and 2, I outlined a view of quantity inferences in which the 
context, and especially the QUD, plays a crucial role – the inferences depend on the 
relative degree to which the semantic meaning of what is said and its alternative 
address the QUD (following Degen & Tanenhaus, 2014; Russell, 2012). As a reminder, 
consider the following contexts for the utterance ‘I broke some of the plates’: 
a) Did you break all of the plates?  
b) Did you break any of the plates?  
(see Degen & Tanenhaus, 2014 p.32) 
For (a) the alternative all maximally addresses the QUD whereas some (and possibly 
all) does not; for (b) both some and all address the QUD. Typically, in context (a) an 
implicature is derived, whereas in context (b) it is not. How might manner inferences 
depend on the QUD? As the alternatives are semantically similar, the relationship 
must be different from scalars: whatever the QUD, the semantic content of what is 
said and its alternative can both address the QUD to the same degree. However, the 
possible implicated meanings – whether to the stereotypical or unusual – may address 
the QUD to different degrees, so the QUD might constrain utterance interpretation in 
this way. For example, consider the following, where it seems as if (a) is more likely to 
lead to a stereotypical, unmarked (I) interpretation, and (b) a marked one:  
a) What happened next?  
John made the door open. 
b) How did you get in without a key?  
John made the door open.  
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In the current task, there was no explicit QUD provided, which could have led to the 
low rates of manner inferences, especially if an assumed QUD was something like 
‘What did she/he do?’. 
Furthermore, the QUD could be important for determining the inferred manner 
implicature in terms of how the referent is atypical. For example, consider the 
following contexts: 
a) What was that bang?  
The man made the door close. 
⇸ The man closed the door by pushing it violently. 
b) I thought the automatic door was stuck open.  
The man made the door close. 
⇸ The man closed the door by overriding the electronic controls and 
shutting it manually. 
Since participants had to infer a QUD in this study, it is plausible that different 
participants may have done so differently, which then would mean that the 
stereotypical and, especially, unusual instantiations depicted in the pictures may have 
matched participants’ own interpretation to a greater or lesser degree – which, again, 
might contribute to low levels of manner inferences. This is a factor that could be 
explicitly manipulated in future work, or controlled for by using an alternative 
methodology, which I will discuss further below.  
Low rates: language use  
Another aspect of the context needed for manner inferences is the speaker’s 
language use. Previously, I defined markedness minimally as frequency in context, 
noting that this would often coincide with other common interpretations of 
markedness, such as length of form or syntactic complexity. This means that manner 
inferences are dependent on linguistic experience – both in general, and with the 
particular interlocutor and discourse. For instance, the speaker may be a first- or 
second-language speaker; the context may be one where, say, legal or medical jargon is 
required, or a particular sociolect expected. This may mean that, from the hearer’s 
point of view, the intentional use of a marked expression may be more or less obvious, 
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depending on how accurate their expectations about the interlocutors’ language use 
are. 
An illuminating parallel here might be psycholinguistic studies relating to 
saliency and speaker-specific expectations, within a predictive model of language 
processing. For instance, Jaeger and Weatherholtz (2016) explore a quantitative model 
of salience for sociolinguistic variants, proposing that ‘the salience of a lectal variant is 
inversely related to frequency – specifically to the expected relative contextual 
frequency of the variant’ (2016: 2–3). The greater the salience, the greater the 
expectation violation, and the greater the surprisal effect – new information gained 
from the input – that can be observed through behavioural and neural correlates. In 
the case of a sociolinguistic variant that the listener has not encountered before, 
expectations about future language use by that speaker are adapted, possibly 
proportionally to the variant’s initial surprisal. Similarly, for manner implicatures, the 
marked form is one that violates expectations of syntactic or lexical production, given 
the speaker’s language use (including sociolectal or stylistic features from the 
discourse context, the speaker’s own variety, first or second language competence, and 
so on); the first step in a manner implicature derivation likely consists of the same 
processes. However, rather than adapting to the speaker’s language use, the hearer 
recognises that this effect could be intentional on the part of the speaker, and looks 
for the intended meaning.  
An open question, therefore, is how hearers decide to treat marked utterances as 
intentionally marked, given that there could be many other plausible explanations, 
such as the speaker’s idiosyncratic usage or a planning failure. Potentially, the use of 
other cues might help, such as particular prosodic patterns or discourse particles (e.g. 
‘well, she put the duvet on top of the bed’). As these were lacking in this picture-
matching task (as the utterances were either read or spoken with neutral intonation), 
participants may have been less sure about whether the markedness was intentional, 
leading to lower rates of manner implicatures. Also, taking expectation violation as 
part of a manner inference suggests another shortcoming: with few items, and equal 
numbers of control (unmarked) and marked utterances, it could be that participants 
did not have enough experience of the speaker to be confident in expectations about 
the speaker’s language use, and therefore attribute intentionality rather than 
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accommodate a marked utterance. The large proportion of marked utterances might 
also lead the hearer to accommodate them as normal for the speaker’s style. 
4.4.2 Manner in development  
The results are suggestive of a similar competence with manner implicature for 
children aged 5–7 and adults, particularly with PCIs. For GCIs, of the periphrastic 
causative ‘make X Y’ type, they perform differently.  
Firstly, this suggests that though manner might be expected on theoretical 
grounds to be the most challenging of implicatures, children are approaching adult-
like competence not long after they do so with scalar implicatures (see Chapter 2), 
ruling out a strong version of the first hypothesis – that manner implicatures are 
acquired very late. This finding contributes to the overall trend across experimental 
pragmatics studies in recent years, of results that reveal pragmatic competence earlier 
than previously thought, right down to preschool age in the case of relevance and ad 
hocs (e.g. Papafragou & Skordos, 2016). At the age in this study, children are 
competent with reasoning by exclusion and contrastive inference (seen in quantity 
implicatures), so these findings suggest that they are also learning sensitivity to 
markedness.  
However, the present studies cannot clearly distinguish a version of the first 
hypothesis that simply predicts that manner is acquired after scalar implicatures, on 
the one hand, and the second hypothesis that children may actually have the ability to 
derive some manner implicatures early, on the other hand. If the former, then in a 
study with a wider age range, a progression in which children become competent with 
manner just after scalars would be expected. If the latter, then some competence with 
some manner inferences would be expected early, around the same time as relevance 
inferences, and other manner inferences would be seen later; alternatively, a U-shaped 
trajectory might be observed, as children relax their expectations of conventionality, 
and then acquire the ability to derive manner inferences in a more adult-like way.  
Like adults, children seem to find it more difficult to detect GCIs than PCIs; the 
difference between the two conditions was greater for PCIs. This could be indicative of 
the challenge of detecting the markedness of alternations in syntactic constructions 
like this in general. Examples of GCI marked utterances in the literature tend to vary 
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much less from the unmarked alternative than PCI marked utterances. It is therefore 
plausible that they are less salient, and hence that it is more challenging for a child 
with less linguistic experience to recognise them as marked or to attribute them to an 
intentionally meaningful use.  
Alternatively, this pattern may be specific to the causative construction used. I 
noted earlier that there may be several interacting patterns of usage for causative 
constructions that might contribute to adults’ expectations: the periphrastic is 
associated with unintentional actions, a focus on manner of motion or status change, 
and describing atypical situations (Kline et al., 2013; Levinson, 2000; Song & Wolff, 
2005; Wolff, 2003). There is further evidence that children’s expectations may be 
different again. Muentener and Lakusta (Muentener & Lakusta, 2011) found that 
children have an ‘intention-to-CAUSE’ bias: in comprehension and production, 
children used more causal language (whether lexical or periphrastic, e.g. ‘break’, ‘make 
break’) for intentionally caused motions or changes of state, and more non-causal 
language (e.g. ‘fall’) for unintentionally caused changes of state or motion. This would 
explain nicely why ‘make the door close’ and ‘make the jar open’ pattern together 
numerically in the M condition, in contrast to ‘make the plate break’: for the former 
two, both pictures show intentional actions and so children might be expected to 
choose the marked or unmarked picture more or less evenly; for the latter, only the 
unmarked picture is intentional. One would, however, therefore expect a preference 
for the unmarked picture across marked and unmarked utterances, which is not the 
pattern seen. 
Future studies on the development of manner implicatures would therefore 
benefit, firstly, from taking into account relevant aspects of children’s syntactic and 
semantic development, and, secondly, from a greater number of more similar items, so 
that any systematic variation between types of implicature can be observed. It may be 
that, as for scalars with some, the causative is a widely cited but atypical example of a 
marked construction that can trigger a manner inference. Furthermore, it seems likely 
that factors which boost children’s performance with quantity implicatures would 
have a similar effect on manner inferences. In particular, having a productive 
knowledge of alternatives is clearly a prerequisite, but additionally making those 
alternatives salient in context is likely to aid children’s inferencing. Note, though, that 
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simply providing the alternative, unmarked expression in context introduces an 
ambiguity in interpreting the results: it can then function as a referential pact, so any 
response could be a reaction to breaking a referential pact, or drawing a contrastive 
inference, or deriving a manner implicature. In addition, making the QUD explicit 
about how an action was accomplished – whether in a stereotypical way – might help, 
just as highlighting quantity boosts quantity implicature rates, again by making the 
alternatives more salient.  
4.4.3 Challenges for investigating manner  
The picture-matching study presented here highlights the challenges of 
investigating manner implicatures experimentally, in terms of both the stimuli used 
and methodologies employed.  
Firstly, while, in principle, manner is a close parallel to the second quantity 
maxim, in practice it can be challenging to distinguish the contributions of manner 
and the first quantity maxim. The items in the picture-matching study reflected the 
kinds of manner implicature examples given in the literature (particularly by 
Levinson, 2000, following my previous work). However, whether the marked 
utterance was semantically similar to the unmarked alternative, or was instead less 
informative in semantic content, was not always clear. Were they therefore treated as 
manner or as quantity inferences? The justifications given by adult participants 
suggested that sometimes informativeness was applied, and sometimes manner. Table 
4.10 presents the PCI items used in the Experiment 2B; how they could be interpreted 
in terms of informativeness; and a suggestion of how this might be improved in a 
future study. For future studies, more norming or some formal test of semantic 
similarity is required, in order to reduce possible quantity interpretations and ensure 
that manner inferences are being tested. In addition, with more picture choices, for 
example of the unmarked, marked and potential quantity-implicated meanings, it 
might be possible to tease apart hearers’ interpretations, without an explicit 
justification measure. 
Secondly, established experimental paradigms that have been successfully 
employed to investigate adults’ and children’s understanding and processing of other 
types of pragmatic inferences may not be well suited to manner. In the case of picture-
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matching tasks, the potential issues are twofold: firstly, the implicated meaning and its 
alternative are not as clearly defined as for quantity implicatures, so, secondly, the 
pictures available may not be such accurate depictions of their meaning. Also, the 
picture choice indicates that the hearer has derived an implicature, but cannot rule 
out some other feature of the utterance or picture causing the choice. 
M utterance I utterance M meaning Q meaning Improved M 
utterance 
The woman 
dipped her brush 
in paint and put 
it on the paper. 
The woman 
painted a 
picture. 
It was 
unusual 
painting. 
She only put it on 
the paper, but 
didn’t paint 
anything; she 
started to paint. 
The woman put paint 
on the paper to make 
a picture. 
The woman made 
small pieces of 
apple. 
The woman 
cut up the 
apple.  
She cut it in 
an unusual 
way. 
She made small 
not big pieces of 
apple. 
The woman made 
pieces of apple. 
The boy pushed a 
cloth across the 
table.  
The boy 
cleaned the 
table. 
He cleaned it 
ineffectually. 
The boy pushed a 
cloth across the 
table only once. 
The boy pushed a 
cloth all around the 
table. 
The man picked 
up some things 
and moved them 
around the room.   
The man 
tidied the 
room. 
Aimlessly, it 
couldn’t be 
called tidying. 
He only moved 
them but didn’t 
put them away.  
The man moved 
things around the 
room to their own 
places. 
The girl put a 
duvet on top of 
the bed.  
The girl made 
the bed. 
She didn’t 
make the bed 
properly. 
She put it on top 
of the bed but 
didn’t tuck it in. 
The girl spread a 
duvet on top of the 
bed / tucked a 
blanket in on the bed. 
Table 4.10 Possible quantity and manner inferences for Experiment 2B stimuli 
Some kind of act-out task might allow for individual differences in how the 
manner implicature is enriched, although much more challenging to execute and to 
code. Another option that would remove some of the ambiguity of pictures would be 
to use short videos, which could, for example, make it clear that actions are finished. 
For adults, a reading-time measure might have potential: following the method in 
Bergen and Grodner’s (2012) study on quantity implicatures and epistemic state, a 
slowdown would be predicted with a follow-on utterance that conflicts with the 
145 
 
implicated meaning, as compared with one that concurs with it. For children, this 
could be adapted as a story-continuation task, for instance:  
a) The man tidied the room / The man moved things around the room 
to their places. – His wife came in and was happy when she saw it / 
His wife came in and was unhappy when she saw it.  
b) The woman painted a picture / The woman put paint on the paper 
to make a picture. – Her friend saw it and said, ‘what a beautiful 
picture.’ / Her friend saw it and said, ‘what an interesting picture.’ 
Finally, on a constraint-based model of implicature, many factors are expected to 
contribute to hearers’ inferencing of manner implicatures, including expectations 
about speaker language use and the QUD as already discussed. More information 
about the speaker – in the form of more exposure – might help hearers to form 
expectations about the speaker’s language use, and be more confident about 
implicated meanings. Other factors that might contribute also need to be controlled 
for or explicitly manipulated in future research: the use of discourse particles (e.g. 
‘well!’) or prosody, and the degree of markedness (infrequency or length of the 
expression chosen), both of which might cue a marked meaning.  
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that manner inferences can be defined as a distinct 
category of inference theoretically, but found that in practice they can be hard to 
disassociate from quantity inferences. Based on theory and existing empirical findings, 
I put forward two hypotheses for children’s development of manner inferences – that 
they might be the most challenging and acquired late, or, alternatively, that some 
might be available early. The experiments provided suggestive evidence that both 
adults and children sometimes derive some manner inferences, and thereby rule out 
very late development of manner inferences in children. However, much more 
research and new experimental methods are needed to tease apart manner and 
quantity inferences.   
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5 Putting the pieces together: epistemic state and implicatures 
Man: I might need one of those.  
Woman: Sorry?  
Man: I might need one of those.  
Woman: One of what?!  
Man: The thing you’re holding.  
Woman: Oh, a pain au chocolat!  
(Overheard in campus café) 
This reference resolution failure was initially perplexing – until I realised that the 
woman was blind, and so unable to pick up on the cues like pointing and eye-gaze that 
her breakfast-partner was using to disambiguate his utterance; he, of course, was 
failing to take into account this difference in their common ground, in particular with 
visual perspective-taking.  
In this chapter, I turn to the development of a particular aspect of implicature 
inferences: taking into account the speaker’s epistemic state. Remember the puzzle 
that unfolded in Chapter 3. Young children seem to be pragmatically competent – if 
not adult-like – at an age where full Theory of Mind, as measured by explicit False-
Belief tasks, is not consistently demonstrated. Further, in Experiment 1B, Theory of 
Mind score was not a significant predictor of implicature score, except in the bilingual 
group. However, an association – or lack of it – between two different tasks is rather a 
crude instrument for revealing whether ToM development and implicature 
development are linked, and, if so, how. It is not clear what children are doing in 
classic implicature tasks in which there is no difference in perspective between the 
interlocutors. This leaves us with two main questions:  
1. Do children engage in perspective-taking in implicature derivation? In other 
words, even when they look pragmatically competent, are they doing the 
same thing as adults are thought to do?  
2. If not, what does this mean for a Gricean model of pragmatics, and 
implicature in particular? Do we need a new model for development? 
I seek to address these questions in this chapter. I concentrate on tracking the 
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speaker’s epistemic state, and in particular perspective-taking: taking someone else’s 
visual point of view, where the assumption is that what someone else can see is what 
they know.  
Perspective-taking is typically divided into two levels (Flavell, 1977; Flavell, 
Beilin, & Pufall, 1992): level 1 ‘assesses what someone else can see’, while level 2 
‘requires participants to adopt someone else’s spatial point of view to judge how that 
person sees a particular visual stimulus’ (Ferguson, Apperly, & Cane, 2017: 1646). The 
first is involved, for example, in reasoning that because of an obstacle, another person 
cannot see something that you are able to see – imagine how, when moving a large 
item of furniture, you might tell the person walking backwards to watch out for a step; 
it would also be needed to successfully play the children’s game of hide and seek. The 
second level is needed, for instance, in Piaget & Inhelder’s (1967) famous three-
mountain test, where children are asked which pictures show what other people see 
when they look at a display of three different-sized model mountains from different 
angles. 
In this chapter, I use the term epistemic state in its general sense, as typically 
used in pragmatic theory: the knowledge in question could be acquired through 
various means, not just visually. For the second experiment, I focus on visual 
perspective-taking as a case of representing and reasoning about epistemic state. By 
perspective-taking, I have in mind level 1 perspective-taking, unless otherwise 
specified.  
5.1 Reasoning about others' epistemic states 
In Chapter 3, I explained how Theory of Mind is inherent to the Gricean project, 
a) in general, as necessary for intentional communication, and b) specifically for 
reasoning about others’ epistemic states in implicature derivation, as part of the 
Competence Assumption which leads to the Epistemic Step. Whether or not an 
implicature is derived depends partly on whether the hearer thinks the speaker is fully 
informed about relevant content – whether knowledge or ignorance is assumed. A 
particular case of this dichotomy is whether relevant information is in common 
ground – what both the speaker and hearer know that they both know, whether that 
be through visual access or shared experience – or in privileged ground – if only the 
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hearer has access to the information (H. H. Clark, 1996). 
In this section, I review what is known about perspective-taking in general and in 
communicative situations in particular, in adults and in children. Adults are able to 
take into account another’s perspective in utterance interpretation – even if it is not 
yet clear whether they always do so. Children begin to show perspective-taking 
abilities early, but whether they do so in implicature derivation remains an open 
question. 
5.2 In adults 
5.2.1 Perspective-taking 
Typically-developing adults demonstrate full Theory of Mind abilities, including 
perspective-taking: they can pass false belief and other more complex second-order 
ToM tests (Cummings, 2015; O’Grady, Kliesch, Smith, & Scott-Phillips, 2015; 
Wellman et al., 2001). One pragmatic phenomenon that has been extensively studied 
in conjunction with perspective-taking is reference resolution – the production and 
interpretation of referring expressions in an optimally informative way, which allows 
both interlocutors to uniquely identify the intended referent (for a brief overview see 
Heller, Parisien, & Stevenson, 2016). Here I touch on this rich field of study, firstly 
because one experimental paradigm used will be important for Experiment 4 here, and 
secondly because the findings on reference inform expectations for implicatures with 
reasoning about the speaker’s epistemic state.  
In one typical reference resolution task, commonly known as the director or 
cubby-hole task – a type of visual-world paradigm (Snedeker & Huang, 2016) – a 
speaker and hearer are engaged in an activity in which the speaker directs the hearer 
to pick up or move certain objects in an array – typically a set of shelves or cubby-
holes – with the speaker and hearer seated on opposite sides. The interesting catch is 
that some of these objects can be seen only by the hearer, and not by the speaker, 
because of a screen between the speaker and those objects. In other words, they are in 
privileged ground, rather than common ground (H. H. Clark, 1996). This requires the 
hearer to take into account the speaker’s perspective in interpreting the referential 
utterance, by representing the fact that the speaker cannot see that object, and 
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reasoning that the speaker therefore cannot know about that object, and so cannot be 
referring to that object (even if, semantically, the object is a good match).  
Findings from offline and online measures (including eye-tracking and reaction 
time) have varied, and have given birth to a lively and current debate. Eye-tracking 
studies work on the assumption that eye-gaze mirrors cognitive processes that are not 
necessarily expressed in language or action: if the participant looks at a particular 
object, he is considering it as a possible referent. Some such studies have found that 
participants are sometimes able to use their knowledge of the speaker’s epistemic state 
to anticipate the referent, before the critical part of the utterance is fully complete 
(e.g. Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004; Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003; Heller, 
Grodner, & Tanenhaus, 2008). A particularly relevant case comes from Heller, 
Grodner and Tanenhaus (2008), who found that hearers either did or did not make a 
contrastive inference online, depending on whether a contrasting object was in 
common or privileged ground: for instance, upon hearing ‘pick up the big…’, hearers 
start to look to the big duck, with the small duck in common ground, rather than the 
big box, with the small box in privileged ground. In other words, pragmatic 
expectations of informativeness interact with perspective-taking. Their methodology 
also overcomes the problem of the privileged ground object being a better match for 
the utterance than the common ground object, found in some other studies. However, 
other studies have found that participants may look at both objects, or even at the 
privileged object first (e.g. Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & 
Brauner, 2000; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). In Keysar and colleagues’ studies, 
participants are even reported to sometimes pick up or point to the privileged ground 
object when it is a better match for the utterance – 71% of participants in one 
experiment did this at least once, for instance.  
Overall, it seems sometimes participants do not only consider the interlocutor’s 
perspective, but also their own; there are egocentric as well as altercentric biases that 
may themselves be weighted by a wide variety of contextual factors (Hawkins & 
Goodman, 2016). However, though the degree to which adults engage in perspective-
taking varies across experimental contexts and possibly individuals, by and large, 
adults can ultimately end up with the intended referent by taking into account others’ 
perspectives, particularly when there are not strongly conflicting cues. Furthermore, 
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this process can, at least in some circumstances, be incremental, with anticipation of 
referents based on the speaker’s perspective. 
5.2.2 The epistemic step in implicature 
Given a Gricean model of implicature and the findings from reference resolution 
studies, there are three basic expectations for adults’ implicature interpretation:  
1. Hearers will derive an implicature if the Competence Assumption is met. 
2. Hearers will not derive an implicature if the Competence Assumption is not 
met; they may derive some other inference, like an ignorance implicature. 
3. Hearers may use the speaker’s epistemic state to anticipate implicated meaning 
ahead of hearing the critical constituent in the utterance. 
In this section I review existing studies on adults, in order to show a) that these 
expectations are borne out, but b) that no existing paradigms can easily be used with 
children, so a new one has to be developed. As there are only a limited number of 
studies, I look at any manipulating speaker epistemic state, not just visual perspective.  
First, two sets of findings suggest that whether hearers derive a scalar implicature 
does indeed depend on the speaker’s epistemic state. In an offline study, Goodman 
and Stuhlmüller (2013) look at scalar implicatures using a ‘betting measure’, in which 
participants read unfolding scenarios about a speaker who has incomplete or complete 
knowledge. In the example below, the speaker opens 2 out of 3 or 3 out of 3 
envelopes, before making a statement about the envelopes’ content:  
Letters to Laura’s company almost always have checks20 inside.  
Today Laura received 3 letters. 
How many of the 3 letters do you think have checks inside? 
Participant distributes $100 to bet on 0, 1, 2 or 3 envelopes.  
Laura tells you on the phone: ‘I have looked at 3 of the 3 letters.  
Some of the letters have checks inside.’ 
                                                 
20 British English cheques 
151 
 
Now how many of the 3 letters do you think have checks inside? 
Participant repeats the betting action.  
(Goodman & Stuhlmüller, 2013: 178)  
The idea is that bets on 2/3 will be higher than bets on 3/3 if the participant has 
drawn an implicature of some but not all. They find that when the speaker has seen 
inside all the envelopes, as above, bets on 2/3 are indeed higher than on 3/3, and that 
this pattern is reversed when the speaker has not seen inside all of them. That is, their 
findings support the theory that hearers take into account a speaker’s epistemic state. 
However, one drawback of their methodology is the fact that participants are told that 
‘envelopes almost always have cheques inside’ in order to make sure that apparent 
implicatures (betting high on 1 or 2 out of 3) are not due to a prior belief that it was 
unlikely that many envelopes would have cheques inside. This stacks the situation in 
favour of them finding a difference between the conditions where the speaker has seen 
inside 2/3 and 3/3 envelopes: hearers are more likely to guess or bet on 3 out of 3 
envelopes containing a cheque when the speaker has only seen inside 2 of them 
because of this knowledge. This means that it might look as if the implicature has not 
been derived because of ignorance, but really it could be because of this world 
knowledge (a different effect of context). In addition, the betting measure itself is one 
that may tap into participants’ conscious or metalinguistic reasoning, rather than 
purely implicature interpretation. This makes it inappropriate for adaptation for 
children.  
Further evidence comes from Bergen and Grodner’s (2012) self-paced reading 
task. The assumptions here are that a) implicatures and b) accommodation of 
unexpected contents will both show up as longer reading times. They present 
participants with scenarios such as:  
At my client’s request, I [meticulously compiled / skimmed] the 
investment report.  
Some of the real estate investments lost money. 
The rest were successful despite the recent economic downturn. 
(Bergen & Grodner, 2012: 1452) 
152 
 
They find an effect of speaker knowledge: at the scalar trigger (‘some’), reading 
times are longer when the speaker is fully knowledgeable than partially 
knowledgeable. But for the continuation (‘the rest’), reading times are longer with a 
partially-knowledgeable speaker – this continuation is unexpected when the anaphor 
has no established complement set (some but not all). Their findings further suggest 
that this kind of pragmatic processing and integration of contextual information 
happens in an incremental fashion, as the delay in reading time was observed 
immediately at the scalar trigger. This also goes against those accounts that might 
predict automatic generation of scalar implicatures in particular, such as a Default 
account (Levinson, 2000) or some grammatical accounts (e.g. Chierchia, 2004). 
Unfortunately, though, the self-paced reading paradigm is also not suitable for young 
children.  
The final study corroborates these findings, but for ad hoc quantity implicatures, 
and also shows that speaker’s epistemic state can be integrated in an anticipatory 
fashion. Breheny, Ferguson & Katsos (2013) use an eye-tracking paradigm and observe 
higher rates of anticipatory looks, indicative of an exhaustive inference, in the 
knowledgeable speaker condition than in the ignorant (or partially knowledgeable) 
one. In the critical case, both the speaker and hearer watch a video in which a woman 
places an object, say a spoon, into Box A, then a spoon into Box B, and then a fork into 
Box B – but the speaker does not see the last action. The speaker then describes the 
video, although not necessarily in sequential order. In this partially-knowledgeable 
condition, the utterance ‘the woman put a spoon into Box A’ is completely ambiguous 
until the final word, so no anticipatory looks to the target were observed. In contrast, 
in the condition where the speaker sees the whole video, the participant is able to 
anticipate the location as soon as ‘into’ is heard, on the assumption that the speaker is 
being fully informative, and means only a spoon – this is exactly what is seen in the 
eye-gaze fixations. Note that this study – like Goodman and Stuhlmüller’s (2013), but 
unlike Bergen and Grodner’s (2012) – makes explicit and precise what the speaker 
does and does not know. This makes the interpretation of participants’ responses 
much more transparent – a point I shall return to in discussing the first study below.  
Some of these studies – particularly Bergen and Grodner’s (2012) – rely on 
assumptions about the cognitive cost of implicature derivation. There is still some 
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debate about whether deriving implicatures and integrating contextual information is 
cognitively costly or not, with evidence largely coming from studies that examine 
other aspects of context, such as upward- or downward-entailment or the QUD (e.g. 
Breheny et al., 2006; Politzer-Ahles & Fiorentino, 2013). Remember, however, that it 
is not straightforward to extrapolate processing predictions from a pragmatic model 
concerned with the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ – and this kind of model is also the concern of 
the offline developmental experiments here. I shall not discuss this processing aspect 
any further at this point, though I will return to it in discussion below. 
5.3 In children's development 
5.3.1 Perspective-taking  
Children develop level 1 visual perspective-taking skills relatively early: Moll and 
Tomasello (2006) demonstrate that by age 2, children are able to give an adult the toy 
that only the child but not the adult can see, when the adult appears dissatisfied and is 
visually searching for ‘the other toy’, and the child and adult have previously 
experienced both toys together. When the adult simply asks for the toy, they instead 
give the mutually visible toy. There is a significant difference between these two 
conditions, although 2-year-olds are not yet at ceiling performance. This is a skill that 
arguably develops from an earlier capacity for joint-attention; Moll and Meltzoff 
(2011) argue that the role of social interaction is crucial here.  
It seems puzzling that young children are able to respond appropriately based on 
shared (or non-shared) experience with adults (Moll et al., 2006) before they exhibit 
level 1 visual perspective-taking. Moll and Meltzoff (2011) point out that in visual 
perspective-taking tasks, the adult is by necessity present and interacting with the 
child, while in experiential ones, the adult typically leaves, cutting off social 
interaction. They postulate that children tend to over-generalise what is shared in 
interactive situations, meaning that only when the adult stops the social interaction 
can the child recognise the adult’s ignorance (as confirmed by Moll, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2011). Crucially, starting from age 2, children are able to recognise an 
adult’s ignorance in visual perspective-taking if strong cues are given. Level 2 
perspective-taking follows later, potentially underpinned by development in executive 
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functions in the preschool years (Diamond, 2006), and at the same time as epistemic 
perspective-taking (as in false belief tasks). Thus, 3-year-olds largely fail level 2 tasks, 
whereas 4½-year-olds largely pass (Moll & Meltzoff, 2011). The understanding that 
seeing leads to knowing is also evident explicitly, as well as implicitly, from age 3 or 4 
years (Robinson, 2011). These abilities are therefore largely in place at the age of 
children in this study, 5–6 years. 
5.3.2 Perspective-taking and communication 
Many studies have shown that young children are also able to use their 
perspective-taking abilities in communicative situations: 18-month-old infants can 
adapt pointing gestures according to an interlocutor’s epistemic state (Diesendruck & 
Markson, 2001; Liebal, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010); 24-month-old infants can use 
experiential perspective-taking in word learning (Akhtar, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 
1996); 2-year-olds can differentiate test questions, where the speaker actually knows 
the answer, from genuine questions (Grosse & Tomasello, 2012); and children aged 2 
and upwards also adjust their production to be more informative when the referent is 
not visually available (Grigoroglou & Papafragou, 2016; Matthews, Lieven, Theakston, 
& Tomasello, 2006; O’Neill, 1996). Importantly, two studies have used the director-
task paradigm to investigate children’s ability to integrate perspective-taking with 
reference resolution.  
Remember that in the director-task paradigm, in the critical condition, there are 
two objects matching the utterance that are visible to the hearer, one of which is 
hidden for the speaker; in a baseline condition, the hidden object cannot be a 
semantic match for the utterance; and in an ambiguous condition, both object 
matches are in common ground, with the other two items in the display being 
distractors. The speaker gives instructions such as ‘pick up the cup’. Nadig & Sedivy 
(2002) tested a small group (N = 15) of 5- to 6-year-old English-speaking children 
using eye-tracking, and found that the critical and the baseline conditions pattern 
together, with participants looking to the target object more quickly than in the 
ambiguous condition, although there was some effect of the privileged object in the 
critical condition.  
These findings are corroborated by Nilsen and Graham (2009), who report not 
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only looking-time results from 5-year-olds (N = 61), but also the object selection 
results. Children were significantly less likely to pick the alternative target object when 
it was in privileged ground (mean = 13%), than when it was in common ground with 
the target object (mean = 56%). This suggests that in an experimental context where 
the difference in perspective is current and salient, and the objects in common and 
privileged ground are of similar saliency, young children are able to take into account 
the speaker’s epistemic state in the pragmatic task of reference resolution. This means 
that this is a suitable experimental paradigm for assessing perspective-taking, and 
motivates an investigation of the same skills with implicatures. 
5.3.3 Perspective-taking and implicatures 
Until very recently, no studies have attempted to investigate children’s ability to 
take into account the speaker’s perspective in implicature derivation. Two studies, 
however, have set out to investigate ‘ignorance inferences’, which are related to, but 
clearly distinct from, quantity implicatures proper (Hochstein et al., 2016; Papafragou, 
Friedberg, & Cohen, 2017). 
An ignorance inference is derived when the hearer concludes that the speaker 
does not know whether the more or less informative proposition is the case, reasoning 
that if the speaker knew that the more informative one is the case, she would have 
said so, she is being co-operative, and there is no evidence that she does know. That is, 
an ignorance inference is an inference about the speaker’s epistemic state. An 
ignorance inference par excellence is the disjunctive case, such as ‘Bob has a Peugeot 
or a Ford’. Upon hearing such an utterance, the hearer can reason that if the speaker 
knew that Bob has a Peugeot, she would have said so, and likewise with the Ford. 
Since she did not, the hearer can conclude that she is not sure which of the stronger 
utterances is true (nor can she know that either is false, else this utterance would not 
be co-operative on the level of quality). Therefore, the hearer infers that the speaker 
does not know – or is ignorant of – whether Bob has a Peugeot or Bob has a Ford, but 
does know that one of these is true (cf. Hochstein et al., 2016: 114–115). The same 
kind of inference occurs with other quantity implicatures as well where the 
Competence Assumption is not met (as explained with the example ‘The puppet 
picked the card with rabbits’ in section 3.1.1). 
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Hochstein et al. (2016) and Papafragou, Friedberg and Cohen (2017) test 4- and 
5-year-olds with a similar experimental design. To take the latter as an example: 
children watch two videos, which each feature a girl performing an action (e.g. 
painting a star), and an observer. In one video, the observer watches the entire action; 
in the other, the observer falls asleep part way through. Participants then hear an 
utterance, such as ‘The girl coloured some/all of the star’ and are asked, ‘Who said 
that? Point to the friend who said that.’ In both studies, 5-year-olds, but not 4-year-
olds, are able to attribute the under-informative statement (‘some of the star’) to the 
ignorant speaker (at above chance rates, M = 63%, in Papafragou et al., 2017, and no 
different from the control trial, M = 75%, in Hochstein et al., 2016).  
Papafragou, Friedberg and Cohen (2017) follow up these results with two further 
studies to try to isolate the 4-year-olds’ difficulty. They found that in the same task 
without an epistemic state manipulation (i.e., akin to a standard scalar implicature 
picture-matching task), they are above chance; but in a non-communicative version of 
the task, in which participants are shown both videos, followed by a picture card taken 
from one of the videos, and then asked ‘Who saw that?’, they are at chance. This seems 
to suggest that the younger children’s difficulty lies not in the scalar inference 
derivation, but instead in the tracking of epistemic states.  
This is surprising, however, given the evidence for early development of 
perspective-taking I reviewed above. One explanation, suggested by Papafragou, 
Friedberg and Cohen, is that this has to do with the more complex task demands in 
this particular case. One factor is the need to remember both scenes, as they are 
videos rather than pictures and neither is available visually at the point the test card is 
produced (the final frame is visible, but in this the girl has covered up the drawing). 
This contrasts with other perspective-taking tasks, like the director task, where the 
difference in perspective is always available and salient to the participant. Another 
factor they mention is the need for an overt response, comparing this to the difficulties 
4-year-olds still have with false-belief tasks (Wellman et al., 2001). An alternative 
explanation might be that the task in fact does not effectively tap children’s 
knowledge. Despite the fact that the second follow-up experiment was meant to be 
non-linguistic, it did rely, crucially, on a question, ‘Who saw this?’. As they point out, 
like a weak scalar utterance, the ‘weak’ picture card is indeed true of both girls – they 
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both see the star half-painted at some point. What is needed here is in fact a 
pragmatic inference to Who saw only this? Or, as they explain, a realisation that the 
weaker picture is not a good representation of everything that the fully-informed 
observer saw. It is perfectly possible that this particular communicative situation does 
not provide enough cues for an exhaustive QUD. Note that for these experiments, only 
4-year-olds were tested, so it is an open question as to how 5-year-olds would respond, 
although a control group of adults performed as predicted. In other words, from this 
study, it cannot be firmly established whether 4-year-olds’ difficulty with ignorance 
inferences is due to the tracking of epistemic knowledge per se, or to the integration of 
this knowledge into a pragmatic inference.  
The conclusion put forward by both studies is that 5-year-olds can derive 
ignorance inferences, although they are clearly still developing this ability. However, 
this is not the only interpretation of their findings. At best, the tasks can be said to be 
a very supportive or scaffolded context for ignorance inferences, as the epistemic state 
of the (potential) interlocutors is highlighted. Alternatively, what they show is some 
kind of reasoning about epistemic state, but not an ignorance inference in the 
traditional Gricean understanding: the epistemic states of the interlocutors are known 
in these studies, and what is required is to match an utterance to one of these 
interlocutors. In an ignorance inference, on the other hand, only the utterance is 
known, and the epistemic state of the interlocutor is inferred based on expectations of 
informativeness and cooperativeness more generally. At minimum, what might be 
needed to solve this task is an ability to remember interlocutor’s epistemic states, and 
a sensitivity to informativeness. Hypothetically, one could use reasoning by exclusion 
along the following lines: I, the participant (and the knowledgeable speaker), would 
have said that the girl painted all of the star; the utterance was ‘the girl painted some 
of the star’; therefore, the knowledgeable speaker cannot have said that; therefore, it 
must have been the other speaker. Even if this is the case, these studies are still helpful 
here, in that they show some sort of reasoning about speakers’ beliefs in a 
communicative context at the age of 5 years. 
To emphasise, what is definitely not being tested in these studies is the ability to 
integrate the speaker’s epistemic state into an implicature inference, and take the 
epistemic step or not, as appropriate, despite claims from one that it ‘offers the first 
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evidence in the literature that preschoolers are able to some degree to consult a 
speaker’s epistemic state when computing a scalar implicature’ (Papafragou et al., 
2017: 11). In these studies, what is at stake is which speaker said something, given the 
utterance interpretation; with ignorance inferences, what is at stake is the epistemic 
state of the speaker, given the utterance; in implicature derivation, what is at stake is 
being able to derive or not derive the implicature, given the speaker’s (assumed) 
epistemic state. The last of these is what I am investigating in this chapter.  
More recently (and after the studies in this chapter were carried out), Kampa and 
Papafragou (2017) test the interaction of ad hoc implicatures and speaker perspective 
in 4-year-olds. In the experiment, children always see two photographs, one of a 
‘speaker’ behind a display where both objects are mutually visible and another of the 
same ‘speaker’ behind a display where one object is occluded for the speaker (see 
sketch in Figure 5.1). In one condition – the ‘strong’ condition – children hear an 
utterance such as ‘I see a spoon and a bowl’, and are asked, ‘which box is she talking 
about?’ In the other condition – the ‘weak’ condition – children hear ‘I see a spoon’. 
On the whole, children succeed in both conditions, though they do better in the 
strong condition. The authors’ conclusion is that 4-year-olds are able to take into 
account speaker perspective in implicature derivation.  
 
Figure 5.1 Sketch of experimental stimuli from Kampa & Papafragou (2017) 
However, what is being tested here is not necessarily the Epistemic Step per se. 
In the ‘strong’ condition the utterance could match either box from the hearer’s 
perspective, but only one from the speaker’s perspective – so this is straightforwardly 
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testing perspective-taking. In the ‘weak’ condition, the utterance is again a semantic 
match for either box from the hearer’s perspective, and a semantic match for either 
box from the speaker’s perspective, but only a fully informative utterance from the 
speaker’s perspective for one box (with the occluded object) – or, alternatively, only a 
match for the exhaustive interpretation for that one box. That is, there are two 
possible ways to arrive at the correct box selection in the weak condition, along the 
following lines of reasoning: ‘if the speaker said ‘I see a spoon’ to describe the box 
where she can see both a spoon and a bowl, she would be under-informative, so it 
must be the other one’, or ‘if the speaker meant ‘I see only a spoon’ it would not be 
true for the box where she can see both a spoon and a bowl, so it must be the other 
one’. Therefore, in this design, both conditions test perspective-taking in referential 
communication. But on one interpretation neither involve an ad hoc inference, only 
sensitivity to informativeness, while on the other interpretation, the ‘weak’ condition 
tests the ability to match an ad hoc inference interpretation to the speaker’s 
perspective. Note, too, that while the experiment is set up to suggest that the 
utterance is produced by one speaker about a particular box – it is about reference 
resolution – the visual display allows for the task to be about matching an utterance 
(interpretation) to a speaker. In other words, it could be that participants are not 
answering the explicit question, ‘which box is she talking about?’ but instead ‘which 
speaker said that?’, just as in Papafragou, Friedberg and Cohen’s and Hochstein et al.’s 
tasks. Therefore, whether children are able to derive or not derive a quantity 
implicature depending on the speaker’s perspective is still an open question.  
5.3.4 Summary 
In sum, there is evidence that adults are able to take into account a speaker’s 
perspective in utterance interpretation, including in implicature derivation – although 
the extent to which the process itself combines egocentric and altercentric biases is 
still a matter of debate. In children, perspective-taking itself emerges early, and in 
communicative interactions from the second year of life. By age 5, children are 
competent in level 1 perspective-taking, and are likely to be able to combine this with 
resolving reference, and matching an utterance to a speaker. They can also derive 
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quantity implicatures (both ad hoc and scalar), where speaker epistemic state is not at 
issue. What is not known is whether they can combine all these skills.  
5.4 Predictions 
By combining expectations from pragmatic theory with what is already known 
about perspective-taking and implicature understanding in children and adults, two 
distinct hypotheses can be formulated about children’s development of perspective-
taking in implicature inferences.  
5.4.1 One-step hypothesis 
This is the fully Gricean hypothesis: that taking into account the speaker’s 
perspective in implicature derivation develops along with the implicature derivation 
itself, in one step. The prediction, therefore, is that when children start to make 
implicature inferences at adult-like rates in situations where perspective is shared 
between interlocutors – where relevant beliefs are in common ground – they will also 
make inferences at adult-like rates when this is not the case, where there is privileged 
ground or possible ignorance on the part of the speaker. 
This hypothesis rests on the notion that to be a competent pragmatic 
communicator requires Theory of Mind abilities such as perspective-taking and 
reasoning about others’ beliefs (Cummings, 2015; Geurts, 2010; Geurts & Rubio-
Fernández, 2015; Goodman & Frank, 2016). There is growing evidence that intention-
reading abilities do emerge early in development (Mascaro & Sperber, 2015; 
Tomasello, 2003), and that these are used in early comprehension and production. In 
their review, Graham, Juan and Khu conclude that ‘these findings suggest that as soon 
as infants begin to reason about the visual perspectives of others, they begin to also 
use this information to inform their interpretation and production of both nonverbal 
and verbal communicative behaviours’ (Graham, Juan, & Khu, 2016: 4). As an aside, 
one might also expect that taking the Epistemic Step would be more, not less, complex 
than not taking it. On this hypothesis, as soon as children develop the ability to make 
complex inferences such as implicature derivations, they are also able to take into 
account the speaker’s perspective in this inferencing. 
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5.4.2 Two-step hypothesis  
Alternatively, the implicature derivation (assuming full common ground) and 
reasoning about others’ epistemic states first develop separately, and then are later 
integrated, in two steps. The prediction is that children first perform at adult-like rates 
for quantity implicatures where common ground can be assumed – where there is no 
reason to drop the Competence Assumption. Then, later, they do so when the 
interlocutor’s perspective must be taken into account, when the speaker’s perspective 
differs from the hearer’s.  
This notion assumes that the pragmatic inferencing process itself does not have 
to include reasoning about others’ beliefs; either this element is ‘replaced’ by own 
beliefs, or the inference can be separated from the pragmatic strategy adopted in any 
given situation. For example, one proposal along these lines is that an interpretation 
norm can be distinguished from pragmatic inference processes (Kissine, 2016). On the 
one hand, there is an interpretation norm, which could in one context be ‘complete 
recovery of the speaker’s communicative intentions’, but in another, ‘the most relevant 
given the speaker’s perspective’, and in yet another, ‘simple egocentric relevance’. On 
the other hand, there is the pragmatic processing, which is ‘driven by the selected 
interpretative norm’ (Kissine, 2016). In other words, some pragmatic reasoning is 
possible without full theory of mind engagement, at least in development and 
potentially in adults as well (Andrés-Roqueta & Katsos, 2017; Breheny, 2006; Katsos & 
Andrés-Roqueta, 2015). If children find integration of pragmatic inferences and 
perspective-taking in processing challenging, as they appear to do with other aspects 
of the context such as the QUD (Skordos & Papafragou, 2016), then a two-step 
developmental trajectory is likely. 
5.5 Experiment 3: ‘Nosy Neighbours’ – ad hocs, scalars and speaker 
epistemic state 
In this experiment, I investigated the effect of the speaker’s epistemic state 
(knowledgeable or ignorant) on the rate of scalar and ad hoc quantity implicatures in 
adults and children. In addition, I looked at the relationship between these rates and 
social aptitude (representing Theory of Mind abilities) in adults.  
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5.5.1 Method 
5.5.1.1 Design 
The design was based on the covered-box paradigm, which has been used with 
both children (Bill et al., 2014), and adults (Schwarz, Romoli, & Bill, 2015). It is 
similar to the ‘magic box’ design which has also been used with children (Y. T. Huang, 
Spelke, & Snedeker, 2013; Li, Barner, & Huang, 2008; Pearson, Khan, & Snedeker, 
2011). Schwarz, Romoli and Bill (2015) employ this task to test scalar implicatures by 
using a detective scenario where it is uncertain whether the speaker was fully 
informed – this is done to raise the number of no-inference responses, rather than to 
examine the effect of speaker’s epistemic state per se. However, this makes it a 
promising paradigm for the present study, as one that is both child-friendly and allows 
for uncertainty (partial-ignorance) on the part of the speaker.  
The covered-box task was similar to a picture-matching task, with a critical 
difference: participants were presented with a context picture and utterance, followed 
by the critical utterance and a choice between a visible picture and a covered picture. 
The utterance and the visible picture conditions were fully crossed (strong 
utterance/‘strong’ picture, strong/weak, weak/strong, weak/weak – Table 5.1 and 
Table 5.2). In the critical case, participants heard an utterance with the weaker term 
(‘some Xs have Ys’, or ‘there is an X’) and saw a picture depicting the stronger term (all 
Xs have Ys or there is an X and a Y) alongside a covered picture; if they rejected the 
visible picture and chose the covered picture as matching the scenario, it could be 
inferred that they had derived a quantity implicature.  
The study had a 2 × 4 × 2 × 2 design: epistemic state × condition × scale × age. In 
the analysis, I primarily concentrated on epistemic state, the two comparable 
conditions (strong/weak and weak/strong), and age: 2 × 2 × 2. Epistemic state was a 
between-subject condition, and condition and scale within-subject. The speaker was 
either knowledgeable or only partially knowledgeable (having a good or poor view of 
the event described); utterance (strong/weak) and pictures (strong/weak) were fully 
crossed; and critical items triggered either a scalar or an ad hoc quantity implicature. 
The position of the visible and covered pictures (left/right) were counter-balanced 
across trials. Each participant saw each item in only one condition (4 lists), and three 
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pseudo-random orders were produced using a python script, such that no more than 
two of any one condition occurred together (Python Software Foundation, 2016), so 
there were 12 lists, each with 16 items (see Appendix 8.7).  
Condition Utterance Visible picture Pragmatic choice 
Critical 
weak/strong 
Some of the guests 
drank lemonade 
All of the guests 
drank lemonade 
Covered picture 
Control 
strong/weak 
All of the guests 
drank lemonade 
Some of the guests 
drank lemonade 
Covered picture 
Control 
strong/strong 
All of the guests 
drank lemonade 
All of the guests 
drank lemonade 
Visible picture 
Control weak/weak Some of the guests 
drank lemonade 
Some of the guests 
drank lemonade 
Visible picture 
Table 5.1 Nosy Neighbour study conditions – examples with scalar items  
(Context question: ‘What did the friends drink?’) 
Condition Utterance Visible picture Pragmatic choice 
Critical 
weak/strong 
There were 
bananas 
There were bananas 
and grapes 
Covered picture 
Control 
strong/weak 
There were 
bananas and 
grapes 
There were bananas Covered picture 
Control 
strong/strong 
There were 
bananas and 
grapes 
There were bananas 
and grapes 
Visible picture 
Control weak/weak There were 
bananas 
There were bananas Visible picture 
Table 5.2 Nosy Neighbour study conditions – examples with ad hoc items  
(Context question: ‘What was on the plate?’) 
Adults were also given the Autism Spectrum Quotient (ASQ, Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), a 50-question survey that measures 
social aptitude in the general population by asking participants to say to what extent 
they agree with statements about themselves (e.g. ‘I find it easy to work out what 
someone is thinking or feeling just by looking at their face’, ‘I enjoy meeting new 
people’). Some other pragmatic tasks with adults also employ this test: Grodner, 
Dalini, Pearlstein-Levy and Ward (2012)  find that greater social aptitude (indicated 
by a lower ASQ score) is associated with better perspective-taking in a reference 
164 
 
resolution task, but in the second half of the trials only; Husband (2014) finds that 
lower ASQ scores show less distinction between implicature cancellations and 
entailment cancellations in an acceptability rating task – seemingly an opposite effect, 
although perhaps explainable in the context of the task. Looking at interpretation of 
ironic utterances, Spotorno & Noveck (2014) find a positive correlation between 
reading time and ASQ scores, again in the second half of the task, such that those with 
less social aptitude maintained a difference in reading time between literal and ironic 
utterances. Goldshtein, Brown-Schmidt and Terkourafi (2017) find no correlation, 
though, between rejection of under-informative scalar utterances and ASQ scores. 
5.5.1.2 Participants 
Adults (N = 144) were recruited on Prolific Academic, an online recruitment 
platform for research (Prolific Academic Ltd, 2016). They declared English as their 
first language, and had been born in and currently lived in UK. 4 participants 
completed the task twice, and so only their first response was included in the analysis. 
One additional participant was excluded for failing to complete the task.  
Children (N = 30) were recruited from two local schools and local families (age 
range: 5;2–6;10; N = 14 girls), where parents gave consent for them to participate, 
following approval from the Psychology Research Ethics Committee (PRE.2014.98). 3 
additional children were recruited but excluded due to technical issues (N = 1) or for 
failing to engage in or understand the task (N = 2). Children were all fluent in English. 
18 were monolinguals. 6 were known to be bilingual, but had been exposed to both 
English and the other language from the first year of life and were exposed to English 
as much if not more than the other language (i.e. English-dominant). For 6 children, 
background information including language use was missing (as parents provided 
consent forms but not background questionnaires). All children’s data was included in 
the present analysis.  
5.5.1.3 Materials 
8 ad hoc and 8 scalar items took the form of a question-answer pair, between two 
characters called Mr and Mrs Watson. Adults read these mini-dialogues, as in Table 
5.1 and Table 5.2, while children heard recordings of a male and female voice saying 
the utterance only (not the name of the speaker).  
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The question was always a simple ‘what’ question (with one exception: ‘how did 
the friends come?’), and the scalar and ad hoc utterances had the same structure: 
‘All/some of the friends V-ed X’ or ‘there was an X (and a Y)’.  
The text or recordings were accompanied by two pictures – one of which was 
always covered by a black box in experimental trials (Table 5.3). These were simple 
colourful cartoon drawings, sourced largely from Pixabay, an online database of 
photographs and illustrations released free of copyright under Creative Commons CC0 
(Braxmeier & Steinberger, 2017), or from an internet search with the ‘labelled for 
noncommercial reuse’ filter checked. They were manipulated using GIMP – GNU 
Image Manipulation Program (Kimball, Mattis, & The GIMP Development Team, 
2016).  
Mrs 
Watson’s 
question 
Mr Watson’s 
reply (strong) 
Mr Watson’s 
reply (weak) 
‘Strong’ 
picture 
‘Weak’ picture 
What was on 
the table? 
There was a 
basket of 
apples and a 
book. 
There was a 
basket of 
apples. 
  
What did 
the friends 
get? 
All of the 
friends got a 
balloon. 
Some of the 
friends got a 
balloon. 
  
Table 5.3 Examples of ad hoc and scalar stimuli for Experiment 3 
Utterances were devised using simple language that would be understandable to 
children, using Kuperman, Stadthagen-Gonzalez and Brysbaert’s (2012) Age of 
Acquisition ratings as a guide. In addition, the utterances and pictures went through 
several rounds of piloting with adults, in order to reduce responses that were based on 
irrelevant reasons, e.g. irrelevant picture details. As part of this process, other scales, 
besides ‹all, some›, were tested: ‹finish, start›, and part-whole pairs (e.g. ‹whole, 
slice›). However, in both cases, the challenge of depicting the intended meaning using 
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still images was prohibitive – not even the straightforward control items were treated 
as expected by participants. Thus, these two were abandoned and the items restricted 
to ‹all, some› scalar and ad hoc items, which renders the design more comparable to 
the majority of other implicature studies in the developmental literature.  
5.5.1.4 Procedure 
Adults completed the task via Qualtrics, an online survey platform, and were 
paid £1 for their participation (Qualtrics, 2016); children did so on a laptop computer, 
with the stimuli presented via PowerPoint, and received a sticker and certificate. The 
children’s responses were recorded by the experimenter using pen and paper.   
The participants were introduced to the task by reading (or, for children, having 
read to them), a ‘Nosy Neighbours’ scenario:  
Mr & Mrs Watson were very nosy neighbours. They always liked to 
know what their neighbours were doing. One day while Mrs Watson 
was out, their neighbours had a party. When she returned she asked 
Mr Watson about what had happened that day next door. He told her 
that some friends had come to a party there.  
[However, there was a large fence between their house and the 
neighbours’, so Mr Watson had not had a good view of what was 
going on; he couldn’t see the party very well.] 
OR 
[Since there was no fence between their house and the neighbours’, 
Mr Watson had a good view of the party; he could see the party really 
well.] 
Your job is to read what Mrs Watson asks about the neighbours’ party, 
and Mr Watson’s responses. Below their conversation you will see two 
pictures, only one of which shows what actually happened at the 
party. However, one of the pictures is always covered. Click on the 
picture that shows what actually happened. If it's not the one that you 
can see, then it will be the covered one. 
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These instructions were accompanied by pictures of Mr and Mrs Watson, their view of 
the neighbours’ house, and the group of friends who came to the party.  
There were then two warm-up trials in which the visible picture was 
unambiguously correct or incorrect. One of these was designed so that the visible 
picture was selected, the other the covered picture. In either case, the covered picture 
was revealed, and feedback was given. This was done to help the participants 
understand the activity, but also to demonstrate that either the visible or covered 
picture could be selected and that there was a picture ‘under’ the black box. At the end 
of the warm-up, the participant was reminded that that Mr Watson had a good or 
poor view of the party.  
In the experimental trials, the covered picture was never revealed; this was 
explained to the participants before they started the main task. Between each trial, Mr 
Watson’s view of the neighbours’ house (with or without a fence) was displayed for 1 
second, before the experiment automatically progressed to the next trial. This was 
meant to act as a visual reminder of Mr Watson’s epistemic state.  
Children were tested in a room at their school or home that was as quiet as 
possible, as part of two test sessions in which they also completed the BPVS, mini-
TROG, and a picture-matching task for manner implicatures. The Nosy Neighbour 
task was always the first presented in the first session. Adults completed the task on 
their computers (or tablets; ‘no mobiles’ was specified) wherever they wished – but 
most likely at home. At the end of the Nosy Neighbour activity, they also completed 
the Autism Spectrum Quotient questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), and were 
told: ‘In the second part of this task, you will complete a personality questionnaire. 
Please answer as quickly and honestly as you can.’ This was followed by the 
instructions from the questionnaire itself:  
Below is a list of statements. Please read each statement very carefully 
and rate how strongly you agree or disagree with it by clicking on your 
answer. 
The Nosy Neighbour task took on average 5 minutes to complete, and the ASQ an 
additional 3 or 4 minutes.  
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5.5.1.5 Predictions 
In line with adults’ abilities and other findings on speaker epistemic state and 
implicatures, the predictions for adult hearers are that:  
• The rate of implicature derivation (in the critical weak utterance/strong picture 
condition) will be higher when the speaker is knowledgeable than when the 
speaker is ignorant.  
• If there is also an effect of speaker knowledge in the control conditions, then: 
difference in the rate of implicature derivation between knowledgeable speaker 
and ignorant speaker will be greater for the critical condition than the control 
conditions.  
(While on a straightforward Gricean model, no difference would be expected in 
the control conditions between knowledgeable and ignorant speaker groups, one 
could imagine that some participants might adopt some sort of strategy where they do 
adjust their responses in the control conditions as well – if they suspect that quality as 
well as quantity is affected by the speaker’s partial knowledge. However, the crucial 
prediction is that the effect is larger for the critical pragmatic condition than any 
control conditions.) 
For children, the predictions are that: 
• On the one-step hypothesis, their responses will pattern like those of adults. 
• On the two-step hypothesis, there may be a different pattern of responses from 
adults’, such that there is no difference in performance between the 
knowledgeable speaker and ignorant speaker groups (depending on the age at 
which the two skills are integrated).  
In addition, given the other studies that find some relationship between ASQ 
scores and pragmatic abilities (e.g. Grodner et al., 2012), it is predicted that those with 
lower ASQ scores (higher social aptitude) will be better at perspective taking, and 
therefore will make more adjustment in the ignorant speaker condition, so that their 
rate of implicature derivation is lower in the critical condition than for those with 
higher ASQ scores (i.e., a positive correlation between implicature rate and ASQ 
score). In the knowledgeable speaker condition, the opposite pattern is expected – 
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those with lower ASQ scores – more social – will derive more implicatures (i.e., a 
negative correlation).   
5.5.2 Results and analysis 
Responses were coded as correct if the semantically correct or pragmatically 
felicitous picture was chosen. In the critical condition, and the strong/weak control 
condition, this was the covered picture. In the strong/strong and weak/weak control 
conditions, this was the visible picture. Overall, there were more correct choices in the 
control conditions than in the critical implicature condition, and there seems to be an 
effect of speaker knowledge that is different between adults and children. 
  
Figure 5.2 Correct responses by condition, speaker knowledge, and age group 
Error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for between-subject comparison 
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adult child 
Speaker: knowledgeable ignorant knowledgeable ignorant 
Weak/strong .66 .53 .27 .47 
Strong/weak .96 .86 .66 .73 
Strong/strong .98 .87 1.00 .88 
Weak/weak .99 .89 .98 .84 
Table 5.4 Proportion correct responses by condition, speaker knowledge and age group 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Correct response by condition, speaker knowledge, scale and age group 
Error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for between-subject comparison 
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adult child 
  
knowledgeable ignorant knowledgeable ignorant 
Ad hoc Weak/strong .53 .42 .39 .66 
 
Strong/weak .98 .88 .89 .94 
 
Strong/strong .99 .87 1.00 .84 
 
Weak/weak .99 .85 1.00 .84 
Scalar Weak/strong .78 .63 .14 .28 
 
Strong/weak .94 .85 .43 .53 
 
Strong/strong .97 .88 1.00 .91 
 
Weak/weak .99 .92 .96 .84 
Table 5.5 Proportion of correct responses by scale, condition, speaker knowledge and age group 
5.5.2.1 Implicature rates with knowledgeable and ignorant speakers, in adults and children 
To look at the effect of speaker ignorance on implicature derivation in children 
and adults, a mixed-effects logistic regression model was fitted, examining only the 
weak/strong control and strong/weak critical conditions – these two conditions are 
most similar in terms of correct response (rejecting the visible picture). There is little 
variance in the other two control conditions due to ceiling effects, and high 
multicollinearity in models fitted with all conditions.  
A model with speaker knowledge, condition, scale and age group as fixed effects 
and their interaction, and subject (by condition) and item (by condition) random 
slopes was fitted with sum coding for fixed effects and the bobyqa optimizer in R with 
the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015; R Core Team, 2016), following suggested best 
practice (Barr et al., 2013). There is no main effect of speaker knowledge (β = .04, 
p = .86) – which is not unexpected, given that this is across both age groups, where the 
effect of ignorance appears to be opposite for these two conditions. There is a main 
effect of condition, such that the critical condition is significantly lower than the 
grand mean (β = -1.86, p < .001); a main effect of age group, such that adults are 
significantly higher than the grand mean (β = .95, p < .001); and a main effect of scale, 
such that ad hocs are significantly above the grand mean (β = .84, p < .001). In 
addition, there is a significant interaction between speaker knowledge and age group, 
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such that the adult knowledgeable speaker group are overall higher than the grand 
mean (β = .66, p = .01); an interaction between condition and age group, such that the 
critical condition for adults is significantly lower than the grand mean (β = -0.62, 
p < .001); and an interaction between age group and scale, such that adults with ad 
hocs are significantly below the grand mean (β = -0.93, p < .001). There are no three- 
or four-way interactions. That is, the analysis confirms what can be seen in Figure 5.3 
that adults are performing poorly on ad hocs in the critical condition, compared to 
scalars, and children poorly overall (for weak/strong and strong/weak conditions) for 
scalars. 
 Estimate SE z p 
Intercept 1.71 .38 4.52 < .001 
Knowledgeable speaker .04 .24 .18 .86 
Critical condition -1.86 .30 -6.13 .00 
Adult age group .95 .25 3.78 < .001 
Ad hoc scale .84 .24 3.51 < .001 
Knowledgeable speaker: critical -0.16 .18 -0.92 .36 
Knowledgeable speaker: adults .66 .24 2.70 .01 
Critical: adults -0.22 .19 -1.18 .24 
Knowledgeable speaker: ad hoc scale .02 .14 .15 .88 
Critical: ad hoc scale -0.62 .18 -3.54 < .001 
Adult age group: ad hoc scale -0.93 .15 -6.13 < .001 
Knowledgeable speaker: Critical: adults -0.11 .18 -0.59 .55 
Knowledgeable speaker: Critical: ad hoc -0.09 .14 -0.63 .53 
Knowledgeable speaker: adults: ad hoc .05 .14 .36 .72 
Critical: adults: ad hoc .01 .15 .07 .95 
Knowledgeable speaker: critical: adults: 
ad hoc 
-0.07 .14 -0.51 .61 
Table 5.6 Response ~ Ignorant * Condition * scale * age group + (1 + Condition | ID) + (1 + Condition | 
Item)  
data: child and adult, weak/strong critical and strong/weak control conditions 
Glmer, family = binomial, optimizer = bobyqa, sum coding 
When the same model is fitted with treatment coding, with knowledgeable 
speaker, critical condition, ad hoc inference, and adults age group as the baseline, 
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there is a significant interaction between speaker knowledge and age group, such that, 
for the critical condition with ad hocs, the difference of ignorant speaker minus 
knowledgeable speaker between children and adults is greater for children than adults 
– as can be seen from Figure 5.3, the pattern is in fact opposite (β = 2.13, p = .03). 
There is also an interaction of condition and inference, such that for adults and 
knowledgeable speaker group, the difference of control minus critical condition is 
smaller for scalars than for ad hocs (β = -3.07, p = .001); and interaction between age 
group and inference, such that for knowledgeable speaker group in the critical 
condition, the difference of children minus adult group is more negative for scalars 
than ad hocs (β = -3.77, p < .001).  
 Estimate SE z   p 
Intercept (Knowledgeable 
speaker/critical/ad hoc/adult) 
.22 .37 .59 .55 
Ignorant speaker -0.69 .38 -1.80 .07 
Control condition 6.23 1.10 5.65 < .001 
Child age group -0.66 .71 -0.93 .35 
Scalar inference 1.58 .48 3.32 .001 
Ignorant speaker: control -1.70 .96 -1.77 .08 
Ignorant speaker: child 2.13 .98 2.17 .03 
Control: children -1.56 1.42 -1.10 .27 
Ignorant speaker: scalar -0.33 .43 -0.77 .44 
Control: scalar -3.07 .93 -3.30 .001 
Child age group: scalar -3.77 .94 -4.00 < .001 
Ignorant speaker: control: children 1.41 1.94 .73 .47 
Ignorant speaker: control: scalar 1.25 1.03 1.22 .22 
Ignorant speaker: child: scalar .15 1.18 .13 .90 
Control: child: scalar .48 1.74 .28 .78 
Ignorant speaker: control: child: 
scalar 
-1.11 2.20 -0.51 .61 
Table 5.7 Response ~ Ignorant * condition * scale * age group + (1 + Condition | Item) + (1 + Condition | 
ID) 
data: child and adult, weak/strong critical and strong/weak control conditions 
Glmer, family = binomial, optimizer = bobyqa, dummy (treatment) coding 
5.5.2.2 Autism Spectrum Quotient scores and implicature rates 
I consider the responses in the critical (weak/strong) condition only. This is the 
condition for which a relationship is expected, as it requires a pragmatic inference, 
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and furthermore the rate of correct choices in the other, control conditions is mostly 
approaching ceiling, obscuring any relationship. On visual inspection, there appears to 
be a very small difference between the knowledgeable and ignorance conditions: a 
positive relationship in the knowledgeable condition, and no relationship or a negative 
one in the ignorance condition. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 AQ score by critical (weak/strong) response and speaker knowledge 
Neither of these relationships is statistically significant, however: for the ignorant 
group, z = -0.55, p = .58, τ = -0.049 (Kendall’s τ, two-tailed, using R Stats Package 
cor.test). For the knowledgeable group, z = 1.867, p = .0619, τ = .172. When this 
correlation is bootstrapped to get the 95% confidence intervals, the intervals cross 0 (-
0.003, .352, Normal), indicating that the direction of the relationship that was tending 
towards significance in the sample may not be the same in the population.  
5.5.3 Discussion 
5.5.3.1 Findings 
The prediction was for an interaction between the critical and control conditions 
between the knowledgeable speaker and ignorant speaker group, such that the drop in 
implicature rates in the critical condition from knowledgeable to ignorant speaker 
groups would be greater than in the other conditions. Comparing the weak/strong 
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critical and strong/weak control conditions, I found a main effect of age group and 
condition: adults choose the target picture more often than children, indicating a 
developmental trend, and fewer implicatures are derived in the critical condition than 
correct semantic interpretations in the control conditions. The interaction between 
age group and speaker epistemic state indicates that for adults there are more correct 
responses when the speaker is knowledgeable across both conditions together. In the 
critical condition, children and adults display opposite patterns: while adults make 
more inferences when the speaker is knowledgeable, children make more inferences 
when the speaker is ignorant. For children, it looks as if the critical and control 
(weak/strong, strong/weak) conditions pattern together numerically, and the other 
two control conditions (strong/strong, weak/weak) also pattern together, with lower 
rates of correct choice in the knowledgeable speaker group in the first pair, and higher 
rates in the second pair.  
5.5.3.2 Epistemic state and implicatures in adults  
There was a main effect of ignorance for adults: across all conditions, there were 
fewer correct choices in the ignorant group. This is unexpected, given that there is 
nothing in the experimental context that is meant to indicate that the speaker is 
violating the maxim of quality, as well as being only partially knowledgeable and 
therefore not maximally informative.  
One possible explanation might be that in this experimental context at least 
some speakers are applying a meta-strategy as a response to the speaker’s ignorance: 
choosing the opposite of the semantically or pragmatically (in normal circumstances) 
correct option, across all conditions. This could be a result of the nature of the task 
encouraging participants to engage in higher level reasoning, possibly on account of 
its game-like setting or the fact that the participants are in effect observers or 
eavesdroppers rather than interlocutors. However, when we look at the subset of 
participants who score 100% in the strong/strong and weak/weak control conditions 
(N = 63 in the knowledgeable speaker group; N = 53 in the ignorant speaker group, for 
adults only), the same pattern is seen – a main effect of condition, but no effect of 
speaker epistemic state. There is no difference in the drop from the strong/weak 
control condition to the weak/strong critical between the knowledgeable and ignorant 
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speaker groups (98% to 66% and 87% to 53% respectively – Figure 5.5). That is, even 
for those who are correctly accepting the visible picture in the two control conditions 
where the picture is a semantic match of the utterance (and therefore who are 
assuming that what the speaker says must be true), there is still an overall effect of the 
speaker’s epistemic state on utterance interpretation in the other two conditions, 
rather than just an effect on implicature derivation. This suggests that this is not the 
only explanation for the findings.  
 
Figure 5.5 Mean correct response for those at ceiling in control conditions (weak/weak, strong/strong) 
Another possibility might be that the nature of the task means that hearers have 
diverging understandings of the goal. Remember that they were asked to pick the 
picture that showed what actually happened at the party. It is possible that some 
participants are trying to choose the picture that reflects the real world, based on the 
speaker’s utterance, and others are trying to choose the picture that reflects the 
speaker’s world. This could lead to different behaviour in some conditions. For 
example, in the critical condition, participants might reject the visible picture 
(showing all of the friends with balloons) on an enriched interpretation for either the 
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actual world or for the speaker’s world; alternatively, they may accept it for the actual 
world on the reasoning that for all the friends the speaker saw, each had the 
characteristic in the utterance, but in the actual world there are more friends who did 
not. This difference in domain restriction applies too for the strong/strong control 
condition.  
The larger issue here is that it is uncertain what Mr Watson, the speaker, has 
seen. In this respect, this study is like Bergen and Grodner’s (2012) study, where the 
extent of the speaker’s knowledge or ignorance is left vague (e.g. ‘she skimmed the 
report’). However, it is unlike Goodman and Stuhlmüller’s (2013) betting design, or 
Breheny, Ferguson and Katsos’ (2013) eye-tracking study, where it is clear to the 
hearer what the speaker does and does not know. It could be that while imprecise 
information about the speaker’s epistemic state is sufficient to suspend implicatures in 
a self-paced reading task, it is not in a picture-selection task. In the latter, by its very 
nature, a precise interpretation is required. This could lead participants to switch to 
some higher-level strategy that affects both the critical and control conditions, or to 
be more uncertain about their choice. Furthermore, what is required here is more than 
level 1 perspective-taking: it is not the case that the participants have to understand 
that the speaker cannot see and know about something that they can. Instead, the 
participant has to imagine that the participant might have seen something different 
from what is presented in the visible picture. This might be an additional challenge for 
adults, and certainly for children.  
5.5.3.3 Epistemic state and implicatures in children 
Children do not show such a clear pattern as adults, but if anything, they tend 
towards choosing the correct picture more in the weak/strong critical and 
strong/weak control conditions when the speaker is ignorant, and in the strong/strong 
and weak/weak conditions when the speaker is knowledgeable. In fact, this means 
that when the speaker is ignorant, they have a preference for choosing the covered 
picture. This could be the result of a heuristic such as: if the speaker’s knowledge is 
not certain, choose the uncertain picture. That is, like the adults, they may be sensitive 
to the speaker’s knowledge state, but applying an interpretation strategy in all 
conditions, whether they could trigger a quantity implicature or not. Task factors as 
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discussed for adults above could be contributing to this response. In addition, as 
already mentioned, in this study, the role of the participant is a third-party observer, 
rather than active interlocutor. While the ability to learn through observing or 
overhearing has already developed by this age, in production studies, children’s 
performance becomes much more adult-like if the task is interactive and with a clear 
communicative goal (Grigoroglou & Papafragou, 2016). This means that the Nosy 
Neighbour kind of task could have been particularly challenging for them.  
5.5.3.4 Rates of ad hoc and scalar implicatures  
For both adults and children, the rate of ad hoc implicature is surprisingly low, 
across both ignorant and knowledgeable speaker conditions, given that there is good 
evidence that children are able to make ad hoc inferences from 3 years (as seen in 
Chapter 2), and adults are also expected to be at rates approaching ceiling. Note, 
though, that Bott and Chemla (2016) also find low rates (below 50%) in adults with 
the same experimental paradigm.  
One explanation might have to do with the perceived QUD and domain 
restriction. It may be that the discourse context did not bias the participant to expect 
an exhaustive answer – in other words, the implied QUD was not, for example, ‘what 
were all the things on the rug?’, but instead, ‘what were some things on the rug?’. This 
could particularly be the case for items where the ‘container’ (e.g. ‘on the table’, ‘on 
the rug’, ‘by the door’) is not very distinct or salient.  Again, note that here the design 
is different from that of Breheny, Ferguson and Katsos (2013), where there is a clear 
container that is an appropriate size for the objects placed in it, creating a clear 
domain for quantification. 
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1 What did the friends wear? All of the friends wore a party hat.  
2 What did the friends do? All of the friends blew bubbles.  
3 What did the friends eat? All of the friends ate a sandwich.  
4 What did the friends bring? All of the friends brought a present.  
5 How did the friends get there?  Some of the friends came on a bicycle.  
6 What did the friends drink? Some of the friends drank lemonade.  
7 What did the friends eat for pudding? Some of the friends ate an icecream.  
8 What did the friends get? Some of the friends got a balloon.  
9 What was on the table? There was a basket of apples and a book.  
10 What was on the windowsill? There was a plant and a plate of snacks.  
11 What was by the door? There was an umbrella and a chair.  
12 What was on the rug? There was a bowl of strawberries and a jelly.  
13 What was on the plate? There were bananas.  
14 What was on the bench? There was a ball.  
15 What was on the stool? There was a jug of juice.  
16 What was on the window? There were triangles.  
 
A second possible explanation has to do with task factors. The covered-box task 
was chosen as one that had been used successfully with children, and in designs where 
some uncertainty about the speaker’s epistemic state was required (Bill et al., 2014; 
Schwarz et al., 2015). However, it has more potential layers of complexity than a 
typical binary-choice picture-selection task. As one picture is always covered, there is 
Figure 5.6 Proportion correct responses by item, condition, and age group for scalars (left) and ad hocs (right) 
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an added element of risk for participants: they need to cross a threshold of confidence 
that the visible picture is not the intended one in order to choose the covered one. 
Potentially for adults, the more conventionalised nature of scalar implicatures means 
that they can draw on their linguistic experience of the intended use of ‘some’ in these 
kinds of contexts, and this might lead them to be more confident about the scalar than 
ad hoc implicatures. Children perform poorly for scalar implicatures as well, 
potentially because of their lack of linguistic experience giving them such a priori 
expectations, or because the explicit question did not highlight quantity. Even in the 
control condition, there is a bimodal distribution of children’s responses for scalars 
(Figure 5.7). In Bill, Romoli, Schwarz and Crain’s study (Bill et al., 2014), 4–5-year-
olds also rejected the visible picture only around 20% of the time in the critical scalar 
condition, although at a slightly younger age.  
5.5.3.5 Implicature rates and social skills 
There was no evidence for a relationship between implicature rates and social 
aptitude as measured by the Autism Spectrum Quotient. This could be simply due to 
Figure 5.7 Histograms of correct picture selection for adults (left) and children (right) 
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the issues with the task that I discussed above, or the task design that means that each 
participant sees only 4 critical trials, which is not very suitable for looking at these 
sorts of correlations. It does, however, accord with Antoniou, Cummins and Katsos’ 
(2016) study in which no relationship was found between the ASQ and rates of 
rejection of under-informative utterances, once age, gender, IQ and verbal abilities 
had been controlled for.  
5.5.4 Summary 
The positive contribution of this study is its indication that children as well as 
adults are sensitive to a speaker’s epistemic state in communication, as measured by 
an offline picture-selection (covered-box) task. However, the results suggested that 
this task was measuring responses to different implied QUDs (in the case of adults), 
and that uncertain speaker epistemic state was associated with the ‘uncertain’ choice 
of the covered picture (in the case of children). The task could therefore be improved 
upon by: reducing uncertainty about the degree of the speaker’s ignorance; removing 
ambiguity in the interpretation of the task and its instructions; and increasing 
interactivity and making the participant part of the dialogue with a clear 
communicative goal. These are addressed in the next study.  
5.6 Experiment 4: director task – ad hocs and speaker epistemic state 
5.6.1 Method 
5.6.1.1 Design 
The task combined the director-task paradigm (described above) and a picture-
matching task testing ad hoc implicatures (e.g. Horowitz & Frank, 2015). Horowitz 
and Frank’s task is not unlike that used in Experiment 1A here, except that the 
pictures contain more than one of each object: in their task, children have to pick the 
book cover that the speaker is referring to, and a book cover might display, for 
example, 4 cats, or 2 cats and 2 birds. The utterance is of the form, ‘there are cats’ – so 
there is the possibility of an ad hoc inference, for example there are only cats. 
Similarly, in this task, children played a game with a puppet that involved following 
his instructions to collect picture cards from an array of four picture cards.  
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Both experimental paradigms have been used successfully with 5–6-year-old 
children. With the director task, Nadig and Sedivy (2002) and Nilsen and Graham 
(2009) found evidence that children take into account the speaker’s perspective in 
reference resolution (also San Juan, Morra, Gibbard, Khu, & Graham, 2017); for the 
implicature picture-matching task, Horowitz and Frank (2015) found high levels of ad 
hoc implicature understanding in 4- to 5-year-olds. Together with the evidence for the 
early development of level 1 perspective-taking reviewed above, this meant that 
children in the present study were expected to succeed in a condition that tests 
straightforward ad hoc inferences, and in a condition that tests perspective-taking; 
what the task had the potential to isolate was the ability to combine the two in a 
critical condition with implicatures plus perspective-taking.  
In addition, the director task provides multiple cues to the speaker’s perspective: 
what is in common ground and privileged ground is visually available to the 
participant; the difference in perspective between the speaker and hearer is physically 
manifest and salient in the experimental set-up (e.g. Nadig & Sedivy, 2002); and the 
speaker gives verbal cues to their ignorance (e.g. Matthews et al., 2006). The design 
does involve attributing an epistemic state to a puppet, but other studies using 
puppets suggest that there is no reason to think that this renders the task a less valid 
measure than if the speaker were a real human interlocutor (e.g. Diesendruck & 
Markson, 2001; Hochstein et al., 2016; Siegal et al., 2010).  
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Conditions Utterance Target 
Common ground unambiguous Pick the card with apples Card with apples 
Common ground ad hoc 
implicature 
Pick the card with bananas Card with only bananas 
Privileged ground ambiguous Pick the card with oranges Card with oranges in 
common ground 
Privileged ground ad hoc 
implicature 
Pick the card with pears Card with bananas and 
pears 
Table 5.8 Utterance and target card for each condition 
The experiment had a 4 × 2 design: the same task with four within-subject 
conditions was given to two age groups, children and adults. The four conditions were 
common ground unambiguous, common ground ad hoc, privileged ground ad hoc, 
and privileged ground ambiguous. In the common ground unambiguous condition, 
only one card, visible to both the puppet and participant, matched the description. 
Figure 5.9 Example display: common ground 
unambiguous, common ground ad hoc 
implicature and privileged ground ad hoc 
implicature conditions 
Figure 5.8 Example display: privileged ground 
ambiguous condition 
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This condition acted as a check of engagement in the game, and as a filler. In the 
common ground ad hoc implicature condition, two cards, both visible to both the 
puppet and participant, were semantic matches for the utterance (the card with only 
Xs, and the cards with Xs and Ys), but only one matched an exhaustive interpretation 
(the card with only Xs); this condition checked children’s ability to make ad hoc 
inferences when the speaker’s epistemic state is not at stake. In the privileged ground 
semantic condition, two cards were matches for the utterance (both cards with Xs), 
but one was in common ground and the other in privileged ground; this condition was 
designed to check children’s perspective-taking in this paradigm. Finally, in the 
privileged ground ad hoc implicature condition, one matching card (the card with Xs 
and Ys) was in common ground while another (the card with only Xs) was in 
privileged ground; this tested children’s ability to suspend the quantity implicature 
and pick the card in common ground. Importantly, from the puppet’s point of view 
‘Pick the card with Xs’ was the most informative way of describing the card with Xs 
and Ys given what he could see – it uniquely identified the target card. In each 
condition, the remaining two cards in the display were distractors (or remaining three, 
in the case of common ground unambiguous).  
Children were also given the Sally-Anne Change of Location task to measure 
Theory of Mind reasoning about false beliefs (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).  
5.6.1.2 Participants 
33 children were recruited from two local primary schools in Cambridge, UK, 
aged 5;3–6;4 (N = 16 girls) where parents gave consent for them to participate 
(through an opt-out or opt-in approach, as dictated by the school, following approval 
from the Psychology Research Ethics Committee). A further 5 children were excluded 
due to experimenter error (N = 2), little knowledge of English (N = 1) or not 
cooperating (N = 2). Children were all fluent in English. 16 of those recruited were 
known to be monolinguals; 3 were known to be bilingual. For the remaining 14 
children, background information including language use was missing (as parents 
provided consent, via not opting out, but not background questionnaires) – but they 
are still included in the analysis.  
Adults (N = 36) were recruited via Prolific Academic, an online recruitment 
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platform for research, and were paid £0.60 for completing the task (£6/hour). They 
declared English as their first language, and had been born in and currently lived in 
UK.  
5.6.1.3 Materials 
The array of picture cards was displayed in a wooden frame, divided into four 
boxes (two by two), that was placed on a table at eye-height for the participants. One 
of the boxes was obscured with a piece of black foam, stuck to the frame on the side 
that the puppet sat. Each box had a clear Perspex card-holder, which picture cards 
could easily be placed into or removed from. To one side of the array, there was a 
cardboard box for placing the collected cards in (Figure 5.10).  
The picture cards themselves were double-sided, with the top half of the card cut 
out in silhouette, as a cue that both the puppet and the participant could see the card. 
The pictures were simple and colourful cartoon illustrations of objects known to 
children, sourced largely from Pixabay, an online database of photographs and 
illustrations released free of copyright under Creative Commons CC0 (Braxmeier & 
Steinberger, 2017), or from an internet search with the ‘labelled for noncommercial 
reuse’ filter checked. They were manipulated using GIMP (GNU Image Manipulation 
Program, Kimball et al., 2016). Each picture card showed 5 items, either 5 of the same 
item (e.g. 5 bananas) or 2 of one item and 3 of another (e.g. 2 bananas and 3 pears). In 
each display, 3 of the cards showed 5 of the same item, and 1 showed two types of 
item. There were 6 sets of 5 picture cards, each with a theme (e.g. fruit, vegetables, 
insects, see Appendix 8.8).  
Figure 5.10 Apparatus for Experiment 4 
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The puppet’s voice was pre-recorded by an adult male with a standard southern 
British English accent, using Audacity (Audacity Team, 1999) and played from a 
computer, using VLC (VideoLAN, 2017).  
In addition, the Sally-Anne task was acted out using puppets, a bucket and a box, 
as in Experiment 1.  
The adult version of the task was conducted online, via Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 
2016). Instead of a puppet, participants saw a cartoon avatar. The cards appeared in 
the same 2 × 2 array as for children, with a white background if they were in common 
ground, and a grey background for privileged ground (indicating that the speaker 
could not see them).  
5.6.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure was based on previous studies that employ the director task with 
children (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Nilsen & Graham, 2009). 
Participants were told that they were going to play a game with a puppet called 
Bob. Bob sat on the other side of the display from the child, and gave them 
instructions. The experimenter operated the puppet and the computer, which played 
the pre-recorded voice of the puppet.  
For the warm-up phase, based on Nilsen and Graham (2009), the puppet 
explained that he wanted to play a guessing game with the child: he could see three of 
the items, but not the fourth. He asked the child to describe it, so that he could guess 
what it was. In the warm-up phase, each card had only one item on, and the warm-up 
items were all different from those used in the test phase. After each trial, the puppet 
guessed (correctly) what the item was and thanked the child. There were three warm-
up trials. The aim of the warm-up was to highlight the difference in perspective 
between the puppet-speaker and participant-hearer. The puppet also explained after 
the first warm-up trial that he would turn around so that he could not see as the 
experimenter put out the new cards each time. Between each trial thereafter, he 
thanked the child and said, ‘now I’m turning around’. This was to ensure that it was 
clear that he could not have seen what was on the privileged card.  
The puppet then explained that they were going to play a different game: in this 
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game, the child had to collect cards and put them in a ‘card box’. He would tell them 
which card to pick. He also explained that each time the child collected four cards, he 
or she would receive a sticker for their sticker chart. This was to motivate the child to 
keep playing the game and to make it a more enjoyable experience. At this point the 
experimenter showed the sticker chart and stickers to the child, but kept the stickers 
out of the way during the trials to avoid distraction.  
The game proceeded one set of cards at a time: the order of the sets stayed the 
same across participants (fruit – farm animals – clothes – vegetables – animals – 
insects). For each set of cards, children saw all four conditions. The order of 
presentation of conditions within each set was counterbalanced across 6 lists (that 
minimised the number of cards the experimenter had to replace), and the position of 
the privileged ground card was also rotated around the display across the sets. Each 
time the child chose a card and put it in the card box, the experimenter would replace 
that card, and change any other cards in the display as the next trial required. There 
were no more than two card changes between each trial, to minimise the gap between 
each trial.  
Before each set, the experimenter asked the child: ‘Which cards can Bob see? And 
which can he not see? Does he know what’s on that card?’. The experimenter 
emphasised the child’s invariably correct response that Bob could not see the 
privileged ground card.  
If the child was uncertain during the game and looked for a clue or reassurance 
from the experimenter about their choice of card, the experimenter remained neutral, 
looking straight at the child rather than the display, and said something like, ‘Pick the 
card Bob wants for the card box’, or ‘Do you want to put it in the card box?’. 
Adults completed an online version of the task. Instead of the warm-up 
production task, they answered questions to check that they had understood the set-
up of the task correctly, particularly which cards they and the interlocutor represented 
by the avatar could and could not see and know about. In addition, they were asked 
only twice which cards the speaker could see, at the beginning and half way through 
the trials. 
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5.6.2 Predictions 
Both adults and children are straightforwardly predicted to:  
• Select the correct picture card in the unambiguous condition – indicating 
successful comprehension of the task 
• Select the pragmatically felicitous card indicating an ad hoc implicature in 
the common ground ad hoc condition – indicating competence with ad hoc 
implicatures where perspective-taking is not at issue 
• Select the common ground card in the privileged ground ambiguous 
condition – indicating perspective-taking where pragmatic inferencing is 
not at issue 
In addition, adults are predicted to select the common ground card in the 
privileged ground ad hoc implicature condition – indicating not deriving an 
implicature, as the epistemic step cannot be taken, taking into account the speaker’s 
perspective.   
There are good reasons – reviewed above – to predict that children will also 
succeed in the privileged ground ad hoc condition. If they do, this would not be 
conclusive evidence of either the one-step or two-step hypothesis, as it could be that 
the age-range in this study is too old to capture development in progress. 
Alternatively, if children do not succeed in the critical condition, but in all other 
conditions, this is good evidence for the two-step hypothesis that children first acquire 
the two skills of pragmatic inferencing and perspective-taking separately, and then 
learn to combine them.  
5.6.3  Results and analysis 
5.6.3.1 Sally-Anne Task  
All children passed the Sally-Anne task, except for one who was therefore 
excluded from the analysis. They also invariably answered the questions about which 
cards the puppet could see and know about correctly.  
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5.6.3.2 Children and adults in director task  
Adults were at ceiling in all conditions except privileged ad hoc; children, on the 
other hand, were at ceiling only in the unambiguous and common ground ad hoc 
conditions.  
 
Figure 5.11 Proportion correct responses by condition and age group 
Error bars show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for between-subject comparison 
As the data was largely bimodally distributed (79% of children and 64% of adults 
scored either 6/6 or 0/6 in the privileged ground ad hoc condition; Hartigan’s D = .23, 
p < .001), participants were coded as ‘passers’ (scoring 5/6 or 6/6) or ‘failers’ 
(otherwise), and χ2 based analyses were conducted.  
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Figure 5.12 Proportion of passers and failers in each condition 
To examine whether children’s performance in the two privileged ground 
conditions was the same, McNemar’s χ2 test was used (for related groups, Table 5.9): 
there were significantly more passers in the privileged ground semantic, than 
privileged ground ad hoc condition (McNemar’s χ2 = 8.5, p = .003). To look at the 
difference between children and adults, Fisher’s exact test was used (Table 5.10 and 
Table 5.11): there was a significant association of age and performance, with more 
adult passers than child passers in the both the privileged ground semantic and 
privileged ground ad hoc implicature conditions (both p < .001).21  
 
                                                 
21 The maximal mixed effects logistic regression model (Barr, et al., 2013) failed to converge 
due to ceiling/floor performances and small random effect sizes (lme4 in R: R Core Team, 
2016; Bates, et al., 2015). A model with condition and age as fixed effects (sum coding), by-
item (list) random slope, and by-subject random intercept, indicated a main effect of age (β = 
1.99, p < .01) – children performed worse than adults – and condition (common ground ad hoc 
β = 1.93, p < .001; privileged ad hoc β = -3.88, p < .001; privileged semantic β = -1.08, p < .001). 
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Passer Failer 
Passer 4 10 
Failer 0 19 
(McNemar’s χ2 = 8.5, p = .003; N = 33) 
Table 5.9 Number of child passers vs failers in privileged ground ad hoc and privileged ground ambiguous 
conditions 
 
Privileged ground ad hoc 
 
  Passer Failer 
Adult 27 9 
Child 4 29 
 (Fisher’s exact test, p < .001) 
Table 5.10 Comparison of number of adult vs child passers in privileged ground ad hoc condition 
 
Privileged ground ambiguous 
 
  Passer Failer 
Adult 36   0 
Child 14   19 
 (Fisher’s exact test, p < .001) 
Table 5.11 Comparison of number of adult vs child passers in privileged ground ambiguous condition 
In other words, there are three groups of children: those that do not seem to take 
into account the speaker’s perspective at all, although they excel with ad hoc 
inferences when all the relevant information is in common ground; those that are able 
to take into account the speaker’s perspective to resolve semantic ambiguity, but are 
not able to not derive an ad hoc inference; and finally those who are adult-like and are 
able to take into account the speaker’s perspective in both semantic and pragmatic 
interpretation. For adults, in contrast, there are only two groups: those that do and 
those that do not take into account the speaker’s perspective in implicature derivation, 
with the latter in the minority in this experimental context.  
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Child#1 Child#2 Child#3 Adult  
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Common ground unambiguous 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Common ground ad hoc 
– ✓ ✓ ✓ Privileged ground ambiguous 
– – ✓ ✓ Privileged ground ad hoc 
19 10 4 
 
= N 
Table 5.12 Numbers of passers in each group 
5.6.4 Discussion 
The results show that children at age 5–6 years have not yet developed an adult-
like ability in combining perspective-taking with ad hoc implicature derivation in this 
kind of task. Adults in this task were able to derive an ad hoc quantity implicature 
when the speaker’s perspective converged with theirs; to take the speaker’s perspective 
into account in resolving a semantic ambiguity; and to take the speaker’s perspective 
into account to not derive an ad hoc implicature, when the speaker’s perspective 
differs from the hearer’s. In contrast, children excelled with ad hoc implicatures when 
the speaker’s perspective was not at issue, like adults; they also were able to make 
explicit judgements about other’s actions involving false beliefs, as they 
overwhelmingly passed the Sally-Anne test. However, more than half of the children 
appeared to fail to take into account the speaker’s perspective to resolve a semantically 
ambiguous utterance, and the vast majority persisted in deriving an ad hoc 
implicature, even when the speaker could not see the picture card associated with the 
implicated meaning. These findings suggest that the ability to integrate knowledge of 
a speaker’s epistemic state with pragmatic inferences develops gradually.  
5.6.4.1 Perspective-taking and implicatures in adults: Gricean reasoning and individual 
differences  
This is the first offline task with ad hoc implicatures with adults to demonstrate 
that adults can engage in full Gricean reasoning; previous studies either used online 
measures (Breheny et al., 2013), or looked at scalar implicatures (Goodman & 
Stuhlmüller, 2013). It therefore lends support to existing evidence that adults are able 
to take into account the speaker’s perspective in their pragmatic inferencing, in this 
case with quantity implicatures. As an offline study, the findings cannot arbitrate in 
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the debate about whether such altercentric perspective-taking is integrated early in 
processing (e.g. Hanna et al., 2003), or only as a late, effortful process (e.g. Epley et al., 
2004), or is based on both perspectives considered simultaneously (Heller et al., 
2016). Nor can these results contribute to answering the question of whether 
utterance interpretation is always fully Gricean – with intention-reading, belief 
tracking, and so on – or whether it can be accomplished with different strategies and 
differing extents of Theory of Mind involvement in different contexts. In this task, 
there are very strong contextual cues that perspective-taking is important for 
understanding the utterance, and so it seems reasonable to assume that even if adults 
use different strategies in different circumstances, they would consult the speaker’s 
perspective in this context. An alternative explanation would be that adults 
extrapolate a rule such as ‘never choose the card on the grey background’ and are 
largely able to follow this (as in control conditions of director ToM tasks, e.g. 
Symeonidou, Dumontheil, Chow, & Breheny, 2016). The current data cannot 
distinguish between these two possible interpretations22. 
Adults are not at ceiling, though, in the critical privileged ground ad hoc 
condition, in contrast to the other three conditions. This is consistent with the 
individual variability observed in pragmatic inferencing tasks with adults (e.g. Franke 
& Degen, 2016) – not all adults are ‘perfect pragmaticians’. In many other studies, 
adults are not at ceiling in implicature inferencing conditions, even when there is no 
explicitly manipulated factor such as epistemic state. This could be perhaps because of 
other demands of the experimental context, even a lack of context and need for 
accommodation (e.g. Antoniou, Cummins, et al., 2016; Guasti et al., 2005; Scrafton & 
Feeney, 2006). In situations where there are additional contextual factors to integrate, 
adults also seem to show differing degrees of integration of these into utterance 
interpretation. For example, Pogue, Kurumada and Tanenhaus (2016) investigated 
                                                 
22 Indeed, this is a potential problem with any version of the director task. However, there are 
at least two pieces of evidence to suggest that adults do not routinely ‘screen out’ the 
privileged object: a) in eye-tracking studies, participants are found to check the privileged 
object when it is a distractor (e.g. Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004), and b) Rubio-
Fernandez (2016) investigated whether director tasks are testing ToM or merely selective 
attention, and in a new adaptation of the task found that ToM was indeed involved.  
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whether listeners are sensitive to a speaker’s under-informative use of prenominal 
adjectives, and found that, while most participants were indeed adapting to the 
speaker’s informativeness, a few-participants (5/32) persisted with a form-based 
generalisation even when the instructions were changed to cue attention to speaker 
differences in ‘clarity’ and ‘naturalness’. Similarly, Dulcinati and Pouscoulous (2016) 
manipulated the speaker’s cooperativeness, and found reduced levels of ad hoc 
implicatures when the speaker is uncooperative, but only at a drop from 90% to 72% 
in the co-operative speaker condition. Most relevantly, the findings from reference 
director tasks have been mixed, as discussed above, at the very least suggesting that 
this can be a challenging task.  
The insights from Hawkins and Goodman (2016) and Heller, Parisien and 
Stevenson (2016), both within a constraint-based view of reference resolution, might 
be able to account for the difference between the two privileged ground conditions in 
adults. Hawkins and Goodman (2016) argue that in the kind of discourse context 
created by a director task experiment, hearers expect speakers to actually be over-
informative, because of the uncertainty created by the privileged ground; the 
‘mistakes’ hearers make in tasks like Keysar, Lin and Barr’s (2003) are due to violations 
of these expectations. In their production and comprehension experiment, Hawkins 
and Goodman found that speakers did indeed use ‘over’-informative referential 
expressions. Heller, Parisien and Stevenson (2016), meanwhile, propose that the 
conflicting results in the literature on reference resolution can be accounted for by a 
single model, in which hearers resolve the reference of the expression by considering 
both common-ground and privileged-ground domains simultaneously, but with 
different weightings, together with expectations about use of referring expressions. 
They do not consider pragmatic expectations of informativeness per se, but it might be 
informally incorporated to model this experiment’s task.  
On their model, for the privileged ground ambiguous condition, as the hearer 
considers only common ground, the utterance ‘oranges’ is a good match for the one 
card with oranges, on either an unenriched ‘at least oranges’ or an exhaustive ‘only 
oranges’ reading. The speaker is also optimally informative in using such a description, 
on either interpretation, as it is the only card with oranges in common ground. 
Secondly, as the hearer considers both common and privileged ground together, 
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‘oranges’ is now an equally good match for either card with oranges, again on either 
the ‘at least’ or ‘only’ readings. But now the speaker would be under-informative, given 
that the utterance is therefore ambiguous. Overall, therefore, the common ground 
card is the best interpretation, as it preserves the speaker’s informativeness – and in 
my experiment, adults are at ceiling in this condition. 
For the privileged ground ad hoc condition, though, the pattern is different. 
Considering only common ground, the utterance ‘pears’ is a match for the card with 
pears and bananas on an ‘at least’ reading – and strictly speaking it is an informative 
description as a unique identifier of the only card with pears, from the speaker’s point 
of view. However, on an exhaustive interpretation, it is not a good match; and, further, 
in this referential-communicative context, the hearer might expect the speaker to be 
more informative, e.g. ‘the card with pears and bananas’. In either case, the speaker 
would be uncooperative. Considering the common and privileged grounds together, 
‘pears’ is a match for either card with pears (and bananas) on an ‘at least’ reading, but 
only a good match for the card with only pears on an exhaustive reading. So, on no 
enrichment, it is ambiguous, and the speaker is under-informative, but, on the 
exhaustive inference, it is not ambiguous and the speaker is optimally informative. 
Therefore, overall, there could be more of a tendency for hearers to consider the card 
in privileged ground in this condition than in the privileged ground ambiguous 
condition, as it fulfills expectations of informativeness of the speaker.  
5.6.4.2 Perspective-taking and implicatures in children: a two-step development  
The findings suggest three groups of children: those who fail to take into account 
the speaker’s perspective in a straightforward case of semantic ambiguity let alone 
pragmatic inference; those who can take the speaker’s perspective in the semantic 
ambiguity condition only, but not in the implicature condition; and a minority who 
are able to take into account the speaker’s perspective in both the semantic and 
pragmatic privileged ground conditions, in an adult-like way. However, children were 
overwhelmingly able to pass the Sally-Anne Theory of Mind test, which arguably 
represents more complex Theory of Mind skills including level 2 perspective-taking. 
They were also able to explicitly state which picture cards the puppet could and could 
not see and know about.  
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Taken as indicating a developmental progression, these findings support the two-
step development hypothesis: first children acquire the ability to reason about others’ 
epistemic states and make pragmatic inferences separately – seen in this study in the 
group of children who are able to derive ad hoc implicatures and reason about 
different perspective and false beliefs, but who do not take into account the speaker’s 
perspective in deriving implicatures. Then, later, they learn to integrate the two skills 
– seen in the small group who take the speaker’s perspective into account to resolve 
semantic ambiguity, and derive an implicature or not as appropriate for the speaker’s 
epistemic state. Anecdotally, some of the children’s comments suggest that this 
interpretation is on the right track. In the critical condition, a few children hesitated 
or expressed doubt as to which picture card they should choose, indicating that they 
were aware of the conflicting cues (linguistic and contextual). Others made comments 
such as ‘Bob has x-ray eyes’ or thought that Bob could see the privileged card, again 
suggesting an attempt to reconcile their interpretation of the utterance with the 
contextual information. These children are aware of both sources of information, but 
not yet able to integrate them in pragmatic processing.  
This two-step account accords with other studies that find that integrating 
relevant contextual information into implicature inferences is challenging for young 
children. For instance, children at this age seem to struggle to track the QUD and 
recognise relevant alternatives when deriving scalar implicatures. Skordos and 
Papafragou (2016) found that when the implicit QUD alternates between quality and 
quantity – when a first statement is rejected because it is false, and a second statement 
is to be rejected because it is under-informative – children perform worse compared 
with when the QUD is consistently a matter of quantity. A similar finding comes from 
Horowitz and Frank (2015): children’s success in scalar implicatures in a picture-
matching task is lower when scalar and ad hoc trials are mixed together than when 
there are only scalar trials. While both implicatures in this study are quantity, it could 
be the subtly changing QUD that is challenging for young children – from an implicit 
‘How many…?’ to ‘What is everything….?’.  
Further, over the course of development from age 5 years to adult, Scrafton & 
Feeney (2006) observe a rise and then fall in the proportion of scalar inference 
responses in a judgement task with little supportive context. While the authors 
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suggest an explanation in terms of dual processes, this pattern can also be simply 
explained in terms of integration of contextual information: the youngest children 
perform poorly as they are still acquiring scalar implicatures (which are acquired later 
than ad hocs); the older children have acquired the ability to derive implicatures but 
do so regardless of the context, which they have not yet learned to integrate into the 
inferencing process; the oldest children and adults take into account the context, 
which in this case does not highlight quantity as a QUD as it consists of ‘out of the 
blue’ statements to judge, and therefore do not derive implicatures more often.  
In Experiment 4, I also found that children struggle even to integrate the 
speaker’s perspective to resolve a semantically ambiguous utterance, in contrast to 
adults. This is more puzzling. This condition was designed as a check that children 
can indeed take the speaker’s perspective, when no pragmatic inference is required, as 
would be expected given the previous findings that children are able to integrate 
speaker perspective in reference resolution (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Nilsen & Graham, 
2009). The findings suggest, however, that even in this case, integrating contextual 
information with linguistic comprehension is challenging, as indicated by the 
inconsistent responses of some children (picking both the common ground and 
privileged picture card across trials). Indeed, not only pragmatic, but also semantic 
and syntactic processing is sensitive to contextual factors, and this may be more fragile 
in children, especially where available visual stimuli conflict with common ground (De 
Cat, 2015; Pomper & Saffran, 2016; Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill, & Logrip, 1999).  
The pattern of children’s performance here fits in well with Papafragou and 
Skordos’ (2016) proposal that across different pragmatic phenomena, the ability to 
integrate linguistic and non-linguistic sources of information develops gradually. The 
children in Experiment 4 are at an age when this integration is only starting to happen 
for ad hoc quantity inferences in a task of this complexity. More work is therefore 
needed to chart this development with increasing age, to confirm this hypothesis. At a 
different level of analysis, a similar theory is that children have difficulties with ‘top-
down’ pragmatic processing, where contextual cues – such as an array of pictures in 
common ground – are used to predict a possible utterance and its meaning (Snedeker, 
2015; Snedeker & Huang, 2016). Instead they tend towards ‘bottom-up’ processing, 
starting with the literal meaning of the sentence, and then deriving the implicated 
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meaning, possibly taking contextual information into account. One piece of evidence 
for this hypothesis comes from Rabagliati and Robertson’s (2017) study on referential 
production, which found that adults but not children pro-actively monitor non-
linguistic ambiguity – noticing two of the same type of object in a visual array before 
knowing the referential expression they are required to produce.  
As Katsos and Wilson (in prep.) suggest, these two theories can easily be 
combined: the top-down route requires early integration of multiple sources of 
information, including non-linguistic sources of information like world knowledge 
stored in long-term memory, and the immediate discourse and visual context in short-
term or working memory. The bottom-up route, on the other hand, can rely on the 
literal meaning of the utterance to cue the search for other relevant pragmatic 
information, although this is likely to be more effortful, and, in the case of children, 
potentially not successful at all. This theory could explain the findings of this study: 
while adults are able to take in the visual array and the speaker’s different perspective, 
and anticipate likely utterances (including the fact that the speaker will not refer to 
the picture card in privileged ground, especially in the non-linguistic ambiguity case of 
the semantic privileged ground condition), children start with the utterance and then 
struggle to integrate the contextual information, including the speaker’s perspective, 
to appropriately infer the intended meaning.  
How does this relate to the constraint-based view presented above? One option 
is that children weight the privileged ground domain more than adults do. Another is 
that they weight speaker informativeness more than adults do, and so choose the 
option for privileged ground ad hoc that renders the speaker maximally informative, 
over considerations of common versus privileged ground. A related idea is that the 
description in the privileged ground ad hoc condition is a preferred match for the 
privileged ground picture – on both an ‘at least’ and an exhaustive reading – and that 
this is weighted by children more than speaker perspective. In contrast, for the 
privileged ground ambiguous condition, weighting the privileged ground domain 
more than adults does not change expectations as much – it makes the utterance 
ambiguous, rather than favouring the privileged ground picture card. And indeed, we 
see a flatter distribution of correct choices for this condition than the privileged 
ground ad hoc one (which is bimodal across children and adults). Pragmatic 
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development, then, involves learning to appropriately weight conflicting cues to 
speaker meaning.  
What might contribute to this shifting weighting of contextual cues? While some 
research has demonstrated a link between children’s Theory of Mind and referential 
communication (Khu et al., unpublished research, cited in Graham et al., 2016), this is 
unlikely to be a contributing factor here, as children overwhelmingly passed the Sally-
Anne test of False Belief reasoning, as expected at this age, and level 1 perspective-
taking is available even earlier. More likely, the task itself might have proved too 
challenging for some children, given their developing Executive Function skills, 
especially inhibition23. The preschool years are a key time of change in Executive 
Function abilities, in terms of both the components and their integration (De Cat, 
2015; Diamond, 2006). Some studies have found a relationship between children’s 
inhibitory control and their perspective-taking in referential communication (Nilsen & 
Graham, 2009), as well as their sensitivity to communicative ambiguity (Gillis & 
Nilsen, 2014; Nilsen & Graham, 2012), although other studies have failed to find this 
association (e.g. Nilsen, Mangal, & MacDonald, 2013). The better the hidden object 
matches the utterance, the more inhibition is required to choose the common ground 
object instead. In Experiment 4, the privileged ground picture in the privileged ground 
ad hoc condition was arguably a better match, so might require more inhibition to 
suppress. The common and privileged ground pictures in the privileged ground 
ambiguous condition are identical – and therefore, semantically, an equal match for 
the utterance – which might be a reason for better performance in this condition, 
although other challenges might also prevent adult-like performance, which I discuss 
below. 
5.6.4.3 Theoretical implications: different pragmatic strategies 
The starting point for this study was the Gricean model, in which Theory of 
Mind, and particularly reasoning about the speaker’s epistemic state, play an 
important role in pragmatic inferencing, which presents a puzzle for development. I 
now take a step back, therefore, and consider what the findings from this study mean 
                                                 
23 Executive Function is typically divided into working memory, cognitive flexibility, and 
inhibitory control.  
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for pragmatic theory.  
In comparison to Experiment 1B, this study was designed more specifically to 
investigate a component of ToM in inferencing, namely perspective-taking. The 
findings therefore have more relevance for the debate on the nature of pragmatic 
inferencing, namely whether speakers are always ‘fully Gricean’, employing their ToM 
for utterance interpretation, or, instead, are able to engage in what are typically 
thought of as pragmatic phenomena without mind-reading. The findings suggest that, 
at the very least in development if not across the lifespan, pragmatic reasoning does 
not always have to involve taking into account another’s epistemic state, as a simple 
psychological instantiation of Grice’s model would imply. As in many other studies 
where there was no difference in perspective between interlocutors, children excelled 
in deriving ad hoc quantity implicatures. But, they could not take into account the 
speaker’s perspective when this was different from their own, despite salient cues – 
suggesting that even in the shared perspective case, they were perhaps simply 
assuming common ground rather than actively taking this into consideration in the 
pragmatic inference.  
This puzzle can be approached in at least three different ways. In the first, it can 
simply be argued that children are still developing in their cognitive capacities, but 
once they do, they surely employ Theory of Mind in their pragmatics. Thus, child data 
is not problematic for pragmatic theory (for typically developed adults); that can be 
kept intact, and a separate model proposed for child pragmatic development. A 
second, related, approach is to distinguish social and visual perspective-taking, in 
communication and in development, again leaving standard pragmatic theory largely 
intact. On a third approach, one can aim for a single unified theory that can account 
for adult and child data, at least on the grounds of parsimony: the child data presented 
in this and other studies then becomes highly problematic for pragmatic theories that 
assume mind-reading. I now discuss these three approaches in more detail. 
1. Developing ToM and pragmatic skills  
One kind of possible solution is put forward by Breheny (2006), whose idea is 
that ‘basic communication’ – which can look very much like more sophisticated 
communication – is actually possible without full ToM, but instead only with joint-
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attention, action concepts and benevolent tendencies that emerge around 9–12 
months of age (Tomasello, 2003). On his ‘minimalist relevance-theoretic’ account, ‘the 
prototype for the concept of communication includes one agent drawing another 
agent’s attention to a situation in a shared situation’ (Breheny, 2006: 96), where 
situation is defined technically as a set of properties, individuals and locations, in the 
spirit of Barwise and Perry (1983). What is useful is the notion that children might be 
merely drawing on their ability to jointly attend in a shared situation and on their 
understanding of goal-directed actions to engage in a kind of ‘basic communication’, 
which adults can nevertheless interpret intentionally. Children then ‘grow out’ of this 
strategy – when they develop ToM, they develop adult-like pragmatic skills. 
However, Breheny’s (2006) argumentation rests on taking scalar implicatures as 
an example of a phenomenon that uncontroversially requires ToM and, drawing on 
earlier studies that found competency with scalars only at 5 years and above, he cites 
this as evidence for ‘basic communication’ before this age. Ad hoc and relevance 
inferences are arguably even surer cases of full pragmatic phenomenon (given more 
recent grammatical approaches to scalar implicatures), but are acquired even younger, 
before children are reliably passing standard False Belief tests – as in Experiment 1A. 
Furthermore, Breheny’s theory as it stands could not account for the two-step 
developmental trajectory seen here: some linking explanation is required for the fact 
that acquiring Theory of Mind enables pragmatic processing whilst this pragmatic 
processing does not immediately draw on all acquired components of Theory of Mind. 
In other words, how can ‘basic communication’ include the capacity for deriving 
implicatures in some situations?  
2. Developing different perspective-taking abilities  
A related but more promising suggestion comes from the observation that – 
counter-intuitive as it may seem – visual perspective-taking is in fact more challenging 
than other seemingly more complex aspects of social cognition. In Experiment 4, and 
to some extent in Experiment 3, visual perspective-taking was taken as a proxy for 
mind-reading abilities. However, Moll and Kadipasaoglu (2013) argue that social 
perspective-taking and visual perspective-taking are distinct, and that the first is 
ontogenetically primary: young infants succeed with perspective-taking when it is 
202 
 
based on common experience – i.e. shared action and shared discourse – but visual 
perspective-taking develops later (aged 2–3 years), and patchily at that. Crucially, 
visual perspective-taking differs in that it relies on static in-the-moment cues to a 
difference in perspective, rather than dynamic, relational ones. They suggest that ‘joint 
attention thus directly paves the way to early forms of social, but not visual, 
perspective-taking’. Similarly, Bishop and Adams (1991) question what is being tested 
in referential communication tasks (where privileged ground is not at stake): in 
children with SLI, their informativeness in such a task did not match their sensitivity 
to listener needs and knowledge in a conversational setting, suggesting task factors 
such as scanning the array are an issue (supported in more recent work by Davies & 
Kreysa, 2017; Rabagliati & Robertson, 2017). 
If visual perspective-taking is additional to or indirectly related to ToM, then one 
might expect that integrating it into pragmatic inferencing is a skill that emerges later 
in development. In other words, if the question of interest is how and when children 
use their ToM abilities in a pragmatic skill, such as implicature derivation, visual 
perspective-taking tasks may not actually be the best place to start. Instead, social 
perspective-taking, where common and privileged ground is established over 
interaction and discourse, would be a better indicator. This insight allows two 
seemingly opposing views and findings to be integrated: language and communication 
can still be fundamentally about intention-reading – being ostensive-inferential – with 
communication development going hand-in-hand with joint attention, intention-
reading and eventually full ToM development. Meanwhile, some cognitive abilities, 
such as visual perspective-taking, present serious challenges when the need to 
integrate them with linguistic processing arises. It also leaves open the possibility that 
a standard approach to pragmatic theory – about speakers’ communicative intentions 
– can apply throughout the lifespan: in effect, development follows the one-step 
hypothesis, with only some edge cases providing exceptions to the trend, such as 
combining inferencing with visual perspective-taking.  
3. Developing pragmatic skills without ToM  
Alternatively, it could be the case that pragmatic communication does not have 
to be so complex, not only in development but also across the lifespan. Kissine (2016) 
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argues that pragmatic processes must be kept separate from pragmatic norms in 
modelling pragmatic competence (see, too, Jary, 2013; Sperber, 1994). The context 
determines the pragmatic norm – which is like a strategy – which in turn determines 
the pragmatic processes involved in interpretation. The norms can be purely 
egocentric, allocentric, or fully Gricean, where allocentric norms require at least 
implicit first-order ToM and enable interpretations that are at odds with the speaker’s 
perspective to be ruled out, while fully Gricean norms involve full ToM. The idea is 
that, while adults can switch between interpretation strategies, children develop these 
strategies consecutively. Crucially, on Kissine’s model, some kinds of implicatures can 
be calculated via the pragmatic processes determined by an allocentric norm, while 
others require full Gricean processing. The first kind only requires expectations of 
relevance in the situation rather than reference to speaker intention. In the following 
example, the utterance itself makes an assumption based on background knowledge 
available (having had breakfast is a good reason for not wanting coffee and croissant) 
which allows the hearer to arrive at the implicated meaning:  
 I have already had breakfast. 
 ⇸ The speaker does not want coffee and croissant. 
 (Kissine, 2016) 
The ad hoc quantity implicatures in the present study could potentially also be 
analysed in a similar way: given the visual context, ‘the card with pears’ is a relevant 
(and in this case informative) way to describe a card with only pears – from the 
speaker’s or hearer’s perspective. In other words, this model challenges the received 
view that an implicature derivation involves taking the Epistemic Step based on the 
Competence Assumption, which makes it easier to explain why taking the Epistemic 
Step could be easier than not taking it – because an implicature can be derived 
without it.  
As it stands, though, Kissine’s model also does not straightforwardly explain a 
two-step development, as implicature interpretation happens only with at least 
allocentric interpretation, which does take the speaker’s perspective into account, so a 
situation where hearers can derive implicatures but not take the speaker’s perspective 
into account in communication would not be predicted. More recently, though, he has 
suggested that some inferences, like scalar implicatures, may be available via 
204 
 
egocentric reasoning strategies, in the context of the pragmatic abilities of people with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (Kissine, 2017). Extrapolating from those comments, it 
thus seems best not to take types of pragmatic phenomena and categorise them by the 
amount of perspective-taking required. Rather, an inference may be available on 
egocentric strategies in one context, but not in another, depending on what contextual 
information is needed – for example just world knowledge, or speaker perspective as 
well. Thus, children might succeed with quantity implicatures where the speaker’s 
perspective is not at stake, but not succeed where it is, while adults may employ 
different strategies context-dependently.  
Note that this suggestion and the previous explanation, about the distinct 
challenges of visual perspective-taking, are not mutually exclusive. It remains an open 
question whether the integration of speaker perspective with pragmatic inferencing is 
inconsistent only in development or across the lifespan. The challenge for models like 
Kissine’s, as well as similar ones such as Andres-Roqueta and Katsos’ (2017), is to flesh 
out which aspects of context trigger which interpretive strategies, how these are 
monitored, and whether there is a default strategy.24  
5.6.4.4 Improvements to the task 
This novel experimental paradigm, which combined the classic reference 
resolution director task with an ad hoc picture-matching task, enabled an assessment 
of perspective-taking in ad hoc implicature derivation. There are a number of ways 
that this task could be improved upon, as well as ways in which it could be extended.  
Firstly, the design copied that of Horowitz and Frank’s (2015) picture-matching 
task, in which the picture cards always displayed the same number of items. For the 
‘only Xs’ card this was, for example, 4 cats, and for the ‘Xs and Ys’ card, 2 cats and 2 
birds. I used 5 items, so that the alternative ‘half’ was slightly less salient. However, a 
potential problem remains: this means that the number of Xs differs between the 
‘pragmatic’ choice card, with 3 cats, and the distractor card with 5 (or vice versa, in 
the privileged ground ad hoc condition in Experiment 4). For those children who are 
not integrating perspective at all, therefore, it could be that they choose the card with 
                                                 
24 These are just examples of more minimal models of communication, without full ToM; there are, of 
course, others, such as Richard Moore’s (e.g. Moore, 2016a, 2016b) or Liz Irvine’s (2017).  
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only Xs because they have derived an ad hoc implicature, or because it is simply more 
visually salient and more cat-ish, for example. This could easily be checked by varying 
the number of items on each card, and making sure that they are matched between 
‘pragmatic’ and distractor choices.  
Secondly, following Nilsen and Graham (2009), there was a warm-up production 
task that was meant to draw attention to the speaker’s different perspective, as the 
puppet asked the participant to describe the card he could not see. However, there is a 
risk that this might suggest to children that the aim of the game is to show the puppet 
what is on the hidden card – even though the puppet announces after the warm-up: 
‘Now let’s play a different game’. Children can struggle to switch between tasks and 
QUDs so there is the possibility that some perseverated with the initial game, and 
therefore were more inclined to choose the privileged picture card as the one the 
puppet wanted. This could have been reinforced by the lack of (negative) feedback to 
card choice: the puppet always responded, ‘Okay, now I’m turning around’. Children 
are able to learn about expectations of informativeness from feedback (Matthews, 
Butcher, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2012; Matthews, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2007), and so 
this could have reinforced the child’s interpretation strategy if interpreted as a positive 
response. Another factor that may have caused the high rate of selection of the 
privileged card in the semantic disambiguation condition is the mixing of trial types: if 
children are unable to integrate speaker perspective in implicature derivation, this 
forces them to choose the privileged picture card in the privileged ground ad hoc 
condition, which, in turn, licenses selection of the privileged card for the semantic 
condition. This would lead us to expect decreasing performance in the privileged 
ground ambiguous condition over the experiment, which, however, is not exactly the 
pattern observed (Figure 5.13). Separating trial types into blocks would be one 
solution, or making sure the privileged ambiguous always precedes the privileged ad 
hoc condition in any block.  
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Figure 5.13 Mean correct response by block (with blocks in order of presentation) for both privileged 
ground conditions, children only 
More generally, I have suggested that this task in particular may carry challenges 
that are not directly related to children’s pragmatic competence. It may be that they 
are aware of the conflicting information, but unable to resolve it: online methods such 
as eye-tracking and reaction-time measures may reveal such patterns of behaviour. For 
instance, one might predict that of those children who fail in the critical privileged 
ground ad hoc condition, those that can do perspective-taking, as shown in the 
privileged ground ambiguous condition, might be slower to react than those who 
cannot, as they try to resolve the conflict. Furthermore, a task that combines social, 
instead of visual, perspective-taking with implicature derivation might be less 
challenging for children, if indeed social precedes visual perspective-taking in some 
senses, as Moll and Kadipasaoglu (2013) argue. For instance, imagine a scenario as in 
Figure 5.14, somewhat akin to the Change of Location task: here the hearer has to not 
derive an exhaustive implicature, choosing the box with only dogs from their 
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perspective, but instead choose the box with dogs and pigs, which, from the speaker’s 
perspective, is the box with only dogs.   
 
Figure 5.14 Example of perspective-taking ad hoc implicature task 
5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I set out to address two questions. Firstly, do children engage in 
perspective-taking in implicature derivation? And secondly, what does this mean for a 
Gricean model of implicature? In two studies, I concentrated on children’s quantity 
implicature understanding.  
The findings confirm that young children are sensitive to a speaker’s epistemic 
state or perspective in communication, as seen in Experiment 3. However, they are not 
always able to integrate this with implicature derivation. While they may look very 
much like adults in straightforward communicative contexts – such as have 
predominated in developmental studies thus far – they are found to be still developing 
in implicature skills when the speaker’s epistemic state must be taken into account. 
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Experiment 4 provided evidence for a two-step development, with implicature 
derivation and reasoning about speaker perspective developing separately, before 
being combined as speaker perspective is taken into account in pragmatic processing. 
I further suggested that this is a result of the difficulty of monitoring contextual cues 
and integrating them with pragmatic processes.  
These findings present a challenge for a Gricean model of implicature in which 
reasoning about the speaker’s epistemic state is integral. I identified two promising 
avenues for solutions to this puzzle. On the one hand, it could be that children can 
actually take into account the speaker’s perspective for implicatures from the outset, 
but only when it is social perspective-taking, rather than visual perspective-taking, 
which presents its own idiosyncratic challenges. On the other hand, it could be that 
children and adults have a variety of strategies open to them to ‘do pragmatics’, not all 
of which involve complex mind-reading. These options are, of course, not mutually 
exclusive, but both require further theoretical development and empirical 
investigation.  
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 Summary of the thesis 
This thesis set out to investigate the development of young children’s 
understanding of implicatures. In particular, it looked at a range of implicature types, 
and the role of other factors in their development, such as structural language 
knowledge and Theory of Mind. It presented a series of studies that used child-friendly 
behavioural measures, all based on a picture-matching task, to examine children’s 
competence. It contributes to the experimental pragmatics literature on children’s 
development, particularly by showing that children’s ability to engage in deriving 
implicatures develops in the preschool years, from age 3, and is associated with their 
structural language knowledge. In addition, though, children’s early competence in 
straightforward communicative situations is paired with ongoing development in 
more complex ones, where sources of contextual information, such as the speaker’s 
epistemic state, have to be integrated into the pragmatic inference. Therefore, at an 
age where children may show adult-like competence with implicatures in some 
situations, they may in fact not attain it in others, depending on the cognitive skills 
required and still to be acquired.  
In Chapter 2, Experiment 1A aimed to address two research questions: what is 
the relationship between different implicature types in development? And, what is the 
nature of WLE? The findings from the novel picture-matching study, which combined 
quantity, relevance and WLE inferences, added to a growing body of evidence that the 
preschool years, age 3–5 years, are a crucial time for learning to understand 
implicatures. 5-year-olds are approaching adult-like competency in all inference types, 
but the youngest of the 2- to 3-year-olds excel only with a potentially related 
inference, WLE. They also showed that word learning exclusion inferences are the first 
to develop, followed by relevance and ad hoc quantity, and finally by scalar inferences. 
The correlation of children’s performance on relevance and scalar implicatures was 
tentatively suggestive of the important role played by sensitivity to relevance and 
elaborative inferences for both implicature types. This was a first study to compare 
WLE inferences with a clearly pragmatic skill like implicatures, but, given children’s 
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high performance in WLE, the potential to answer the second research question was 
limited. In the youngest age-group a correlation between ad hoc and word learning 
inferences could be attributed to a common pragmatic component, as predicted by a 
pragmatic theory of WLE, or to their common exclusion mechanism.  
In Chapter 3, I explored cognitive and environmental factors that might be 
associated with children’s pragmatic development, using standard tests of vocabulary 
and grammar, Theory of Mind, socioeconomic status and number of languages 
spoken, with a subset of the data collected for Experiment 1A. The main finding was 
that structural language knowledge was a key predictor of children’s implicature 
understanding at this young age. Socioeconomic status was also associated through 
correlation with structural language. There was no evidence that growing up bilingual 
or monolingual makes a difference for implicature understanding. There was also no 
evidence for an association with Theory of Mind, and, given that this was so 
surprising, I followed this up with a more direct investigation in Chapter 5.  
In Chapter 4, I turned to manner implicatures, asking whether adults and 
children derive manner inferences, as indicated by pragmatic theories. Given their 
relative neglect in the theoretical and empirical literature, more groundwork was 
required, and the results are more tentative than for quantity and relevance 
implicatures. I set out a working definition of manner implicatures, and spelt out some 
predictions of acquisition, suggesting that on theoretical grounds they might be 
predicted to be the last of the implicatures to emerge in development, while given 
empirical work on comparable skills they might, alternatively, be available relatively 
early. The results of experiments 2A and 2B with 5–7-year-olds suggested that 
children and adults may have similar understanding for clearly contextually-
dependent inferences. However, investigating manner implicatures poses particular 
challenges, as discussed.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, the role of Theory of Mind in implicature inferences was 
addressed more directly, by asking whether children can take into account the 
speaker’s perspective in utterance interpretation. I presented two experiments, both 
with quantity implicatures only. The results of Experiment 3 suggested that children, 
as well as adults, are sensitive to the speaker’s epistemic state, but the design was 
unable to tease apart the contribution for pragmatic inferences in particular. In 
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Experiment 4, I combined an ad hoc picture-matching task with the referential 
communication director task, and found evidence for a two-step development in 
children: first they learn to take a person’s perspective into account outside utterance 
interpretation and for semantic disambiguation, and to derive implicatures; then they 
learn to integrate both skills, of implicature derivation and perspective-taking. This 
indicated that children’s adult-like performance in tasks with a simple context, as 
Experiment 1A, can belie their ongoing development, particularly in learning to 
integrate different sources of relevant information.  
6.2 Implications for developmental pragmatics 
This thesis contributes to the growing body of evidence to suggest that 
implicature understanding develops relatively early as a pragmatic skill, beginning 
from around 3 years. It may emerge before some pragmatic skills like irony (Filippova, 
2014), but alongside others like presupposition (Bill et al., 2014; Pouscoulous, 2013) 
or some metaphors (Pouscoulous, 2014). It may be preceded by related inference-
making abilities that share some components, such as WLE, which involves negation 
of alternatives and which, in Experiment 1A, was found to be associated with ad hoc 
implicatures.  
However, the ability to understand implicatures does not emerge at a single 
point, but is instead ongoing in development throughout childhood, depending, 
firstly, on the type of implicature, and, secondly, on the context. Firstly, the ability to 
derive different types of implicature may be learned at different times. Due to the 
nature of their derivation, relevance, ad hoc and scalar implicatures may be learned to 
some extent sequentially, as seen in Experiment 1A. Furthermore, even once children 
are sensitive to informativeness, relevance and manner, and can engage in pragmatic 
reasoning, particular instances of implicatures may be more or less challenging, 
depending on the linguistic and real-world knowledge that they demand. For instance, 
quantity implicatures might depend on the particular scalar relations between 
quantifiers or real-world sets; relevance implicatures on the linking fact from world-
knowledge in an elaborative inference; or manner implicatures on the linguistic 
knowledge of the unmarked alternative. In this thesis, it was seen, for example, that 
scalar implicatures with ‘some’ seem to be harder than ad hocs or relevance inferences, 
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owing, at least in part, to the challenge of learning quantifiers – remember that 3-year-
olds succeeded with control trials with the stronger alternative ‘all’ only 76% of the 
time in Experiment 1A. Similarly, the results of Experiment 1B indicated that 
structural language knowledge was a main predictor of implicature skill (though, of 
course, the directionality of this association could not be established). And again, in 
Experiments 2A and 2B on manner inferences, those GCIs that depend on particular 
linguistic knowledge of alternatives – causatives – seemed to pattern differently for 
children and adults. 
Secondly, the communicative context may make it more or less challenging for 
children to arrive at the implicated meaning. In Experiment 1A, children performed 
well in comparison to other similar studies, most likely because of the experimental 
context, in which alternatives were provided visually and trials included a context 
question. In Experiment 4, children were sensitive to the speaker’s epistemic state, but 
unable to integrate it in the pragmatic inference – they continued to derive an ad hoc 
implicature even when the speaker was ignorant, unlike adults. This contributes to an 
overall picture in which children may find it challenging to integrate linguistic and 
non-linguistic information in utterance interpretation, as suggested by Papafragou and 
Skordos (2016). Towards the algorithmic level of explanation, this in turn might be 
due to limitations on children’s capacity to predict upcoming utterances and their 
meaning, given a discourse and visual context (Snedeker, 2016).  
In other words, there are many aspects of implicature understanding, which 
develop over time in interdependence and contribute to the gradual progress towards 
adult-like competence: knowledge about communication (including expectations of 
cooperativeness), structural language knowledge, and world knowledge; pragmatic 
reasoning skills, including elaborative inferences and reasoning by exclusion; and 
social cognition, including mindreading and, especially, reasoning about others’ 
beliefs. Once these knowledge and skills are in place, children must also learn to 
integrate them online for utterance interpretation. Our understanding of the way 
these factors work together in adults’ pragmatic understanding is being greatly 
enriched in current research, particularly within a constraint-based approach to 
implicatures (e.g. Degen & Tanenhaus, 2014; Pogue, Kurumada & Tanenhaus, 2016; 
van Tiel, van Miltenburg, Zevakhina & Geurts, 2014); the agenda for developmental 
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pragmatics is to build up such a fine-grained model for children’s changing 
understanding, too.  
6.3 Implications for pragmatic theory 
Three implications for pragmatic theory can be highlighted. Firstly, Chapter 4 
sought to investigate manner implicatures in development, but against a dearth of 
theoretical and empirical research. While they can be categorised theoretically as a 
distinct class to some extent, it proved challenging to find examples that were 
unambiguously manner, rather than quantity as well. This stems from an essential 
property of manner inferences – they are based on the form of the utterance, not the 
content, and so the alternative must have the same semantic content. However, in line 
with the Principle of Contrast, discussed in Chapter 2 in the context of word learning 
(E. V. Clark, 1988), some, like Clark, would argue that true synonymy is never found 
in a linguistic system: there is always some difference in meaning, even if it is in the 
sociolectal information attached to the word, for instance. One exception might be 
alternatives in English such as ‘open’ – ‘cause to open’. However, it was seen that even 
with these there are complex usage patterns in terms of agency, direct causality, and 
animacy (e.g. Song & Wolff, 2005), that go well beyond the simple predictions made 
by neo-Gricean pragmatics (e.g. Franke, 2009; Levinson, 2000). And, needless to say, 
this example is language-specific, so more cross-linguistic cases would need to be 
documented before it can be taken as a robust phenomenon.  
Yet, there were some indications in Experiments 2A and 2B, and from previous 
work (E. Wilson & Katsos, 2016), that adult speakers do sometimes derive manner 
implicatures, particularly from the more qualitative data of justifications or free 
responses: hearers inferred something about the non-stereotypical nature of the act 
described, presumably via the marked form. Perhaps what is needed, therefore, is a 
new category, where informativeness and manner interact – where the form of the 
utterance is an additional, intentional, trigger to the speaker’s meaning, on top of the 
over-informative content. If so, then a further open question is whether the degree of 
markedness contributes not just to recognising a marked form, triggering a manner 
implicature, but also to the inferred meaning. In other words, do speakers use a 
greater discrepancy in markedness – or frequency – between the marked form and its 
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alternative to indicate a more atypical situation? Consider, for instance, the following 
cases:  
a) Bill is meeting a woman this evening.  
⇸ Bill is not meeting his wife. (Via quantity) 
b) Bill is meeting a female adult this evening.  
⇸ ? Bill is not meeting his wife this evening, and it is unusual 
for him to meet up with women.  (Via quantity and manner) 
c) Bill is meeting a female human being this evening.  
d) Bill is meeting a member of the species homo sapiens of female 
gender this evening.25  
On an information-theoretic approach to language, frequency in context and 
informativeness are negatively correlated – such that the lower the frequency in 
context, the more informative. This could be a promising way to conceptualise the 
relationship between quantity and manner, and to test predictions in processing and 
in development (cf. Bannard, Rosner & Matthews, 2017, for an information-theoretic 
approach to children’s production). When compared with the rich understanding of 
quantity, and especially scalar, inferences, there is much work still be done on 
manner.   
Secondly, while the focus within developmental – and to some extent, theoretical 
– research has been on single types of implicature, the way that maxims apply together 
and simultaneously must not be neglected. Grice (1989) himself considers cases of 
clashes between maxims, and Levinson (2000) proposes a hierarchy for his three 
heuristics, Q, M and I, to resolve conflicts. However, hearers also understand the 
speaker’s meaning by making assumptions about the maxims in concert. In Chapters 1 
and 2, I argued, following Skordos and Papafragou (2016), that sensitivity to and 
reasoning about relevance is also crucial for quantity implicatures. The finding in 
Experiment 1A that scalars and relevance inferences are correlated in acquisition hints 
                                                 
25 These examples are inspired by those in Cummings (2005: 16). However, my interpretation 
differs from hers, in implicating the maxim of manner and the varying interpretations that 
may arise.  
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at this connection – quantity implicatures cannot be derived in an adult-like way 
without also having acquired the ability to track the QUD and generative relevant 
alternatives. Then, I suggested in Chapter 4 that relevance to the QUD is equally 
important for manner implicatures, and, further, above, that manner may often serve 
to intensify or elaborate a quantity implicature. In other words, a comprehensive 
model of implicature understanding has to account for both distinct instances of 
quantity, manner, or relevance inferences, and also inferences that involve reasoning 
about all three. This, then, has implications for acquisition, as the question becomes: 
how do children learn to identify flouting or exploitation of a combination of maxims, 
and weight expectations of cooperativeness appropriately?  
Thirdly, the Gricean understanding that communication – and implicature 
derivation – inherently involves reasoning about the interlocutor’s intentions and 
beliefs may have to be revised. Although to be taken with some caution, the findings 
of Chapter 5 add to other studies with adults and with atypical populations which 
suggest that some pragmatic reasoning is available without engaging in full reasoning 
about the others’ beliefs, or that both perspectives are considered (e.g. Andrés-
Roqueta & Katsos, 2017; Heller et al., 2016; Kissine et al., 2015). If this is the case, 
then a new and more diverse model would be required, in which heuristics can replace 
the Competence Assumption and Epistemic Step, in some circumstances. It may be 
that more, or different, distinctions within pragmatic competences are required to 
model these findings: for example, between quantity implicatures where reasoning 
about others’ beliefs is vital, and those where heuristics suffice. A constraint-based 
model has the potential to capture these many dimensions to utterance interpretation, 
and the changing weighting of different sources of information over development (e.g. 
Degen & Tanenhaus, 2014; Heller et al., 2016). Again, this is an area where more work 
is needed, especially with social perspective-taking and pragmatic inferences.  
6.4 Implications for the study of developmental pragmatics 
Research on children’s pragmatic development has burgeoned within the 
experimental pragmatics programme over the last two decades. When it comes to 
implicatures, the focus has been predominantly on scalar implicatures (e.g., Katsos, 
2014; Papafragou & Skordos, 2016). This thesis adds to the small but growing 
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collection of studies on relevance and ad hoc implicatures, and breaks new ground for 
investigation of manner implicatures. This broader focus is needed not only to give us 
a more comprehensive picture of children’s development of implicatures, but also 
because the differences and similarities between types of implicature may help us to 
better understand which cognitive skills children have to learn – or, to put it another 
way, what the challenges for acquisition are. This has already proved a fruitful avenue 
in the case of ad hoc and scalar quantity implicatures, where studies comparing them 
have indicated that acquiring quantifiers or generating quantifier alternatives is a 
particular challenge in the case of ‹all, some›, as children find scalars harder than ad 
hocs, all else being equal (Barner et al., 2011; Horowitz & Frank, 2015; Horowitz, 
Schneider, & Frank, under review; Katsos & Bishop, 2011; Katsos & Smith, 2010). 
Examining a range of scalar, ad hoc, relevance and manner implicatures has the 
potential to highlight the role of linguistic, social or world knowledge and of 
components of inferencing, and how children learn to integrate these.  
Similarly, many studies to date have been driven, at least in part, by a ‘how young 
can we go’ research question, and have thus used supportive, child-friendly tasks to 
demonstrate that children younger than previously thought are able to derive 
implicatures. In such tasks, the speaker is co-operative (or there is no reason to think 
otherwise, except for the confounding critical under-informative condition in 
acceptability judgement tasks), and there is little or no contextual information to 
suggest that an implicature is not relevant. Experiment 1A here was in this spirit. 
However, the findings presented in Chapter 5 suggest that children’s adult-like 
competence in these optimal settings do not represent the whole story; instead, 
preschoolers are still very much developing in their ability to derive implicatures 
appropriately, when more information from the context must be taken into account. 
Developmental pragmatics therefore needs a variety of tasks and experimental 
contexts to provide a full picture of children’s development, which is important in 
forming realistic expectations, for example in clinical settings.  
The experiments in this thesis were all versions of a picture-matching task 
(including the covered-box and director tasks). I suggested that this had advantages 
over Acceptability or Truth Value Judgement Tasks, particularly in avoiding 
metalinguistic reasoning and in testing implicature comprehension, rather than just 
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sensitivity to speaker cooperativeness. However, reflecting these methods now, I can 
see that picture-matching tasks also have limitations. In particular, as I suggested in 
Chapter 2, the visual presence of alternatives not only supports an implicature 
inference, but allows for a slightly different contrastive inference, in which the 
alternative is excluded with no reference to informativeness. For instance, reasoning 
could be along the following lines: ‘It’s not the picture with all because the speaker did 
not say ‘all’, so it is the other one’, or ‘the speaker did not say ‘strawberry [and 
orange]’, so it’s the other one’. Another potential problem with picture-matching is the 
introduction of a new challenge: inhibition of the alternative when it is so salient in 
context (and arguably more salient, in the case of quantity). This means that there is 
still a need for developing methods that are capable of testing a variety of inferences in 
young children. One option, used by Miller, Schmitt, Chang and Munn (2005) but not 
widely adopted, is an act-out task, in which children have to follow instructions, such 
as ‘make some faces happy’. Devising and coding such scenarios for relevance and 
manner would be more challenging, but worthwhile. Another avenue, as in 
Experiment 4, is to borrow existing methodological paradigms employed for other 
pragmatic or communicative phenomena in development. For instance, interactive 
tasks where the experimenter and child are jointly engaged in an activity used to 
investigate indirect requests, in typically and atypically developing children, might be 
promising for implicatures as well (e.g. in Kissine et al., 2015; Schulze & Tomasello, 
2015). Finally, the implication of Experiment 1B is that, until we know more about 
what is driving the association of structural language knowledge and implicature 
abilities, structural language should be carefully controlled – in terms of using 
vocabulary and constructions that are known to be well within the grasp of the 
children tested – or children’s language skills should be measured separately.  
6.5 Implications for educational policy 
Looking slightly further afield, the kind of research presented in this thesis may 
eventually have implications for educational policy and practice. In UK, the National 
Curriculum for Key Stages 1 and 2 (primary school, aged 4–10 years), introduced a 
requirement of inference-making as part of literacy. For Key Stage 1, the Curriculum 
states that children should be able to ‘understand both the books they can already 
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read accurately and fluently and those they listen to by making inferences on the basis 
of what is being said and done’ (Department for Education, 2013: 11). Obviously, this 
pertains to reading skills in particular. However, while reading and listening to books 
demands many additional skills, it clearly also has much in common with spoken 
language comprehension, including the typically pragmatic skills of implicature, 
presupposition, irony, and so on, as well as higher level critical inferences and analysis. 
Indeed, pragmatic theory has been applied widely to texts, reading and writing (e.g. B. 
Clark, 2014; and, for children’s literature, Meibauer, 2017). 
As Williams (2014) points out, in the Curriculum there is no break-down of 
different kinds of inference, despite Kispal’s (2008) earlier Department for Children, 
Schools and Families report on reading, which outlines several different types of 
inference. The report draws on a large literature on reading (e.g. Kamil, Pearson, Moje, 
& Afflerbach, 2011), and in particular Graesser, Singer and Trabasso’s (1994) typology, 
but there is no indication that these are based on or influenced by theories within 
linguistics, such as a Gricean approach to pragmatics. The examples of inference put 
forward in the report, however, include not only those made consciously on reflection 
about a text, but also many inferences made online in comprehension, of the sort 
which are typically studied in psycholinguistic and pragmatic approaches to language. 
Examples include anaphora resolution, cohesion inferences, and relevance inferences 
(to use standard pragmatic terminology). Furthermore, some of the factors identified 
as being involved in reading inferences are strikingly similar to those observed as 
playing a role in developmental pragmatics studies: word-level knowledge (including 
vocabulary), shared background knowledge of writer and reader (i.e. common 
ground), and accessibility of background knowledge. Kispal cites Bowyer-Crane and 
Snowling, who found that the children in their study who were less adept at reading 
were ‘in possession of the knowledge… but are unaware of the need to draw on that 
knowledge’ (2005: 199); this could be a parallel of children’s struggle to generate 
relevant alternatives in quantity implicatures (Skordos & Papafragou, 2016), or of the 
relationship between relevance inference skills and general knowledge 
(Anagnostopoulou et al., 2017).  
Kispal then turns to possible practices to improve inferencing skills, although her 
review is focussed on Key Stages 2 and 3 (ages 8–14): the main concepts of overt 
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‘why?’ questioning are unlikely to be able to be extended to younger ages, because of 
ongoing metalinguistic and production development (Lieven, 2006). Studies and 
paradigms from developmental pragmatics and psychology could have a contribution 
to make here. For instance, looking at children’s production, Matthews and colleagues 
(2012) find that feedback involving questions that label alternatives helps children to 
produce informative requests more than general feedback asking for clarification. 
Likewise, providing alternatives in context and highlighting their relevance facilitates 
children’s derivation of quantity implicatures, although it is not yet known whether 
doing so can improve children’s derivation skills longer-term. 
In other words, connecting research on reading inferences with research on 
developmental pragmatics, and using these together as a basis for intervention studies 
could then better inform recommendations for policy and practice in schools. In 
particular, teachers and educators might be helped by clearer typologies of inferences, 
detailing which inferences are likely to develop as part of general communication and 
oracy skills, and which may be more specific to reading in a reflective context. In 
addition, pragmatics could provide theoretical frameworks for approaching 
conversational and reading inferences, for understanding their commonalities and 
differences, or for making predictions about strategies that might aid children’s 
inferencing skills. However, it is an open question whether pragmatic skills like 
implicature require or can be improved by intervention, or whether only higher-level 
inferences are amenable to such strategies. In the meantime, developmental 
pragmatics research, including the present studies, can at least contribute to realistic 
expectations for children’s achievement, including the fact that skills such as 
implicature understanding in more complex situations are still very much developing 
at the point children enter school in UK. Conversely, the rich literature on inferences 
in reading may have insights to offer for developmental pragmatics, too.  
6.6 Research outlook 
The studies presented in this thesis point to questions for future research. I 
highlight some of them here, based on the three strands running through the thesis – 
the relationship of implicatures in development (Chapters 2 and 4), the role of 
structural language knowledge (Chapters 3 and 4), and of Theory of Mind (Chapters 3 
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and 5).  
6.6.1 Implicatures 
As outlined above, many questions remain about manner implicatures in general, 
but there is also the issue of how children learn to understand them. Here, manner 
implicatures were investigated separately from quantity and relevance, due to their 
unique challenges as well as lack of established experimental paradigms and items to 
test them. In future, examining their relationship with quantity and relevance could 
shed light on the common challenges in acquisition, or on the differences. To what 
extent is structural language knowledge, including knowledge of conventional usage, 
required on top of quantity-like inferences? What cues, like degree of markedness or 
prosody, help or challenge children in deriving manner inferences? What kind of 
sources of information in the context, especially speaker-specific characteristics, affect 
manner inferences, and how and when do children learn to integrate these?  
The results of Experiment 1A hinted at a ‘floor’ to some implicature skills, which 
corroborate the findings of other studies that children under 3 years are not able to 
derive simple ad hoc implicatures (Stiller et al., 2015; Yoon et al., 2015). Why is there 
this gap between early WLE inferences and similar word learning inferences, or non-
verbal inferences? Is it the structural language burden, the nature of the inference, or a 
by-product of task challenges? More studies that control and manipulate the 
complexity of the language, the salience of the stimuli, and the demands of the 
experimental task could begin to answer these questions.  
6.6.2 Structural language 
There is mounting evidence for an association between structural language 
knowledge – vocabulary and grammar skills – and implicature understanding, but 
which direction does any causality in this relationship go, and why? And, is any 
contribution of structural language to pragmatic inferencing – at the ‘local’ or the 
‘global’ level – to do with the processing of any given utterance, or with cumulative 
linguistic experience? Establishing, for instance, to what extent familiarity with 
vocabulary and constructions used in the task aids implicature understanding, or 
whether an association persists with non-verbal inferences, could start to address 
these questions. Furthermore, does it make a difference whether this knowledge is 
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receptive or expressive? Remember that for word learning, productive knowledge of 
alternatives is a predictor of an exclusion inference (Grassmann et al., 2015).  
One avenue for addressing these issues could be longitudinal studies, which have 
been scarcely employed in the recent experimental pragmatics programme but have 
long enriched understanding of other aspects of children’s linguistic and cognitive 
development. For instance, Brooks and Meltzoff (2015) are able to find a 
developmental association between different cognitive skills. They find that gaze-
following at 10.5 months predicts mental-state word knowledge at 2.5 years, which in 
turn predicts Theory of Mind skills at 4.5 years, even controlling for general language, 
maternal education and nonsocial attention skills. Such studies offer the potential to 
join the dots between early and late pragmatic abilities, and related or prerequisite 
skills, or reveal discontinuities.  
Another avenue could be cross-linguistic studies. Katsos and colleagues observed 
striking discrepancies as to when children were able to reject an under-informative 
utterance with ‘some’ in their study of the acquisition of quantifiers across 31 
languages (Katsos et al., 2016). They note that linguistic factors such as negative 
concord and partitive markers seem to have some effect in children’s performance 
overall (not just with under-informative ‘some’), and that it is conceivable that other 
features like agreement or the semantic field of the quantifiers could also play a role in 
the variation. Cross-linguistic studies not only of very specific inferences, like scalars 
with ‘some’, but also ad hoc quantity implicatures, for example, might be able to tease 
apart contributions of language knowledge from general cognitive development.  
A related issue is the contribution of formal education. Unfortunately, in 
Experiments 1A and 1B, there were not enough age-matched children at nursery and 
school to perform a comparison. Formal education and the literacy that accompanies 
it can have a significant effect on the rate of children’s word learning (Bloom, 2002). 
Does this change in input also have an effect on children’s pragmatic development – 
either indirectly through structural language knowledge or directly? In Katsos and 
colleagues’ (2016) cross-linguistic study, whether children were in formal schooling 
turned out to be a predictive factor for performance with quantifiers (both semantic 
and pragmatic skills) in exploratory analyses. Similarly, the effect of SES in Experiment 
1B was associated with structural language knowledge, but there has been little 
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previous work on how input differences associated with SES affect pragmatic skills 
such as implicature understanding. Knowing more about these associations could 
have important implications for testing or intervention.  
6.6.3 Theory of Mind 
In Chapter 5, the integration of visual perspective-taking and pragmatic 
inferencing was shown to be challenging for children, and further studies were 
suggested to investigate the generality of this effect with social perspective-taking, 
where common and privileged ground is established through discourse and 
interaction. Experiments 3 and 4 added to a small number of studies that consider the 
effect of speaker epistemic state, informativeness, deception and the QUD for 
children’s understanding (e.g. Pogue et al., 2017; Scrafton, 2009). However, other 
aspects of context which involve reasoning about the speaker have been examined in 
implicature studies with adults, and in word learning studies with children: for 
example, cooperativeness (Dulcinati & Pouscoulous, 2017; Pouscoulous & Dulcinati, 
2017), reliability (Grodner & Sedivy, 2011; Sobel et al., 2012), expertise (Sobel & 
Corriveau, 2010), honesty (Feeney & Bonnefon, 2013), face-threatening contexts 
(Bonnefon, Feeney, & Villejoubert, 2009), and speaker-specific usage patterns 
(Yildirim, Degen, Tanenhaus, & Jaeger, 2016). More studies like this with both age 
groups may lead us to a more nuanced account of pragmatic development, in which 
children and adults differ in their use or weighting of different cues in communication, 
and children become adult-like over many years. For example, is there a difference 
between speaker-specific traits that are particular to the context (for instance, 
deception or politeness) and those that are persistent (perhaps informativeness, or 
features connected to L2 language use)? To what extent is Theory of Mind required for 
tracking these different characteristics, reasoning about them, and integrating them 
into pragmatic inferences? And is this the same for WLE inferences and implicatures? 
The role of Theory of Mind in children’s pragmatic development – as well as in 
inferencing across the life-span – is part of a current live debate. It connects 
implicature and word learning strategies to other pragmatic and cognitive skills, and 
invites further research on children’s development.   
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8 Appendices 
8.1 Stimuli for Experiment 1A 
 
 Context   Critical 
Utterance 
Control 
Utterance 
Critical 
target 
Control 
target 
 Warm up:      
 It was time 
for a snack. 
Bob’s mum asked, 
‘Do you want the 
big apple or the 
little one?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
want the little 
apple.’ 
 little apple big apple 
 Bob was 
drawing a 
picture. 
His dad asked, 
‘What have you 
drawn?’ 
And I said, ‘I’ve 
drawn a teddy 
bear.’ 
 teddy bear flowers 
 Next they 
watched TV. 
His dad asked, ‘Do 
you want to sit on 
the black chair or 
the brown chair?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
want to sit on 
the black 
chair.’ 
 black chair brown 
chair 
 Bob was 
doing some 
baking.  
His dad asked, 
‘What have you 
made?’ 
And I said, ‘I’ve 
baked a cake.’ 
 cake bread 
 This is a story about Bob at home… 
R1 It was 
breakfast 
time. 
Bob's dad asked, 
‘What would you 
like for breakfast?’  
And I said, ‘I'll 
get the milk.’ 
And I said, ‘I’d 
like toast.’ 
cereal toast 
A1 Bob was 
getting 
ready for 
school. 
His mum asked, 
‘What have you 
packed in your 
bag?’ 
And I said, ‘I've 
packed a hat’. 
And I said, ‘I've 
packed a book 
and a hat.’ 
hat book and 
hat 
S1 Bob was 
laying the 
table. 
His dad asked, 
‘What did you do 
with the rows of 
cups?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
filled some of 
the cups with 
juice.’ 
And I said, ‘I 
filled all of the 
cups with 
juice.’ 
some of the 
cups 
all of the 
cups 
A2 Bob came 
out of the 
kitchen. 
His dad asked, 
‘What did you 
take from the 
fridge?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
took a 
strawberry.’ 
And I said, ‘I 
took an orange 
and a 
strawberry.’ 
strawberry orange and 
strawberry 
R2 Bob had a 
new toy. 
His mum asked, 
‘Where do you 
want to use it?’ 
And I said, ‘I’ll 
get my coat.’ 
And I said, ‘I 
want to play 
inside.’ 
outside inside 
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S2 Bob made a 
crash in the 
kitchen 
His dad asked, 
‘What did you do 
with the pile of 
plates?’ 
And I said,’ I 
broke some of 
the plates.’ 
And I said, I 
broke all of the 
plates. 
some all 
 This is a story about Bob at school…  
A3 Bob was 
eating his 
packed 
lunch. 
A friend asked, 
‘What did you put 
in your lunchbox?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
put in a 
sandwich.’ 
And I said, ‘I 
put in a biscuit 
and a 
sandwich.’ 
sandwich biscuit and 
sandwich 
S3 Bob was 
doing some 
building. 
His teacher asked, 
‘What did you 
with the pile of 
blocks?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
used some of 
the blocks.’ 
And I said, ‘I 
used all of the 
blocks.’ 
some all 
R3 Bob was 
making a 
picture. 
His teacher asked, 
‘How would you 
like to make your 
picture?’ 
And I said, ‘I'll 
fetch a brush.’ 
And I said, ‘I'd 
like to use 
pencils.’  
 
paints crayons 
A4 Bob was 
doing some 
drawing. 
His teacher asked, 
‘What have you 
drawn?’ 
And I said, ‘I've 
drawn a 
picture of my 
mum.’ 
And I said, ‘I've 
drawn a 
picture of my 
dad and my 
mum.’ 
mum dad and 
mum 
S4 Bob was 
doing some 
baking 
His teacher asked, 
‘What did you do 
with the 
gingerbread men 
on the tray?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
gave smiley 
faces to some 
of the 
gingerbread 
men.’ 
And I said, ‘I 
gave smiley 
faces to all of 
the 
gingerbread 
men.’ 
some all 
R4 It was time 
for art. 
His teacher asked, 
‘What would you 
like to do in art?’ 
And I said, ‘I'll 
get the glue.’ 
 
And I said, ‘I'd 
like to draw 
with crayons.’ 
collage crayons 
 This is a story about Bob in the garden…  
S5 Bob went to 
see how his 
plant had 
grown. 
His mum asked, 
‘What did you do 
with the flowers 
on your plant?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
picked some of 
the flowers.’ 
And I said, I 
picked all of 
the flowers. 
all some 
R5 There was a 
stream in 
the garden. 
His dad asked, 
‘What do you 
want to do by the 
stream?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
brought a net.’ 
And I said, ‘I 
want to draw 
the stream.’ 
 
drawing fishing 
A5 Bob went to 
the 
vegetable 
patch. 
His mum asked, 
‘What did you 
find?’ 
And I said, ‘I've 
found a 
carrot.’ 
And I said, ‘I've 
found a potato 
and a carrot.’ 
carrot potato and 
carrot 
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R6 There was 
lots to do in 
the garden. 
His mum asked, 
‘What fruit do you 
want to pick?’ 
And I said, ‘I'll 
get a ladder.’ 
And I said, 'I 
want to pick 
strawberries' 
strawberries apples 
S6 Bob 
emptied the 
washing 
machine. 
His mum asked, 
‘What did you do 
with the pile of T-
shirts?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
hung up some 
of the T-shirts.’ 
And I said, ‘I 
hung up all of 
the T-shirts.’ 
all some 
A6 Bob felt a 
bit cold in 
the garden. 
His dad asked, 
‘What have you 
put on to keep 
warm?’ 
And I said, ‘I've 
put on a 
jumper.’ 
 
And I said, ‘I've 
put on a scarf 
and a jumper.’ 
jumper scarf and 
jumper 
 This is a story about Bob in the park… 
R7 It was hot in 
the park. 
Bob's dad asked, 
‘How do you want 
to cool down?’ 
And I said, ‘I've 
got my trunks.’ 
And I said, ‘I 
want a drink.’ 
pool drink 
A7  Bob went 
over to the 
ice cream 
van. 
His dad asked 
‘What did you 
buy?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
got a lolly.’ 
And I said, ‘I 
got a drink and 
a lolly.’ 
 
can and lolly lolly 
S7 Bob was 
enjoying the 
park. 
His dad asked, 
‘What did you do 
to the ducks on 
the pond?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
fed some of 
the ducks.’ 
And I said, ‘I 
fed all of the 
ducks.’ 
all some 
A8 Bob was 
looking in 
the pond. 
His mum asked, 
‘What have you 
seen?’ 
And I said, ‘I've 
seen a frog.’ 
And I said, ‘I've 
seen a fish and 
a frog.’ 
frog fish and 
frog 
R8 They 
wanted to 
have some 
fun. 
Bob's dad asked, 
‘What game shall 
we play?’ 
And I said, ‘I've 
brought a ball.’ 
And I said, 
‘Lets play 
cards.’ 
 
tennis cards 
S8 Bob liked 
collecting 
things from 
the park. 
His mum asked, 
‘What did you do 
with the leaves 
under the tree?’ 
And I said, ‘I 
picked up 
some of the 
leaves.’ 
And I said, ‘I 
picked up all of 
the leaves.’ 
some all 
 This is a story about Bob at the shop. Bob went to a big shop one day and to buy a lot of things. He 
went around the shop and put different things in his basket.  
 Near the 
door… 
 ‘I picked a dax.’ ‘I picked a 
fork.’ 
dax fork 
 He went 
further 
inside and… 
 ‘I chose a wug.’ ‘I chose some 
scissors.’ 
wug scissors 
 Around the 
next 
corner… 
 ‘I got a jop.’ ‘I got an apple.’ jop apple 
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 Bob went 
up the stairs 
and… 
 ‘I got a zev.’ ‘I got a knife.’ zev cutlery 
knife 
 He looked 
on a top 
shelf and… 
 ‘I picked up a 
blicket.’ 
‘I picked up a 
spoon.’ 
blicket spoon 
 He looked 
on the 
bottom 
shelf and… 
 ‘I picked up a 
pimwit.’ 
‘I picked up a 
banana.’ 
pimwit banana 
 He went to 
the back of 
the shop  
 ‘I chose a 
fendle.’ 
‘I chose a pen.’ fendle pen 
 His basket 
was almost 
full but… 
 ‘I got a 
chatten.’ 
‘I got a bucket.’ chatten bucket 
Table 8.1 Items for Experiment 1A 
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Figure 8.1 Pictures of novel items used in Experiment 1A (From top, left to right: a beater, a mangosteen, an 
aspergillum, a gauge, an eccentric rod, a dough mixer, an ackee, a climbing chock) 
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Context picture Control picture Critical picture 
   
   
   
Figure 8.2 Examples of scalar, ad hoc and relevance pictures in Experiment 1A 
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8.2 Alternative analysis for Experiment 1A 
An alternative strategy suggested by Barr et al. (2013) in the face of nonconvergence, is 
to do a separate analysis for each fixed effect with the corresponding random slope. For 
instance, here to test the effect of condition (control vs critical) a model is fitted with all 
fixed effects (condition, type and age group), but only random slopes for condition (item by 
condition, and subject by condition). Repeating this for type and age group as well (see 
Tables 2.6, 2.7, 2.8), the above results are confirmed: there are main effects of condition, of 
the youngest age group, and of scalars, and marginal main effects of ad hoc and relevance 
inferences as well. 
 Estimate SE z p 
Intercept 3.18 .23 13.92 < .001 
Control .66 .16 4.05 < .001 
Ad Hoc .54 .24 2.25 .024 
Relevance -0.25 .23 -1.06 .29 
Scalar -1.42 .22 -6.48 < .001 
2;8–3;11 -1.00 .21 -4.67 < .001 
4;0–4;11 .06 .22 .26 .79 
Table 8.2 Response ~ Condition + Type + Age group + (1 + Critical | Item) + (1 + Critical | Subject) 
Glmer, family = binomial, optimizer = bobyqa, sum coding 
 Estimate   SE z p 
Intercept 3.20 .25 12.61 < .001 
Control .58 .08 7.09  < .001 
Ad Hoc .39 .29 1.37 .17 
Relevance -0.26 .23 -1.16 .25 
Scalar -1.20 .25 -4.82 < .001 
2;8–3;11 -1.16 .26 -4.44 < .001 
4;0–4;11 .03 .24 -0.14 .89 
Table 8.3 Response ~ Condition + Type + Age group + (1 + Age group | Item) + (1 + Subject) 
Glmer, family = binomial, optimizer = bobyqa, sum coding 
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 Estimate SE z p 
Intercept 3.63 .37 9.91 < .001 
Control .59 .08 7.14 < .001 
Ad Hoc 2.25 .93 2.41 .016 
Relevance -0.83 .39 -2.10 .036 
Scalar -2.03 .39 -5.18 < .001 
2;8–3;11 -0.80 .22 3.55 .00038 
4;0–4;11 .01 .21 .06 .96 
Table 8.4 Response ~ Condition + Type + Age group + (1 + Item) + (1 + Type | Subject) 
Glmer, family = binomial, optimizer = bobyqa, sum coding 
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8.3 Background questionnaire for Experiment 1A and 1B  
267 
 
 
 
 
268 
 
269 
 
 
 
 
 
270 
 
 
8.4 Instructions for Theory of Mind tasks  
Sally-Anne task 
I’m going to tell you a story. Listen and watch carefully.  
This is Sally. This is Anne. 
Sally and Anne are playing with their marble.  
Sally puts the marble in the box. Then she goes outside, where she can’t see or hear anything 
that’s going on here. 
Then Anne gets the marble out of the box and puts it in the bucket. Then she takes it out of the 
bucket and out of the room.  
 
Where did Sally put the marble at the beginning?  
Where is the marble now?  
 
Here comes Sally. Sally wants to play with the marble.  
 
Where will she look first for the marble?  
 
Smarties task 
Look what I’ve got here.  
What do you think is in the box?  
Let’s have a look. [open] 
What’s in there? Oh! Pencils!  
Let’s close it up.  
At the beginning, when you first saw the box closed up, what did you think was inside the box?  
What’s really inside the box?  
Next I’m going to show this box to your friend X. What do you think X will think is inside the box?  
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8.5 Picture stimuli for Experiment 2A 
M picture I picture 
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8.6 Picture stimuli for Experiment 2B 
 
M picture I picture 
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8.7 Stimuli for Experiment 3 
Question Utterance – ‘strong’ Utterance – weak Visible picture – 
‘strong’ 
Visible picture – 
‘weak’ 
What was on the rug? There was a bowl of 
strawberries and a jelly. 
There was a bowl of strawberries. 
  
What did the friends drink? All of the friends drank 
lemonade. 
Some of the friends drank 
lemonade. 
  
What was on the window? There were triangles and 
circles. 
There were triangles. 
  
What did the friends eat? All of the friends ate a 
sandwich. 
Some of the friends ate a 
sandwich. 
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What was on the table? There was a basket of 
apples and a book. 
There was a basket of apples. 
  
What did the friends get? All of the friends got a 
balloon. 
Some of the friends got a 
balloon. 
  
What was by the door? There was an umbrella and 
a chair. 
There was an umbrella.  
  
How did the friends get 
there?  
All of the friends came on a 
bicycle. 
Some of the friends came on a 
bicycle. 
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What did the friends wear? All of the friends wore a 
party hat. 
Some of the friends wore a party 
hat. 
  
What was on the bench? There was a ball and a box. There was a ball. 
  
What did the friends bring? All of the friends brought a 
present. 
Some of the friends brought a 
present. 
  
What was on the windowsill? There was a plant and a 
plate of snacks. 
There was a plant. 
  
What did the friends eat for 
pudding? 
All of the friends ate an 
icecream. 
Some of the friends ate an 
icecream. 
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What was on the stool? There was a joy of juice 
and a bag of crisps. 
There was a jug of juice. 
   
What was on the plate? There were bananas and 
grapes. 
There were bananas. 
  
What did the friends do? All of the friends blew 
bubbles. 
Some of the friends blew 
bubbles. 
  
280 
 
8.8 Stimuli for Experiment 4 
Utterance Display  
Pick the card with bananas pears bananas 
 
pears/bananas oranges 
Pick the card with pears pears bananas 
 
pears/bananas apples 
Pick the card with apples pears bananas 
 
pears/bananas apples 
Pick the card with oranges oranges bananas 
 
pears/bananas oranges 
Pick the car with dogs pigs hens 
 
dogs pig/hen 
Pick the card with hens pigs hens 
 
dogs pig/hen 
Pick the card with pigs pigs hens 
 
horses pig/hen 
Pick the card with horses pigs horses 
 
horses pig/hen 
Pick the card with hats hat / shoe jumper 
 
hat shoe 
Pick the card with jumpers hat / shoe jumper 
 
hat shoe 
Pick the card with t-shirts hat / shoe tshirt 
 
tshirt shoe 
Pick the card with shoes hat / shoe tshirt 
 
hat shoe 
Pick the card with tomatoes tomatoes carrots 
 
carrot/potato tomatoes 
Pick the card with cucumbers cucumber carrots 
 
carrot/potato potato 
Pick the card with potatoes cucumber carrots 
 
carrot/potato potato 
Pick the card with carrots tomato carrots 
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carrot/potato potato 
Pick the card with cats rabbit rabbit/cat 
 
cat cow 
Pick the card with cows cow rabbit/cat 
 
cat cow 
Pick the card with rabbits rabbit rabbit/cat 
 
cat duck 
Pick the card with ducks rabbit rabbit/cat 
 
cat duck 
Pick the card with butterflies caterpillars bees 
 
butterfly bee/caterpillar 
Pick the card with bees caterpillars bees 
 
butterfly bee/caterpillar 
Pick the card with spiders caterpillars spider 
 
spider bee/caterpillar 
Pick the card with caterpillars caterpillars bees 
 
spider bee/caterpillar 
 
 
 
